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Health Insurance Reform and Its Effects on the 
Small Employer Market: A Review of H.R. 3626 
P. Anthony Hammond* 
Abstractt 
This paper provides a detailed analysis of H.R. 3626, a bill that is intended to 
improve employers' and employees' access to health care. H.R. 3626 attempts 
to accomplish this through the use of guaranteed availability, community rat-
ing, and generous standard benefits. A migration model is used to analyze the 
impact of H.R. 3626. Using this model, it is shown that while improving the 
availability and affordability of health insurance, its rating restrictions increase 
premiums disproportionately for the majority of small employers. In addition, 
H.R. 3626 increases the number of uninsured small employers. 
Key words and phrases: rating restrictions, community rating, cost contain-
ment, redistributional effects, migration effects 
1 Introduction 
The majority of Americans obtain their health insurance coverage 
through an employer-provided health plan. In spite of this fact, many 
* Anthony Hammond, A.S.A., M.A.A.A., is an associate director and actuary policy at 
the Health Insurance Association of America. His responsibilities include assessing the 
costs and implications of federal and state health care reform proposals. 
Mr. Hammond's address is: Health Association of America, 1025 Connecticut Avenue 
NW, Washington DC 20036-3998, USA. 
Mr. Hammond thanks the editor and the anonymous referees for their numerous 
helpful comments and suggestions. 
tThis paper is a revision of an analysis prepared for the Health Insurance Associ-
ation of America. Given the current debate on national health care reform, I hope to 
provide some insights into the methodologies that may be used to analyze the impact 
of health insurance market reforms and impart an appreciation for the actuarial com-
plexity inherent in these reforms and the consequences of these reforms for insurers, 
employers, and employees. 
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working Americans are still uninsured, especially those who work for 
small employers. 1 One may argue that the main reason why these work-
ers are uninsured may have more to do with economics than insurance. 
Yet there are problems in the small employer health insurance market 
that are exacerbating the problem of the working uninsured. BaSically, 
these are problems of access, affordability, and coverage. 
Several small group reform proposals dealing with these problems 
have been presented to the United States Congress.2 These proposals 
generally promulgate restrictions on health insurance premiums and 
cost containment measures to improve affordability; require insurers 
to issue and guarantee renewal of policies to small employer groups 
in order to improve access (availability) of health insurance; and pro-
vide portability (continuity) of coverage when employers or individuals 
change carriers or jobs or when insurers leave the market. 
In spite of their similarities, however, the various proposals are of-
ten quite different in their specific provisions. One major difference is 
how much premiums are allowed to vary (rating restrictions) and the 
definition of a small employer. The question remains, however, as to 
how effec;tive these proposals are at resolving some or all of the prob-
lems in the small employer market and whether the cost exceeds the 
benefits to small employers, their employees, insurers, and society as 
a whole. 
This paper examines the efficacy of H.R. 3626, The Health Insur-
ance Reform and Cost Control Act of 1991. H.R. 3626 includes all of 
the approaches mentioned above and goes one step further. It estab-
lishes a minimum standard for benefits that must be covered by a small 
employer health insurance plan. H.R. 3626 does not include, however, 
reforms such as health risk adjusters, employer mandates, or individ-
ual health insurance reforms. Discussion of these reforms is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
The ability of H.R. 3626 to improve access, affordability, and cover-
age in the small employer market is analyzed using data from Health 
Insurance Association of America3 (HIAA) member companies and two 
1 A small employer is defined throughout this paper to be an employer that employs 
two to 50 employees. 
2 As of October 1994, the United States Congress has been unable to pass comprehen-
sive health care reform legislation. So the focus of the health care reform debate has 
returned to insurance market reforms such as those proposed just a few years ago for 
small employers. Although these reforms are called incremental by policymakers, they 
will have a considerable impact on insurers, as these reforms represent a significant 
departure from past insurance practices. 
3The Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) is a Washington, D.C.-based 
trade association of the United States' leading commercial insurance carriers. HIAA 
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actuarial models. One model analyzes the impact of rating restrictions 
on a sample of small employers insured by five different commercial 
insurers. The other model (called a migration model) combines the rel-
ative morbidity (net claim cost) of each segment of the changing small 
employer population in order to estimate the change (as a result of H.R. 
3626) in the average premium of all small employers insured by small 
group insurers. 
The insurers chosen for this study represent five insurers with sig-
nificant sales in the commercial, small employer, group health insur-
ance market. The insurers reflect the broad spectrum of underwriting 
practices that are experienced in the market: from carriers with demo-
graphic rating (premiums vary based on age, sex, area, family status) to 
carriers with aggressive underwriting. Further, while an effort is made 
to obtain data from a group of carriers that is representative of the small 
employer group market, it is not possible to determine accurately how 
representative these carriers are. Therefore, the estimates should not 
be considered as industry estimates but as the composite experience 
of five insurers. The results presented in this paper are averages, so it 
always should be kept in mind that specific insurers and employers will 
have results that will be higher or lower than the average. In addition, 
it must be pointed out that small group reforms that already have been 
implemented in several states will limit the impact of implementing 
reforms on a national level. 
I have tried to make this paper as detailed as possible, but the com-
plexity of small employer market reforms contained in H.R. 3626 and 
other proposals have exceeded the available data. In response, I have 
concentrated on those areas that will have the greatest impact on the 
small employer market, highlighting those factors and effects that will 
be of greatest concern to policymakers, small employers, insurers, and 
the small employer population. 
Findings from this actuarial study and their implications are pre-
sented in detail in the next five sections. Section 2 gives an overview 
of the results of this paper. Section 3 describes the redistribution of 
small employer premiums as a result of H.R. 3626 rating restrictions. 
Section 4 details the changes in the insured and uninsured small em-
ployer populations and the effect these population changes will have 
on small employer premiums. The impact on rates of standardized 
benefits is described in Section 5. Section 6 covers the impact of cost 
containment provisions. Section 7 deals with the provisions that can-
represents the majority of the nation's commercial insurance companies. HlAA's ac-
tivities range broadly from education to legislative analysis to collecting and dissemi-
nating data and information. 
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not be quantified; it also gives suggestions for areas of further study. 
Section 8 contains the summary and conclusions. Appendix A contains 
a summary of the basic provisions of H.R. 3626. Appendix B contains a 
summary of the provisions of H.R. 3626 that affect rating. Appendix C 
describes the assumptions of the actuarial model under optimistic, best 
estimate, and pessimistic scenarios; and gives a quantitative evaluation 
(based on my best estimate) of H.R. 3626's impact on small employers. 
2 Overview of the Impact of H.R. 3626 
If enacted, H.R. 3626 will make significant changes to the small em-
ployer (two to 50 employees) market for health insurance.4 In particu-
lar, it will: 
• Guarantee that every small employer will have access to coverage; 
• Guarantee that all employees (working at least 17.5 hours a week 
for a small employer with a health insurance plan) and their de-
pendents will be eligible to participate in the employer-provided 
plan; and 
• Make health insurance more affordable for higher risk small em-
ployers (thereby providing coverage to more high risk uninsureds). 
But it also will 
• Make health insurance less affordable for the majority of small 
employers (more than three-quarters of small employers will re-
ceive rate increases of 10 percent or more; see Table 1). For ex-
ample, Table 1 shows that 19 percent of employees will receive a 
rate increase of more than 35 percent, 13 percent will retain their 
coverage, and 6 percent will choose to drop their coverage; 
• Increase the small employer average premium per employee 8 to 
24 percent, on average, adding an estimated three to nine billion 
dollars to small employer costs.s This increase in the average pre-
mium is in addition to the rate increases most small employers will 
receive as a result of rating restrictions. Some small employers, 
however, will receive decreases in rates; and . 
4This study only addresses the impact of H.R. 3626 on the small employer market, 
but H.R. 3626 also sets forth portability requirements that apply to all group health 
plans. 
SMy best estimate is that premiums will rise 12.3 percent, adding $5.6 billion to 
small employer costs. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Rate Changes for Currently Insured 
Small Employers (two to 25 Employees) and the Per-
centage of Employees Keeping or Dropping Coverage 
Under H.R. 3626 
Percentage Rate Change* Keep Drop Total 
More than 35% 13% 6% 19% 
19% to 35% 23% 3% 26% 
7% to 19% 33% 1% 34% 
-10% to 7% 13% 0% 13% 
Less than -10% 8% 0% 8% 
Source: Health Insurance Association of America. 
*Includes 12.3 percent (best estimate) increase in market average rate. 
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• Increase the total number of uninsureds 2 to 5 percent, adding an 
estimated one to two million persons to the total uninsured.6 This 
occurs in spite of the one to two million uninsureds who rejoin the 
market. These new additions are offset by the one to four million 
(mostly low risk) employers and employees who leave the market. 
In addition, the tendency will be for these new uninsureds to be 
younger, to have lower incomes, and to work for the smallest of 
the small employers. Many will be children. 
The percentage of employers receiving rate increases and the mag-
nitude of those increases are related directly to the degree of rate com-
pression created by rating restrictions. Consequently, the nearly flat 
community rating of H.R. 3626 leads to more and greater rate increases 
for employers than might other, less restrictive proposals. 
Furthermore, these rate increases are in addition to trend increases 
and are a direct result of the combination of the access, rating, and 
benefit provisions of H.R. 3626. (See Table Al in Appendix A for a 
summary of these prOvisions.) H.R. 3626 also will lead to significant 
changes in who will be insured in the small employer market. Some of 
these changes are described briefly below . 
• Rating Restrictions: Under H.R. 3626 rating restrictions, the pre-
mium increase experienced by individual small employers will 
vary widely. Rating restrictions will increase rates significantly 
6My best estimate is that the total number of uninsureds will increase 3.4 percent, 
adding an estimated 1.3 million persons to the total uninsured. 
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for two-thirds of the currently insured small employers and their 
employees. Lower income employers and younger employees will 
be forced to subsidize higher income employers and older em-
ployees. Premiums no longer will reflect expected claims, except 
in the aggregate. 
Rating restrictions also lead to a larger percentage rate increase 
for the smaller small employers than for the larger small employ-
ers. This probably reflects two factors: the greater likelihood of 
the smaller small employers purchasing coverage only if they have 
a lower than average risk (and, therefore, premium) and the im-
pact of insurer underwriting. 
• Changes in the Insured, Small Employer Population: The com-
bined results of the H.R. 3626 rating, access, and benefit provi-
sions will be to make health insurance more affordable and acces-
sible for higher risk groups and less affordable for average and 
lower risk groups. This will lead to adverse selection, Le., persons 
who have higher than average health care costs will tend to pur-
chase insurance and those who have lower than average costs will 
tend not to do so. 
Lower risk employers who don't want to drop their coverage also 
may switch to other forms of coverage that now may be less costly 
(as a result of H.R. 3626) than group insurance. In addition, the 
tight rating bands of H.R. 3626 will result in more adverse selec-
tion than proposals with less severe rating bands. Thus, H.R. 3626 
leads to greater changes in the insured, small employer popula-
tion than other proposals might. Altogether, H.R. 3626 leads to 
an 8 to 24 percent average increase in the average premium for 
small employers and to fewer small employers and their employ-
ees being insured . 
• Standardized Benefits: H.R. 3626 standardizes benefits for small 
employer plans by preempting state mandates and promulgating a 
standard benefit package. The standard benefit package is similar 
to Parts A and B of Medicare, but it also includes certain preventive 
services with first dollar coverage.? 
H.R. 3626 increases the self-employment deduction for health in-
surance and adds four portability provisions that will apply to 
all group health plans, regardless of size, including self-insured 
7 First dollar coverage refers to crwerages with no deductible or coinsurance paid by 
the insured. All charges are fully covered by the insurer. 
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plans. The portability requirements are: (i) an excise tax (25 per-
cent of gross premium for the plan) for failure to provide all of 
these portability benefits; (ii) a prohibition against denying, limit-
ing, or conditioning coverage (or benefits) on health status; (iii) a 
maximum six month preexisting condition limitation (except for 
newborns); and (iv) a continuity of coverage provision that man-
dates credit for prior coverage if no more than a three month break 
in coverage has occurred. 
The combination of these benefits is expected to increase pre-
miums about 4 to 5 percent overall for small employers because 
these benefits, in aggregate, are more generous than the average 
plan of benefits that small employers currently offer . 
• Cost Containment Provisions: H.R. 3626 calls for the establish-
ment of a national health care cost containment commission soon 
after the bill's enactment. It also requires the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to develop optional, maximum payment rates 
for hospitals, physicians, and other health services by October 
1, 1994 and annually thereafter. The rates are to be based on 
DRG (diagnosis-related group) and RBRVS (resource-based rela-
tive value scale) methodologies similar to what Medicare currently 
uses. 
These cost containment provisions are too nebulous to justify any 
estimated reduction in costs at this time. While some studies have 
estimated significant savings from using current Medicare reim-
bursement maximums, it is by no means certain that the payment 
rates eventually approved will be so low. To the extent that the 
optional DRG and RBRVS rates are used uniformly by health care 
payors, including government, however, some reductions in cost 
shifting may occur. 
Thus, although H.R. 3626 will improve the availability of coverage 
for small employers and portability of coverage for all employees, the 
severe rating restrictions in a voluntary market (without mandated uni-
versal coverage) will lead to more persons being uninsured than at 
present. It will force many small employers to pay a high price to make 
coverage more affordable for a few small employers. In short, its costs 
will far exceed its benefits. 
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3 Rating Restrictions 
3.1 The Redistribution of Small Employer Premiums 
Most of the provisions in H.R. 3626 that will have a direct impact 
upon rating are summarized in Appendix B. H.R. 3626 calls for commu-
nity rating of all small employer (two to 50 employees) health insurance 
plans with only a ±25 percent adjustment in rates for age and gender 
if applied consistently to all small employers. 
The redistributional effects (or first order effects as they sometimes 
are called) are the effects of applying the H.R. 3626 rating restrictions 
to premiums for currently insured employers before any changes occur 
in the insured population. That is, before anyone migrates to or from 
(enters or leaves) the small employer market. 
Rating restrictions limit the range of premiums that insurers can 
charge small employers. They redistribute premium rates charged to 
employers about the average (mean) rate, but the mean rate remains 
unchanged. As a result, premiums will increase for some employers 
and decrease for others. 
In the discussion of the redistributional effects of H.R. 3626's rating 
restrictions, the following must be kept in mind: 
1. The insured population is held constant when examining the ef-
fect of H.R. 3626 rating restrictions on currently insured, small 
employer groups; 
2. The redistributional effects do not include the effects of changes 
in the insured and uninsured small employer population. The 
changes in the insured and uninsured small employer population 
are in addition to the redistributional effects described in this 
section; 
3. The aggregate premium generated from all small employer groups 
is assumed to be the same before and after rating restrictions are 
applied. Thus, the average premium is not changed by the effects 
of H.R. 3626. 
4. The change in small employer premium due to redistributional 
effects is the premium the employer pays after rating restrictions 
less the premium it paid before rating restrictions. The after pre-
mium must not include any increases due to the trend increase 
employers will receive at renewal or any other increases resulting 
from H.R. 3626. 
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5. By definition, there is no redistributional effect on the uninsured 
because it is a first order effect, i.e., before migration. 
3.2 Methodology 
The estimates given in this section are derived from an analysis of 
a representative sample of actual small employer group data from five 
different HIAA member companies. Data are collected for similar fee-
for-service, indemnity benefit plans (similar to a $200 deductible, 80 
percent coinsurance plan), a representative mix of employers for each 
insurer, and a representative mix by age/sex, industry, area, size, and 
other small group rating factors for each insurer. 
The data are normalized for each insurer before being run through 
an actuarial model that recalculates the premium each insurer charges 
each of the 3,750 small employers in the sample using the H.R. 3626 
rating restrictions. Geographic factors also are normalized for each in-
surer, but otherwise are unaffected across insurers. The total premium 
for each insurer is not changed, but the premium for each employer 
group is restricted to the H.R. 3626 rating bands such that some em-
ployers receive increases and others receive decreases. 
The insurers chosen for this study represent five insurers with sig-
nificant sales in the commercial, small employer, group health insur-
ance market. This group includes insurers with broad and tight under-
writing practices. While aggregated estimates are provided, there are 
large variations between insurers. This suggests that the effect of rate 
limits will vary greatly from one insurer to another. Further, while an 
effort is made to obtain data from a group of carriers that will be fairly 
representative of the small employer group market, there is no way to 
determine accurately how representative these carriers are. Therefore, 
the estimates should not be considered industry estimates but should 
be considered as the composite experience of five insurers. 
Representative databases of groups with two to nine employees and 
ten to 25 employees are obtained from each of the five insurance com-
panies. The two to nine and ten to 25 data are analyzed separately 
and then combined. The results for groups with two to nine employees 
are in the same direction but more pronounced than the results for the 
combined market (Le., groups with two to 25 employees). Results are 
somewhat less pronounced for groups with ten to 25 employees. 
The database includes employer groups with two to 25 employees 
rather than groups with two to 50 employees (the definition of a small 
employer in H.R. 3626). But comparing the effect ofH.R. 3626 on groups 
with two to nine employees versus its effect on groups with ten to 25 
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employees indicates that H.R. 3626 has relatively less impact on the ten 
to 25 employee groups. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
effect of H.R. 3626 on groups with 26 to 50 employees will be even less. 
Hence, groups with two to 25 can serve effectively as proxies for the two 
to 50 employee groups without significantly affecting the conclusions 
of this study. 
3.3 Impact on Small Employers 
Even though the overall average premium remains unchanged, the 
premium per capita8 for almost every employer group either will in-
crease or decrease as a result of H.R. 3626. Therefore, the distribution 
of rates will change. The change in the distribution of premium rates 
for insured employer groups before rating restrictions, and before mi-
gration and expanded benefits, is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 
1 shows the distribution of premium rates for insured employer groups 
before rating restrictions, and before migration and expanded benefits 
(Le., before H.R. 3626) as a percentage of the mean rate, while Figure 2 
shows the distribution after H.R. 3626 rating restrictions are applied. 
The impact of the H.R. 3626 rating restrictions on individual small 
employer groups is examined by determining the premium increase (or 
decrease) each employer will receive under H.R. 3626's rating restric-
tions. The employers are grouped into five categories based on the level 
of the employer's percentage change from its current premiums. Then 
the subSidy provided by low average age employers to high average 
age employers is examined. Last, the subsidy provided by the smallest 
small employers to larger small employers and the price sensitivity of 
the smallest small employers are examined. 
Rating restrictions will affect each small employer differently. H.R. 
3626 restricts small employer rates to a narrow band, forcing all but a 
handful of employers to receive premium increases or decreases. These 
first order effects on the total premium for each small employer in 
the sample are illustrated in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Table 2, for example, 
shows that 19 percent of employers with two to 25 employees will have 
an increase in premium of more than 20 percent from H.R. 3626 rating 
restrictions alone. For this 19 percent of employers, however, increases 
will range from 21 percent to 238 percent, and the average increase for 
all employers receiving more than a 20 percent increase will be 36.6 
percent. More than two-thirds of all employer groups (68 percent) will 
BThe premium per capita is the total premium for the employer group divided by 
the total number of employees and dependents covered by the employer. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of Premium Rates of Currently Insured Employers 
Before Rating Restrictions, Migration and Expanded Benefits 
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15 
receive premium increases from rating restrictions. Nearly half of all 
employer groups (45 percent) will receive premium increases greater 
than 5 percent. 
Table 2 
Distribution of Rate Changes for Currently Insured 
Small Employers (two to 25 Employees) Under H.R. 
3626 Before Migration and Expanded Benefits 
Percentage Rate Change 
More than 20% 
6% to 20% 
-6% to 6% 
-20% to -6% 
Less than -20% 
% of Employees 
19% 
26% 
34% 
l3% 
8% 
Source: Health Insurance Association of America. 
16 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.1, 1994 
Figure 2 
Distribution of Premium Rates of Currently Insured Employers 
After Rating Restrictions, but Before Migration and Expanded 
Benefits 
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To examine the extent to which low average age employers subsi-
dize high average age employers, increases in premiums for the one-
fifth (the fifth quintile) of employers with the lowest average employee 
age are compared to the increases in premiums for all small employ-
ers. If the percentage of employers receiving a premium increase is 
similar in each premium-increase category, it indicates that little or no 
extra subsidy is demanded from the employers with a younger group 
of employees. The results, howev~r, show that considerably more low 
average age employers will receive premium increases than will all em-
ployers. Compared to the 68 percent of employers receiving premium 
increases among all employers, 82 percent of low average age employ-
ers are expected to receive premium increases. 
Table 3 shows that, in contrast to the 19 percent of employers that 
will receive a premium increase of more than 20 percent, 30 percent 
of low average age employers will receive premium increases of this 
magnitude. Additionally, only 10 percent of low average age employers 
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will receive a significant premium decrease versus 21 percent of all 
employers. 
Table 3 
Distribution of Rate Changes for the Youngest 
Quintile of Small Employers (two to 25 Em-
ployees) Under H.R. 3626 Before Migration 
and Expanded Benefits 
Percentage Rate Change 
More than 20% 
6% to 20% 
-6% to 6% 
-20% to -6% 
Less than -20% 
% of Employees 
30% 
30% 
30% 
7% 
3% 
Source: Health Insurance Association of America. 
While the direction of this result is not surprising, its magnitude is 
significant and indicates the extent to which H.R. 3626 shifts rates from 
the actuarial goal of consistency between premiums and risk assumed 
(Le., premiums no longer reasonably reflect expected claims, except in 
the aggregate). Also, because of the clear relationship between higher 
ages and higher incomes, this has the perverse effect of forCing lower 
income employees to subsidize higher income employees. Thus, the 
redistributional effect of H.R. 3626 is regressive. 
To examine the extent to which the smallest of the small employ-
ers will subsidize larger small employers, increases in premiums for the 
largest size quintile of employers insured by each carrier (generally, em-
ployers with more than 15 employees) are compared to the increases in 
premiums for all small employers. Again, if the percentage of employ-
ers receiving a premium increase is similar in each premium increase 
category, it indicates that little or no extra subSidy exists. The results 
of this model, however, indicate that considerably fewer of the larger 
small employers will receive premium increases when compared to all 
small employers. Compared to the 68 percent of all employers that will 
receive increases (increases ranging up to 238 percent), only 59 percent 
of larger small employers will receive increases (increases ranging only 
as high as 131 percent). 
Table 4 shows that 12 percent of these larger small employers (ver-
sus 19 percent of all employers) will receive a premium increase of more 
than 20 percent. Likewise, in contrast to the overall statistic that 32 per-
cent of small employers will receive a premium decrease, 41 percent of 
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the larger small employers will receive a decrease. That is, larger small 
employers are almost one-third more likely to receive decreases than 
the smallest of the small employers. 
Table 4 
Distribution of Rate Changes for the Largest 
Quintile of Small Employers (two to 25 Em-
ployees) Under H.R. 3626 Before Migration 
and Expanded Benefits 
Percentage Rate Change 
More than 20% 
6% to 20% 
-6% to 6% 
-20% to -6% 
Less than -20% 
% of Employees 
12% 
22% 
42% 
15% 
7% 
Source: Health Insurance Association of America. 
There are several ways that Table 4 can be interpreted. The most 
simplistic way is that the smallest employers pay less because carriers 
underwrite the smallest employers more aggressively and select better 
risks, on average. If this is true, the fifth quintile of small employers 
will have the greatest increases. Upon reviewing the data on the fifth 
quintile of small employers and comparing it to all small employers, 
however, the results are ambiguous. 
Alternatively, Table 4 can be interpreted as an illustration of the 
greater price sensitivity of the smallest of the small employers. Be-
cause the larger small employers have about the same percentage of 
premium decreases as all small employers, those larger small employ-
ers seem as willing as all small employers to pay the increases when 
premiums rise. But a smaller percentage of larger small employers 
receive premium increases than all small employers. As a result, the 
smallest small employers appear to be either less willing or unable to 
purchase coverage unless they have a lower than average risk and, as a 
consequence, receive a lower than average premium. This indicates the 
greater price sensitivity of the smallest small employers. 
It is probably most reasonable to interpret Table 4 as demonstrating 
the combined result of underwriting decisions by carriers and the price 
sensitivity of the smallest small employers. 
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3.4 Impact on Insurers 
All insurers are not affected equally under H.R. 3626. The impact of 
the H.R. 3626 rating restrictions on insurers varies depending on the 
mix of high and low cost insureds that the insurer underwrites. For 
example, in contrast to the 19 percent of employers that will receive a 
premium increase of more than 20 percent, one insurer in the sample 
will have 37 percent of employers with increases that large. 
The rating restrictions in H.R. 3626 break the actuarial link between 
the premiums insurers charge and the risks they assume. Thus, pre-
miums no longer will reflect the expected claims the insurer will incur 
for each class of risk. Solvency and actuarial soundness of rates will be 
affected any time reforms lead to an environment where it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to charge rates that reasonably reflect the expected 
costs the insurer will incur for each class of risk. Therefore, the reforms 
in this bill could place additional financial stress on insurers and could 
lead to their financial insolvency. 
Insurer rate bands will be based on the insurer's own average rate. 
Some insurers will have lower average rates and some will have higher 
average rates. Insurers that, coincidentally or because of underwriting 
before reform, have insured populations with lower than average risk 
can be expected to have a lower average (or community) rate. Other in-
surers could insure a population that has a greater proportion of higher 
than average risks; their community rate is likely to be higher than the 
community rate of insurers with lower than average risks. Insurers may 
be able to absorb some losses for a period of time, but continued dete-
rioration will force them out of the small group business. In addition, 
other lines may subsidize these losses. 
Insurers that have the majority of their business in the small group 
market may not fare as well as insurers with a more diversified mix of 
business. Insurers that are only in the health business may not have 
the option of retaining losses until they can leave the market gracefully. 
Unrecoverable losses could force them into insolvency, further disrupt-
ing the market and threatening coverage for their existing policyhold-
ers. Furthermore, this will be particularly disruptive to policyholders 
in managed care networks and to provider-patient relationships. 
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4 Changes in Insured/Uninsured Small Employers 
4.1 Migration Effects on Small Employers Populations 
In this section, the migration effects (also called the second order 
effects) of H.R. 3626's rating restrictions, access provisions,9 and stan-
dardized benefits are examined. The migration effects are the effects 
of employers and employees entering and leaving the small employer 
group market as a direct result of the change in access rules and changes 
in premiums. 
The rating restrictions (described in Section 3) lirmt the premium 
rate that insurers can charge high risk employers, making coverage 
more affordable for high cost risks. At the same time, access provi-
sions guarantee employers and employees the right to purchase cov-
erage. This combination encourages insured high risk employers and 
employees to retain their insurance coverage. The access provisions 
also encourage uninsured high risk employers and employees to pur-
chase insurance coverage. Guaranteed eligibility provisions assure that 
all employees (working at least 17.5 hours a week for a small employer 
with a health insurance plan) and their dependents will be eligible to 
participate in their employer's plan. Guaranteed renewability provi-
sions ensure that once an employer gets coverage, the employer will 
not lose it. 
In addition, H.R. 3626 increases the self-employed deduction for 
health insurance benefits, and self-insurance10 is limited. The effects of 
the self-employed deduction and, to a lesser extent, the self-insurance 
provision lead to changes in the insured small employer population. 
The expanded benefits also increase premiums for small employers, 
thus exacerbating population changes. 
In the absence of rating restrictions, H.R. 3626's access provisions 
will lead to some changes in who is insured. These prOvisions also will 
lead to either higher rates for the groups affected, to increases in the in-
surers' average rate for all small employers, or to a combination of both. 
When combined with the severe rate compression of the nearly flat com-
munity rating and the expanded benefits, however, access provisions 
will increase rates significantly. These increases either (i) add to the 
increases the majority of small employer groups receive; (ii) make the 
9The H.R. 3626 access provisions also are summarized in Appendix B. The most 
significant access reforms are guaranteed issue, guaranteed eligibility (whole group), 
and guaranteed renewability. 
tOH.R. 3626 limits the efficacy of self-insurance, but it does not prohibit it. Conse-
quently, small employers for whom it is still advantageous to self-insure (even with the 
2S percent excise tax) may choose to do so. 
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employers that receive small decreases instead receive rate increases; or 
(iii) reduce the rate decreases that employers receiving larger decreases 
will receive. 
In the following discussion of the migration effects of H.R. 3626's 
rating restrictions, the following should be kept in mind: 
1. In this section, the insured population is changing. Also, there is 
no mandate on the employer to provide, or on the employee to 
obtain, coverage, Le., it is a voluntarv market; 
2. The effects of migration are examined using sensitivity tests on 
a range of assumptions regarding how many insureds enter and 
leave the market and the morbidity (net claim costs) of these mi-
grants; 
3. Because carriers are insuring a different population, the average 
premium of each employer group and the aggregate premium over 
all groups combined may change; 
4. The difference in premium for all small employers is determined 
by comparing the market average of premiums before reforms to 
the market average of premiums after reforms. This difference is 
in addition to the trend increase employers may receive in their 
premiums and to the redistributional effects; 
5. Migration effects also have an impact on the number of uninsured 
small employers. 
4.2 Methodology 
The estimates in this section are derived from sensitivity analysis us-
ing the actuarial migration model described in Appendix C. The model 
is a reasonable compromise between simplicity and complexity. It iden-
tifies those factors that need to be measured to understand the impli-
cations of small group reforms. In addition, the model shows which 
of the factors have the greatest impact on premium changes as a re-
sult of reforms. The model splits the small employer health insurance 
market into three blocks: (i) employer-provided insurance (including 
self-insured employers); (ii) insurance from any other source; and (iii) 
the uninsured. 
The model addresses the movement of small employers into and out 
of the health insurance market, but it does not attempt to simulate the 
effect of employers moving between carriers within the market. While 
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movement within the market may lower a particular employer's pre-
mium, it will not change total costs in the market unless employers 
reduce their coverage at the same time. In the long run, any premium 
shortfalls from insufficient rates will show up as future trend rate in-
creases. 
Starting with the small employer population and the morbidity pat-
tern of each block before reforms, the population and morbidity of 
insured small employers entering and leaving each of these blocks is 
combined algebraically in the migration model in order to estimate the 
small employer population and the morbidity pattern in each block af-
ter reforms. 
The uninsured are segmented further into high and low risk individ-
uals. Varying assumptions are used for how many individuals enter the 
insured market from these two segments, as high risk individuals and 
their employers have a greater incentive to enter the market and have 
a greater impact on the increase in premiums as a result of H.R. 3626. 
These assumptions are discussed in greater detail in Sections 4.6 and 
4.7. 
While population-based data are not consistent with developing ex-
act numerical estimates, reasonable ranges can be developed for the 
model's assumptions. (See Appendix C.) Consequently, it is necessary 
to perform sensitivity tests on the results using different sets of as-
sumptions, or scenarios, in order to test the full range of possible val-
ues for each variable. For purposes of illustration, these are narrowed 
to three scenarios that bound the full range of outcomes: low cost, 
most likely, and high cost. The results vary over a wide range and are 
sensitive to some of the assumptions. 
4.3 Impact on Premium per Capita 
Migration effects will increase the premium per capita for all small 
employer groups covered by an insurer equally. The premium per 
capita for every employer group will increase above what it would have 
been due to rating restrictions only. Employers scheduled to receive 
rate increases will get higher increases. Employers due to receive rate 
decreases will receive smaller decreases or no decreases. The distribu-
tion of premiums per capita for insured employer groups will change 
to reflect the migration effects as well as redistributional effects. 
The distribution of premiums per capita for currently insured em-
ployer groups after migration will be similar to the distribution in Figure 
2 except the average premium (the 100 percent level) will be higher, i.e., 
Figure 2 shifts to the right for currently insured employers. 
Hammond: H.R. 3626, Health Insurance Reform 23 
4.4 Impact on Small Employers 
H.R. 3626's access provisions, in conjunction with rating and benefit 
provisions, will lead to population changes that will cause the average 
premium per capita to rise for all small employers. This increase could 
range from 8 to 24 percent of current premiums. This range is broad 
because the estimated results are sensitive to critical assumptions that 
are used in the migration model. The upper and lower ends of the 
range can be considered extremes such that the most likely outcome 
falls somewhere close to the middle of the range. 
The premium increase from migration will be in addition to any in-
crease or decrease that employers will receive from redistributing pre-
miums to meet rating restrictions. For example, if a carrier has to raise 
the average premium 12 percent for second order effects, any group 
that previously received a 24 percent increase now will receive a 39 
percent increase. (The impact on rates is cumulative, e.g., 1.24 x 1.12 = 
1.3888, which is roughly a 39 percent increase.) Likewise, any group 
that had received a 24 percent decrease from rate compression now 
will receive only a 15 percent decrease (0.76 x 1.12 = 0.8512), effec-
tively wiping out almost half of the benefit of the rating restrictions. 
While it is possible to envision better or worse scenarios, it seems 
most likely that employers will experience premium changes from -25 
percent to +271 percent at renewal when the effects of trend and H.R. 
3626 are combined (assuming an 18 percent trend factor). Thus, the 
covariant effects of community rating in conjunction with guaranteed 
access and expanded benefits effectively could undermine the goals of 
greater access, affordability, and coverage in a voluntary market. 
Some employers may respond to the rate increases caused by H.R. 
3626 by dropping their coverage. Historically, however, employers re-
ceiving large trend or experience increases have not responded by drop-
ping their coverage. Instead they try to retain their coverage by seeking 
less costly alternatives such as reducing plan benefits or increasing em-
ployee contributions. Failing that, they may seek coverage through the 
individual health insurance or self-insurance markets to the extent that 
these markets provide cheaper alternatives after H.R. 3626 reforms. 
Employees experiencing large rate increases also will seek lower cost 
options. Some employees may choose to reduce their health insurance 
premium by dropping family coverage in favor of single coverage on 
the employee only or by increasing their deductibles and copayments. 
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4.5 Impact on Insurers 
The H.R. 3626 rating, access, and benefit provisions will make health 
insurance more affordable and accessible for high risk groups and less 
affordable for low risk employers. This will increase adverse selection, 
i.e., persons who know that they have higher than average health care 
costs will increase their purchase coverage while those who know that 
they have lower than average costs will reduce their coverage. The tight 
rating bands of H.R. 3626 cause more adverse selection than other pro-
posals with less severe rating bands. Thus, H.R. 3626 leads to greater 
adverse selection and greater changes in the insured, small employer 
population than other proposals to date. 
Because low risk insureds tend to shop for coverage (replace their 
current coverage for lower cost coverage) more than high risk insureds, 
insurers with lower average rates can be expected to attract more low 
cost risks than those with higher average rates. This implies that, for 
competitive/antis election reasons, some companies will not be able to 
raise their rates high enough to cover expected claim costs. If their 
in-force business eventually deteriorates to the point that it contains a 
significantly disproportionate share of high cost insureds, the insurer 
will be left with two equally poor choices: reduce rates (and hope that 
the low cost risks will come) or raise rates and experience further dete-
rioration of their claims experience. 
Alternatively, those insurers experiencing enrollment losses as a re-
sult of employers dropping coverage (especially low risk ones) could 
be forced to (i) strengthen and apply participation requirements more 
strictly; (ii) expand self-insurance products for small employers; or (iii) 
seek reinsurers/partners in order to spread the risk and maintain mar-
ket share. The impact on insurers of current migrations of both large 
and small employers toward self-insured, ERISA-protected plansll pro-
vides strong empirical evidence of this tendency. 
Insurers will be subject to the effects of adverse selection (even from 
employers that maintain their coverage) if employees who will have to 
contribute toward higher premiums choose to forego coverage instead. 
The insurer still may cover the employer, but now fewer employees and 
their dependents will be in the risk pool. It also can be presumed that 
employees foregoing coverage will be, as a group, lower risk than those 
remaining insured. 
Insurers that guarantee issue coverage to a disproportionate share 
of high risk insureds will face an additional risk: their small group busi-
11 ERISA plans are self-insured medical plans established by the United States 
Congress in accordance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 
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ness will have a higher percentage of high cost claimants than their rates 
anticipated. At the same time, rates only can be set within the allowable 
rate bands, and rate increases are limited. It may become impossible to 
offer an actuarially sound, competitive rate that attracts a reasonable 
mix of high and low risk insureds to assure the integrity of the risk 
pool. Insurers could find their total premium (from all small groups) 
insufficient to pay their claims. This increases insurer uncertainty that 
premiums will be sufficient to pay claims. 
Risk margins in current rates are based upon the level of uncertainty 
(the probability that actual costs will vary from expected costs) that 
exists in the current market. The increased uncertainty of the market 
after reforms will encourage insurers to increase their risk margins. 
The magnitude of the increase will depend on each insurer's specific 
situation, and it is unlikely that any a priori estimate of its magnitude 
will be credible. 
4.6 Impact on the Uninsured 
Estimating the number of un insureds attached to the small employer 
market is hindered by having to determine whether an establishment is 
a small employer or part of a larger firm. For example, six dry cleaners 
each with ten employees may be part of the same 60 employee firm or 
they may be six separate ten employee firms-in both cases they will 
be six establishments. The question of what to do about dependents 
when both spouses work and both are uninsured, but one works for 
a small firm and the other works for a large firm is also problematic. 
Also, the data are not always split into the employer size categories 
desired for analysis. In spite of these complications, algorithms have 
been developed that address these issues. Estimates of the number of 
small employer uninsured range from 11 to 15 million. 
Even in the best scenario, indications are that the number of small 
group uninsureds will increase rather than decrease under H.R. 3626, 
contrary to the desired goal of this bill. As many as 0.6 million to 2.3 
million Americans may reenter the market under H.R. 3626 reforms. 
An estimated 1.2 million to 4.1 million more Americans may drop or 
lose their coverage. The net effect will be an increase in the number of 
uninsureds of 0.7 million to 1.9 million, increasing the number of small 
group uninsureds 6 to 12 percent. Because small group uninsureds are 
about half of the uninsured, however, H.R. 3626 will increase the total 
number of uninsureds about 3 to 6 percent. If previous socioeconomic 
patterns hold for these new uninsureds, the tendency will be for these 
new uninsureds to be younger, lower income, and from the smallest 
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employers. Many also will be children. 
Certain assumptions related to the uninsured have a profound im-
pact on the results of this study, so a short discussion of these as-
sumptions is presented below. The migration model assumptions used 
in each of the three scenarios are shown in Appendix C. 
4.7 Number of High Risk Uninsureds 
A key assumption is the number of high risk uninsured employees. 
High risk uninsureds are medically uninsurable individuals who may be 
denied health insurance under current medical underwriting practices. 
Prior to a recent AHCPR (Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, 
United States Department of Health and Human Services) study, reason-
able estimates for this variable ranged from 7 to 12 percent. The AHCPR 
study shows that only 36.8 percent of the uninsured have investigated 
the cost of private health insurance; only 2.5 percent of that cohort 
have ever been denied coverage or had their coverage limited. The 2.5 
percent includes more than just medically uninsurable individuals and 
includes those who have been excluded from individual (not just group) 
coverage. It also includes those who ever have been rejected for a pol-
icy, whether they will be today or not. It does present an upper bound 
for who may be medically uninsurable among the 36.8 percent who 
have investigated coverage. Assuming the same proportion of uninsur-
able persons among those who haven't investigated coverage as among 
those who have (a grossly conservative assumption), 6.8 percent of the 
uninsured at most could be medically uninsurable. 
Medically uninsurable individuals may not be distributed uniformly 
among the various segments of the uninsured population. For example, 
small employers could have a higher percentage of medically uninsur-
able employees than large employers. In case there is a disproportion-
ate share of these high cost insureds among small group uninsureds, 
7 percent is assumed to be the t'ow end of the range for small group 
uninsureds. Even with the possibility of a biased distribution, however, 
it appears that the 12 percent estimate for the top of the range for this 
assumption is too conservative. But the 7 to 12 percent range used in 
this study encompasses the most reasonable range of values available 
from current research. 
4.8 The Morbidity of Medically Uninsurable Employees 
Current studies show that the morbidity of medically uninsurable 
employees range anywhere from 200 percent of the net claim cost of 
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the current small employer group market to as much as 500 percent. 
Analysis of the experience of individual high risk pools, however, shows 
that even when considered as individuals rather than as groups, the 
experience for these high cost insureds only averages 350 percent of 
the current small employer group market experience. Because groups 
can be expected to have employees and dependents that are standard 
or better risks to offset the additional claim cost of high cost insureds, 
it is expected that, on average, the morbidity of high risk groups will 
be less than the morbidity of individual high risk pools. For this study 
a range of 248 to 300 percent of current small employer net claim cost 
is used for this variable. 
5 Standardized Benefits and Deductions 
H.R. 3626 mandates a generous preexisting condition limitation, the 
preemption of state mandates, the addition of preventive services with 
first dollar coverage, and a standard benefit package similar to Parts 
A and B of Medicare. In an attempt to place the self-employed on par-
ity with all other employers, H.R. 3626 increases the self-employed de-
duction for health care expenses to 100 percent of expenses. These 
provisions are described in Appendix B. 
The standardized benefits detailed below are expected to increase 
small employer premiums about 4 to 5 percent overall because these 
benefits are more generous in aggregate than the average plan of bene-
fits small groups currently offer. The impact of the deductions is harder 
to quantify. The following is a description of the standardized benefits 
and deductions . 
• Preexisting Condition limitation: Based on data from HIAA's em-
ployer survey and HIAA calculations using the 1994 Tillinghast 
Group Medical Insurance Rate Manual,12 it is estimated that re-
ducing the preexisting condition limitation period to a required 
maximum of six months will add about 2 percent to an average 
policy. 
• Standard Benefit Package, Including Preventative Services: The 
standard benefits package (except for some of the preventive ben-
efits) will be less than a standard employer provided plan in some 
12The 1994 Tillinghast Group Medical Insurance Rate Manual is published by Tilling-
hast, 101 South Hanley Street, St. Louis MO 63105-3411, USA. 
28 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.1, 1994 
states, while in other states the H.R. 3626 plan will be more gen-
erous. The net effect is estimated to be about a 1 percent increase 
in the avprage premium from current levels . 
• Elimination of State Mandates: The effect of eliminating state 
mandated benefits and policy provisions is included in the pric-
ing of the standard benefit package. The reduction for eliminating 
state mandates is not readily apparent because H.R. 3626 man-
dates a package of benefits that, with the exceptions above, is 
similar to the average small employer plan. Furthermore, for a 
small employer that offers its employees a plan with fewer ben-
efits than the H.R. 3626 minimums, rate increases will be even 
higher than this analysis otherwise indicates. 
• Self-Employed Deduction: It is difficult to estimate the impact of 
the self-employed deduction provision. Though the self-employed 
population is small compared to the total population, it is rea-
sonable to assume some increase. For example, increasing this 
deduction will tend to encourage the self-employed with above 
average costs to seek insurance more than it may encourage the 
self-employed with below average costs to seek insurance. This 
is evident in the results of the 1987 national medical expenditure 
survey13 that show individually insured persons have much higher 
cost and risk than group insureds. I estimate that this may add 
another 1 to 2 percent to the average premium. 
6 Cost Containment Provisions 
H.R. 3626 calls for the establishment of a national health care cost 
containment commission shortly after enactment of the bill. It also 
requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 
to establish optional maximum payment rates for hospitals, physicians, 
and other health services by October 1, 1994 and annually thereafter. 
The rates are to be based on DRG and RBRVS methodologies similar to 
those Medicare currently uses. 
This approach to cost containment will not contain health care costs 
effectively because it does nothing to control the fundamental sources 
of health care cost increases other than medical price inflation. 
13The national medical expenditure survey is a detailed survey of the health expen-
ditures of Americans and their families. This survey is sponsored by the US Agency 
for Health Care Policy and Research, Department of Health and Human Services, 200 
Independence Avenue SW, Washington DC 20201. 
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The most important sources of health care cost increases are med-
ical cost inflation, cost shifting, utilization (the number of health care 
services used), adverse selection, defensive medicine, and new tech-
nologies. In 1991 the medical cost inflation component was responsible 
for only about a third of health care cost increases. Thus, an approach 
that addresses only medical cost inflation addresses only) about one-
third of the problem. 
But H.R. 3626 may not control medical cost inflation effectively. 
While some studies have estimated Significant savings from using cur-
rent Medicare reimbursement maximums, it is by no means certain that 
the payment rates eventually approved will be so low. Because the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services will be charged with establishing 
maximum payment rates (without guidelines for how high these rates 
could be), it is not certain that the maximum payment rates set by the 
Secretary will contain costs effectively. 
The only positive point that can be made regarding this approach is 
that, to the extent that the maximum payment rates are used uniformly 
by health care payors (including government payors), some reductions 
in cost shifting may occur. It is reasonable to expect that insurers will 
use these rates if they are legislated or if they are less than what the 
insurer currently pays. Any insurer that does not likely will be at a 
competitive disadvantage. 
The H.R. 3626 cost containment provisions are still too nebulous to 
justify any estimated reduction in costs at this time. 
7 Provisions Not Quantified 
The number and complexity of health insurance market reform pro-
posals have outstripped the available data, and H.R. 3626 is no excep-
tion. Consequently, it is impossible to quantify certain provisions in 
the bill. In some cases more data and analysis are needed. In others 
data are not available to estimate credibly the impact of certain reforms 
on the market. 
Some of the provisions not speCifically quantified in this study are 
the minimum plan period, the notice of renewal, the index rate variation 
between blocks, the types of family enrullment, the transfers among 
blocks, the 5 percent limit on rate increases above trend, the geographic 
factors limited to MSAs,14 the self-insurance prohibition, the uniform 
claims forms, and the uniform reporting standards. 
14As defined by the United States Census Bureau, MSA means a metropolitan statis-
tical area, e.g., Hartford, Connecticut. 
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Although the effect of H.R. 3626 on employees purchasing single 
coverage versus employees purchasing family coverage is not analyzed 
in this study, an independent study by an HIAA member company 
shows H.R. 3626 can be expected to increase rates for single coverage 
more than for family or single parent coverages. (Increases for singles 
are estimated to be five times greater.) 
Some covariant effects cannot be analyzed with the data available 
and are beyond the scope of this study. For example, how geographic 
factors may change in the absence of other risk classification factors 
(such as industry or full age/gender rating) is not examined. As the 
scope of this study is limited to the effects of H.R. 3626 on the small 
employer group health insurance market, the impact of portability re-
quirements on employers other than small employers is not analyzed. 
Similarly, the impact of H.R. 3626 on association groups and employer-
provided individual health insurance is also beyond the scope of this 
study. 
No specific attempt is made in this study to measure H.R. 3626's 
effect on the solvency of employers and insurers. But the magnitude of 
rate increases for some employers and the likelihood that certain insur-
ers will get a disproportionate share of high risk insureds will have an 
impact on their solvency. Also, it is not possible to include the impact 
of state regulations already promulgated. For example, some states 
have passed laws similar to the rating restrictions and other provisions 
in this bill. In these states, to the extent that premiums and the market 
already reflect these changes, H.R. 3626 will have less impact. 
8 Summary and Conclusions 
H.R. 3626 tries to marry the social goals of guaranteed availability, 
community rating, and generous standard benefits. It doesn't consider 
sufficiently the realities of price-sensitive small employers and individ-
ual employees acting in their own best interest in a highly competitive, 
voluntary market. 
While improving availability and affordability of health insurance for 
a minority of small employers, H.R. 3626's rating restrictions increase 
premiums disproportionately for the majority of small employers. Em-
ployers with younger, lower income employees will be forced to sub-
sidize employers with older, higher income employees. Smaller small 
employers will subsidize larger small employers. Premiums no longer 
will reflect expected claims, except in the aggregate, exacerbating the 
tendency in small employer markets to be uninsured due to cost. 
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Changes in the insured small employer population as a result of H.R. 
3626 will increase the average premium per capita of all small employer 
groups 8 to 24 percent, largely as a result of the severe rating restric-
tions. The premium per capita for almost every small employer group 
either will increase or decrease, and the distribution of premiums per 
capita for insured employer groups will change, generally worsening. 
In effect, H.R. 3626 proposes a solution that affects 100 percent of in-
sured small employers, most of them negatively, in order to address a 
problem that afflicts less than 15 percent of small employers. 
Some employers will respond to the H.R. 3626 rate increases by 
dropping their coverage altogether. Based on my experience with sell-
ing coverage to small employers, it seems far more likely that small 
employers who currently have coverage will do what they have always 
done when faced with significant rate increases. They will seek less 
costly alternatives such as reducing benefits to the minimum allowable 
(if their benefits are currently more generous), increasing employee con-
tributions (employee share of the premium), self-insuring (if feasible), 
or utilizing the individual health insurance market. 
While the full impact is not yet clear, the impact of the community 
rating law for small employers in New York State seems consistent with 
this conclusion. Young and healthy lives have dropped out of the sys-
tem, claims costs have risen, and, at least anecdotally, small employers 
and individuals are choosing less generous benefit plans. (New York 
does not mandate a minimum or standard benefit plan.) Mitigating any 
negative impact of reforms in New York State is the implementation of 
a risk adjustment mechanism for risk pooling across the individual and 
small group markets. If H.R. 3626 had contained such a provision, the 
impact on rates and the market would be less. 
Employees experiencing large rate increases also will seek lower cost 
alternatives. Employees could choose to drop their coverage or reduce 
their contribution toward premiums by dropping family coverage in 
favor of single coverage on the employee only. 
H.R. 3626 will increase the risk to insurers of providing small em-
ployer coverage. Coupled with a hostile regulatory environment wherein 
rate increases often are reduced or denied, insurers will find it increas-
ingly difficult to charge premiums that are adequate to protect existing 
policyholders. In response, insurers staying in the market may try to 
strengthen and apply participation requirements more strictly, increase 
risk margins, expand self-insurance products to small employers, re-
duce rates below an actuarially sound level (in an attempt to achieve or 
maintain a standard mix of risks), or develop more innovative responses 
that will protect the insurer from insolvency. 
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In a highly competitive, voluntary insurance market, the actuarial 
process of rating, the underwriting process of risk selection, and the 
competitive market in which they operate are symbiotic. Actuarially 
sound rates are established to ensure the solvency of the insurer in 
order to protect its policyholders. If these rates are too high, some 
persons will not purchase insurance. If rates are too low, there will 
not be sufficient reserves to pay policyholder claims. If the insurer 
screens too many risks, there will not be sufficient policyholders to 
cover the costs of operating the business. If the insurer screens too 
few or does not assign the appropriate rate to high risk policyholders, 
it will not have sufficient reserves to pay policyholder claims. There is 
always a decision to be made regarding costs versus benefits whenever 
considering changes to any of these processes-changing one affects 
all. 
H.R. 3626 fails this litmus test of cost/benefit analysis. It does so, 
in large part, because of its severe rating restrictions. In the current 
market where health care costs are such a large proportion of nonsalary 
employee expenses, employers are looking to reduce this expense and 
are unwilling to subsidize actuarially higher risk insureds of another 
employer. If their employees are actuarially low risk, they demand low 
premiums. Otherwise, they do not purchase insurance. Consequently, 
forcing insurers in a free market to charge premiums that do not reflect 
the expected claims of insureds (thereby forcing large rate increases on 
most small employers) in order to satisfy a social goal will not produce 
the intended result. 
This study shows that it is not the guaranteed issue/availability pro-
visions of H.R. 3626 that lead to most of the small employer premium 
increases; rather it is the bill's rating restrictions. Other small group 
reform proposals with less severe rating restrictions will provide the 
benefits of guaranteed availability without the onerous rate increases 
precipitated by H.R. 3626. 
In clOSing, although H.R. 3626 will improve availability of coverage 
for small employers and portability of coverage for all employees, the 
severe rating restrictions will lead to more persons being uninsured. It 
will force many small employers to pay a high price to make coverage 
more affordable for a few small employers. In short, the costs of this 
bill will far exceed its benefits. 
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Appendix A: H.R. 3626, Summary of Benefit Provi-
sions 
Table Al 
Summary of the Basic Benefit Provisions of H.R. 3626 
Provision 
Group Size 
Transitional Period 
Availability 
Individual Policies 
Case Characteristics 
Rating Restrictions 
Renewal Rating 
Renewability 
Whole Groups 
Reinsurance 
Reinsurance Price 
Cost Sharing 
Assessments 
Brief Description 
Two to 50 employees (portability provisions 
apply to all group health plans); 
Various, but up to three years for some 
provisions; 
Guaranteed issue (year round; uniform waiting 
periods and minimum participation require-
ments allowed); 
Not applicable to individual policies (unless 
provided by employer); 
Age, gender, and geography (no smaller than 
MSA);' 
Community rating such that variations between 
plocks of business shall not exceed 20 percent. 
Age and sex adjustments may be used, but only 
up to ±25 percent and only if applied to all 
small employers; 
May not exceed the sum of the percentage 
change in the base premium rate plus 5 per-
centage points; 
• Guaranteed renewable except for nonpayment 
of premiums, fraud or misrepresentation, and 
failure to maintain minimum participation 
rates; 
• Must give notice 60 days prior to renewal 
date; terms of renewal must be same as at 
issue except for premiums and administrative 
changes; 
Coverage must be offered to any eligible 
employee and dependent; 
Not included; 
Not applicable; 
Not applicable; 
Not applicable; 
'MSA ~ Metropolitan statistical area. 
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Table Al (continued) 
Summary of the Basic Benefit Provisions of H.R. 3626 
Provision 
Portability 
Other 
Effective Date 
Brief Description 
These provisions apply to all group health plans: 
• Excise tax for failure to provide all of these 
portability benefits (25 percent of gross pre-
miums); 
• Prohibition against denying, limiting, or con-
ditioning coverage (or benefits) on health 
status; 
• Maximum six month preexisting condition 
limitation (except for newborns); 
• Continuity of coverage provision that man-
dates credit for prior coverage if no more than 
a three month break in coverage; 
• Self-employed deduction increased to 100 per-
cent; 
• Applies to employees working at least 17.5 
hours per week; 
• deductible standard benefit package with pre-. 
ventive benefits; 
• Preemption of state mandates beyond stand-
ard benefit package; 
• percent excise tax on self-insured; 
• Any payor may choose to use DRC" and 
RBRVSt schedules; 
• Must offer single, couple, single parent, and 
family rates 
Various: depends on provision (some on January 
I, 1992). 
"DRG = Diagnosis-related group. 
tRBRVS = Resource-based relative value scale. 
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Appendix B: H.R. 3626, Summary of Provisions Af-
fecting Rating 
H.R. 3626 has provisions that apply to small groups (defined as em-
ployer groups of two to 50 employees) and all employer groups, in-
cluding self-insured plans. An employee is defined as any worker who 
normally works at least 17.5 hours per week. 
Self-employed deduction: The amount of deduction for self-em-
ployed individuals is extended indefinitely, starting in 1993. The 
deduction increases from 25 percent to 50 percent in 1993, 75 
percent in 1994, and 100 percent in 1995 and subsequent years. 
Preemption of state-mandated benefits: States cannot mandate 
benefits beyond those in the standard benefit package, but they 
can establish more stringent requirements in other areas. 
Guaranteed eligibility: Insurer cannot exclude any eligible em-
ployee or dependent to whom the employer offers coverage. 
Guaranteed issue: Insurers offering a plan to small employers in 
a community must offer it to all employers in the area year round. 
Waiting periods are allowed if applied to all employees. 
Minimum plan period: Rating basis applies for 12 months. 
Guaranteed renewability: Insurers only can nonrenew and cancel 
for nonpayment of premiums, fraud, misrepresentation, or failure 
to maintain minimum participation rates. 
Notice of renewal (expiration): Insurers must give notice 60 days 
prior to the renewal date. Terms of renewal must be the same as 
at issue except for premiums and administrative changes. 
Discrimination based on health status: Insurers cannot deny, 
limit, or condition coverage or benefits based on an individual's 
"health status, claims experience, receipt of medical care, medical 
history or lack of evidence of insurability." An exception is made 
to this provision to allow for the preexisting condition exclusion. 
Index rate variation between blocks: This must be less than 20 
percent unless the block is one that always has provided open en-
rollment, the insurer never has transferred groups into the block 
involuntarily, and the block is currently available for purchase 
when an exception to the 20 percent rule is sought. 
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Community rating: Must be used within a block. 
Age and sex adjustments: This may be used if applied consis-
tently to all small employers. Maximum variation is ±25 percent. 
Definition of community: Not smaller than an MSA. 
Types of family enrollment: Insurers must have separate rates 
for single adults, childless couples, single parents, and families. 
Transfers among blocks: Insurer cannot force an employer to 
transfer among blocks and may not transfer an employer unless 
the transfer is offered to all small employer plans and unless it is 
not based on demographics, experience, or date of issue. 
limits on rate increases: Increase may not exceed the percentage 
change in the base premium rate plus 5 percent (500 basis points). 
Definitions: 
1. A block (of business) consists of the small employer plans is-
sued by an insurer. Distinct groups can be treated as separate 
blocks based on whether the group is marketed through di-
rect response, has been acquired from another insurer, or is 
provided via an association of at least 25 small employers. 
2. The reference premium rate is the lowest rate charged or 
available to any actuarial class. 
3. The index rate is 133 1/3 percent of the reference premium 
rate. 
4. The base premium rate, though not specifically defined, can 
be defined to be the index rate. 
Standard benefit package: 
1. In general, same as Parts A and B of Medicare. 
2. Unlimited inpatient hospital coverage for children without 
coinsurance. (The deductible is not excluded.) 
3. Maternity (including prenatal, inpatient labor and delivery, 
postnatal, and postnatal family planning). 
4. The $250/500 deductible is indexed for future inflation. 
5. The individual out-of-pocket limit of $2500/3000 is indexed 
for inflation in future years. 
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6. Preventive services must be provided without deductible or 
coinsurance. These services include: maternity, well-child 
care (including dental), screening mammography, screening 
pap smear, colorectal screening, and certain immunizations. 
Others may be added at a later date. Their are limitations on 
what providers may charge for these. Effective 1/1/92. 
Self-insurance prohibition: Small employers (two to 50 employ-
ees, including self-employed) may not self insure. This is enforced 
through a 25 percent excise tax on health care expenditures by 
self-insured plans. 
Preexisting condition limitation (PCL) for all groups: Limits pre-
existing condition exclusion to six months with a further proviso 
that prior coverage must be credited toward the six months as 
long as there isn't more than a three month lapse in coverage. 
PCL cannot be applied to newborns and is defined as a condition 
diagnosed or treated during the three months prior to issue. This 
applies to all employers. Effective 1/1/93. 
Other portability provisions: In addition to the PCL, the portabil-
ity provisions are an excise tax for failure to provide all of these 
portability benefits (25 percent of gross premium for plan); a pro-
hibition against denying, limiting, or conditioning coverage (or 
benefits) on health status; and a continuity of coverage provision 
that mandates credit for prior coverage if no more than a three 
month break in coverage has occurred. All of the portability provi-
sions apply to all group health plans, regardless of size, including 
self-insured plans. 
Cost containment: This includes optional rates (prices) for hos-
pitals, physicians and other medical prOviders, DRGs, and RBRVS. 
Any health care purchaser, including individuals, can choose to 
use promulgated rates. Providers must accept these rates as pay-
ment in full. 
Uniform claims forms: Effective 1/1/94. 
Uniform reporting standards: For development of rates (prices) 
to be used in cost containment efforts. Effective 1/1/93. 
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Appendix C: H.R. 3626: The Impact of Migration 
Table Cl 
Assumptions for Migration Modeling Under the 
Optimistic, Best Estimate, and Pessimistic Scenarios 
Assumption Optimistic Best Estimate Pessimistic 
Total Market 45,000,000 50,000,000 55,000,000 
Distribution (before reforms): 
A. Employer-sponsored 55% 51.36% 50.0% 
B. Individually-insured 20% 22.31% 22.5% 
C. Uninsured 25% 26.33% 27.5% 
Morbidity of Population as a 
Percentage of Employer-
Sponsored Net Claims Cost 
(before migration): 
A. Employer-sponsored 100.00% 100.00% 100% 
B. Individually-insured 100.00% 100.00% 120% 
C. Uninsured 75.04% 80.62% 102% 
Employer-Sponsored Insureds 
Withdrawing From Small 
Employer Market: 
A. % withdrawing 5% 10% 15% 
B. Morbidity 24% 32% 40% 
Individually Insureds 
Withdrawing From Small 
Employer Market: 
A. % withdrawing 5% 5% 5% 
B. Morbidity 100% 120% 120% 
Hammond: H.R. 3626, Health Insurance Reform 39 
Table Cl (continued) 
Assumptions for Migration Modeling Under the 
Optimistic, Best Estimate and Pessimistic Scenarios 
Assumption Optimistic Best Estimate Pessimistic 
Additions of Uninsureds to 
Small Employer Market: 
A. Percentage of uninsureds 
who are medically 
uninsurable 7% 10% 12% 
B. Percentage of medically 
uninsurables purchasing 
coverage after reforms 25% 50% 100% 
C. Percentage of all 
uninsureds purchasing 
coverage after reforms 5% 10% 15% 
D. Morbidity of medically 
uninsurables 248.08% 248.08% 300% 
E. Morbidity of uninsureds 
who are not medically 
uninsurable 62.02% 62.02% 75.00% 
Note: Total Market = Population (employees and dependents) in small employer market before 
any changes 
Table C2 
Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms (Without Guaranteed Issue): 
Basic Set of Assumptions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total Market (before migration): 
A. ER' -sponsored Insureds 25,680,000 51.36% 100.00% $1,470.74 1.95 
B. Individually insured 11,155,000 22.31% 100.00% $1,470.74 1.95 
C. Uninsured 13.165.000 26.33% 80.62% $1,185.71 1.45 
TOTAL 50,000,000 100.00% 94.90% $1,395.69 1.79 
Impact of Migration on: 
ER-Sponsored Insureds: 
A. Withdraw from markett 2,568,000 10.0% 32.00% $470.64 1.95 
B. Remain in market 23,112,000 90.0% 107.56% $1,581.86 1.95 
Subtotal 25,680,000 100.00% 
Individually Insureds: 
A. Migrate to SGM* 557,750 5.0% 120.00% $1,764.89 1.95 
B. Remain individually insured 10.597,250 95.0% 98.95% $1,455.26 1.95 
Subtotal 11,155,000 100.0% 
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Uninsureds (UIs): 
A. -MUIs migrating to SGM 
-Insurables entering SGM 
B. Uninsureds who remain 
Subtotal 
Total Market (after migration): 
A. ER-sponsored insureds 
B. Individually insured 
C. Uninsured 
TOTAL 
658,250 
658,250 
11,848,500 
13,165,000 
24,986,250 
10,597,250 
14,416,500 
50,000,000 
5.0% 248.08% $3,648.61 
5.0% 62.02% $912.15 
90.0% 72.35% $1,064.08 
100.0% 
49.97% 110.34% $1,622.75 
21.19% 98.95% $1,455.26 
28.83% 65.16% $958.37 
100.00% 94.90% $1,395.69 
Note: Column headings are as follows: (1) Number of Covered lives; (2) Percent of subtotal or total in column (1); 
1.45 
1.45 
1.45 
1.92 
1.95 
1.52 
1.79 
(3) Ratio of Net claim Costs to Market Cost (Market Cost = $1470.74); (4) Cost Per Covered life; and (5) Average Family Size. 
Data in columns (2) to (5) are rounded to two decimal places. 
·ER = Employer. 
tThese withdrawing employer-sponsored insureds are now considered as uninsured. 
'SGM = Small group market. 
§MUI = Medically uninsured. 
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Table C3 
Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms (Without Guaranteed Issue): 
Calculations Using Data From Table C2 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
Total Market (before migration): 
A. Employer-sponsored insureds 37,768,603,200 13,169,231 $2,867.94 $239.00 
B. Individually insured 16,406,104,700 5,720,513 $2,867.94 $239.00 
I..-
0 
C. Uninsured 9,079,310 $1,719.28 $143.27 
s:: 
15,609.879,891 .... 
::l 
TOTAL 69,784,587,791 27,969,054 $2,495.06 $207.92 ~ 
0 ...., 
Impact of Migration on: :t> n ..... 
Employer-Sponsored Insureds: s:: 
III 
A. Withdraw from market 1,208,595,302 1,316,923 $917.74 $76.48 ~. 
~ 
B. Remain in market 36,560,007,898 11,852,308 $3,084.63 $257.05 -0 .... 
III 
n 
Individually Insured: !:!. n 
A. Migrate to small group market 984,366,282 286,026 $3,441.53 $286.79 -(I) 
B. Remain individually insured 15,421,738,418 5,434,487 $2,837.75 $236.48 < 0 
N 
Uninsured: Z 
A. Uninsured MUIs' migrating 2,401,698,712 453,966 $5,290.49 $440,87 
0 
Insurable migrants 600,424,678 453,966 $1,322.62 $110.21 
Subtotal migrating 3,002,123,390 907,931 $3,306.55 $275.55 1.0 
1.0 
B. Uninsureds who remain 12,607,756,501 8,171,379 $1,542.92 $128.57 ..j::. 
Total Market (after migration): 
A. Employer-sponsored insureds 40,546,497,570 13,046,264 $3,107.90 $258.99 
B. Individually insured 15,421,738,418 5,434,487 $2,837.75 $236.48 
C. Uninsured 13,816,351,803 9,488,302 $1,456.15 $121.35 
TOTAL 69,784,587,791 27,969,054 $2,495.06 $207.92 
Note: Column headings are as follows: (6) Total Cost; (7) Number of Covered Employees; (8) Annual Cost Per Employee; 
(9) Monthly Cost Per Employee. 
'MuIs = Medically uninsureds. 
Data in columns (8) and (9) are rounded to two decimal places. 
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Table C4 
Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms: 
Increase in Employer-Sponsored Insured Small Group Net Claim Cost 
due to Guarantees and Other Benefits After Reforms 
(Calculations Using Data From Tables C2 and C3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Guarantees! 10.3% $152.01 $2,777,894,370 $239.96 $20.00 
Other Benefits2 4.0% $58.83 $1,469,931,093 $112.67 $9.39 
TOTAL 14.3% $210.84 $4,247,825,463 $352.63 $29.39 
Percentage Change 14.3% 11.2% 12.3% 12.3% 
Note: Column headings are as follows: (1) Increase in the Ratio of Net Claim Costs to Market Cost; 
(2) Increase in the Cost Per Covered life; (3) Increase in the Total Cost; (4) Increase in the Annual Cost Per 
Employee; and (5) Increase in the Monthly Cost Per Employee. 
IThese include guaranteed issue, eligibility, and renewability; community rating; and rating restrictions. 
%ese include preexisting condition limits, self-employment deduction, preventive services, elimination of 
mandates, cost containment, and the standard benefit package. 
Column (1): 10.3% is taken from 110.34% in Table C2, column; and 4.0% is based on information in Section 5. 
Column (2) = Column (1) x 1470.74. 
Column (3): 2,777,894,370 = 40,546,497,570 - 37,768,603,200; and 1,469,931,093 = 58.83 x 24,986,250. 
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Table C5 
Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms: 
ER-Sponsored Net Claim Cost After Reforms (Migrations, Guarantees, and limits Included) 
Calculations Using Data From Tables C2, C3, and C4 
Total 
ER*-Spononsored 
(Before Reforms) 
Increases due to: 
Current insureds 
Migrations 
Subtotal 
Total 
ER-Sponsored 
(After Reforms) 
(1) 
25,680,000 
-2,568,000 
1.874,250 
-693,750 
(2) 
24,986,250 97.30% 
(3) (4) (5) 
100.00% $1,470.74 $37,768,603,200 
14.34% 
14.34% 
$1,096,120,368 
$3,151.705,095 
$4,247,825,463 
114.34% $1,681.58 $42,016,428,663 
(6) 
1.95 
1.92 
(7) (8) 
13,169,231 $2,867.94 
-1,316,924 
1.193,957 
13,046,264 
13,046,264 $3,220.57 
Note: Colurrm headings are as follows: (1) Number of Covered lives; (2) Percentage of Total Number of Employer-Sponsored lnsureds; (3) Ratio of 
Net Claim Costs to Market Cost (Market Cost = $1470.74); (4) Cost Per Covered Life; (5) Total Cost; (6) Average Family Size; (7) Number of Covered 
Employees; and (8) Annual Cost Per Employee. 
*ER = Employer. 
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An Introduction to Individual Disability Income 
Insurance 
Mark j. Chartier* 
Abstract 
There are several actuarial software packages purporting to calculate expected 
benefit cash flows on disability income insurance policies. To the author's 
knowledge, however, there is no published text that explains how to perform 
these calculations. This paper is intended to fill this gap in the literature. It 
describes some of the more common techniques for pricing disability income 
insurance. Those techniques for which claim costs can be used and th!Jse for 
which the pricing actuary must project cash flows are identified. 
Key words and phrases: benefits, claim costs, cash flows, incidence rate, expo-
sure, survivorship function 
1 Purpose and Product Features 
1.1 Purpose 
One of the primary purposes of life insurance is to protect a family 
from the catastrophic financial consequences of a breadwinner's pre-
mature death. Death is not the only reason, however, that a breadwin-
ner may be unable to work. For example, what if the breadwinner is a 
victim of serious illness or injury and is unable to work for a significant 
period of time? Will his or her dependents be worse off financially than 
if he or she had died? 
*Mark Chartier received his B.Sc. in mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology in 1980. He served four years in the United States Navy before joining 
Monarch Life Insurance Company. Afflicted with a congenital inability to pass fellow-
ship exams, he bears the title "Career Associate" as a badge of honor. 
Mr. Chartier's address is: Monarch Life Insurance Company, One Monarch Place, 
Springfield MA 01133, USA. 
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This other need defines the purpose of disability income insurance: 
to provide income when illness or injury renders the insured unable to 
work. The need is all too real and is arguably greater than that for life 
insurance. For example, according to the 1980 Commissioner's Stan-
dard Ordinary Table, l a male age 35 has a 0.00211 probability of dying 
during the next year. According to the 1985 Commissioner's Individual 
Disability Tables A, 2 the probability that a 35 year old male will suf-
fer a disability lasting at least 90 days at some time during the next 
year ranges from 0.00164 in the best occupation class to 0.01176 in 
the worst occupation class. 
Most United States residents have two forms of disability income 
protection provided by social insurance: workers' compensation and 
Social Security. Although workers' compensation is technically liabil-
ity insurance for an employer, it effectively provides disability income 
protection to the employee. There are, however, some important limi-
tations to workers' compensation. An obvious one is that it only pro-
tects employees from disabilities that are work-related. Another is that 
some segments of the population (the self-employed, for example) are 
not covered. 
Social Security provides much broader protection. The D in OASm3 
represents the United States' most comprehensive response to the need 
to care for the incapacitated. There are, however, serious shortcomings 
to Social Security including: (i) a restrictive definition of disability that 
makes it difficult to qualify for benefits; (ii) a claim settlement process 
that does not determine eligibility for benefits on a consistent basis; 
and (iii) an absence of promises. Entitlement to Social Security benefits 
of any kind is a statutory right (not a contractual right) and the terms of 
coverage can be changed at any time by an act of Congress. No promise 
is made about the level of benefits, the size or the timing of any cost 
of living adjustment, or the definition of disability used to determine 
eligibility for benefits. Only private insurers can make promises by en-
tering into contracts with private individuals. See Rejda (1984, Chapter 
2, pp. 19-46) for a more detailed discussion of the shortcomings of 
Social Security. 
The providers of individual disability income insurance form a small 
segment of the insurance industry. Based on net earned premium fig-
l"Report of the Committee to Recommend New Mortality Tables for Valuation." 
Transactions of the Society of Actuaries XXXIII (1981): 617-674. 
2"Report of the Committee to Recommend New Disability Tables for Valuation." 
Transactions of the Society of Actuaries XXXVII (1985): 449-601. 
3 Old-Age, Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance (OASDI) refers to the monthly 
retirement, disability, and survivor benefits paid under the United States Social Security 
system. 
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ures for 1992, more than half of the business is written by only four 
carriers: Paul Revere, Provident Life and Accident, Northwestern Mu-
tual, and UNUM. (See Conning & Company, 1993.) 
Similarly, not many Americans purchase individual disability income 
insurance. According to Conning & Company (1993), 75 percent of the 
individual disability income insurance in-force is on the top occupation 
class, the professional elite consisting mainly of physicians, attorneys, 
highly paid corporate executives, certified public accountants, actuar-
ies, etc. For example, Soule (1993), reports that 80 percent of dentists, 
78 percent of physicians, and 68 percent of lawyers have disability in-
come insurance. The situation with group disability income insurance 
is slightly better. Contrary to popular belief, however, most Americans 
do not have group long-term disability income protection. According 
to Goldman (1990), while there were over 50 million workers covered 
by short-term disability (benefit period of two years or less) in 1986, 
the number covered by group long-term disability was small, less than 
20 million. 
1.2 Policy Features 
Below is a list of some of the more common policy features of indi-
vidual4 disability income insurance. This is by no means an exhaustive 
description. The reader should consult Kidwell (1988, Chapter 3) for 
more detailed information. 
1. Rate Structure: Premiums can be level (in which case they vary 
by issue age but not by attained age) or they can increase by at-
tained age. Level premium rate structures are common and in-
volve a significant prefunding of future benefits. This prefunding 
is quantified in the active life reserve (to be discussed later). 
2. Renewability: Three categories are common: nonrenewable for 
stated reasons only, guaranteed renewable, and noncancellable. 
A contract is nonrenewable for stated reasons only if the insurer 
reserves the right to cancel coverage but may do so only for one 
of the reasons stated in the contract. For example, the contract 
might specify that the insured must be working full time in order 
to renew. The premium rate the insured pays is not guaranteed 
for the life of the contract. 
4Group disability income coverage is a different topic. This important subject will 
not be discussed here. See Goldman (1990) for more on group disability income 
insurance. 
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A contract is guaranteed renewable if the insurer is contractually 
prohibited from canceling coverage for any reason other than fail-
ure to pay premiums. The premium rate the insured pays is not 
guaranteed. Even when the contract has a level rate structure, the 
insurer reserves the right to increase the rate if experience is sig-
nificantly worse than anticipated when the contract originally was 
priced. 
The most generous renewability provision is found in noncan-
cellable contracts. The insurer makes timely payment of premi-
ums the only condition for renewal and guarantees the premium 
rate until policy expiration, typically at age 65. An insured who 
buys such a contract with a level rate structure at age 25 will pay 
the same rate for his or her coverage for the next 40 years. 
3. Elimination Period: The elimination period is the period of time 
for which the policyholder self-insures. The insured only begins 
to accrue benefits after the elimination period is completed. The 
elimination period can be likened to the deductible on a medical 
expense policy. Let's illustrate the concept by a few examples. 
Suppose the insured has a contract that, should he or she become 
disabled, will pay an annuity of $100 per month.s Furthermore, 
assume the insured is disabled for 45 days before returning to 
work: 
(a) If the insured's contract has a zero day elimination period, 
he or she is paid $150 (one and a half month's benefit) for 
those 45 days. 
(b) If the insured's contract has a 30 day elimination period, he 
or she would be paid $50 (half a month's benefit) for the 
remaining 15 days. 
(c) If the insured's contract has a 60 day elimination period, he 
or she would accrue no benefit because the disability did not 
extend beyond the end of the 60 day elimination period. 
This paper distinguishes time on claim and time disabled. A claim 
does not begin until the elimination period is completed. The 
length of time on claim plus the length of the elimination period 
equals the length of time disabled. Because the longer the elimi-
nation period, the lower the premium the insured must pay, the 
choice of an elimination period is important. It should reflect the 
sOne month is assumed to have 30 days 
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insured's judgment of how long he or she can rely on personal 
savings. Elimination periods of 30, 60, and 90 days are common. 
For financially well-endowed individuals, 180 day and 365 day 
elimination periods are available. 
4. Benefit Period: This is the maximum length of time an insured 
can collect benefits for a single claim. Benefit periods can range 
from a few months to the entire life of the insured. A common 
benefit period is one that would allow the policyholder to remain 
on claim until age 65. 
5. Definition of Disability: Determining whether to pay a life in-
surance benefit is a relatively straightforward matter. This is not 
the case for disability income insurance; the potential for poli-
cyholder abuse is enormous. It is essential that the policy state 
as precisely as possible what constitutes a disability. Two defini-
tions are common. The most generous is the regular occupation 
definition. According to this definition, the insured is disabled 
if an illness or injury renders her or him unable to perform the 
substantial and material duties of her or his regular occupation; 
whether the insured is able to perform the duties of some other 
occupation is irrelevant. 
An alternative is the reasonable occupation definition under which 
the insured is disabled if he or she is unable to do the substantial 
and material duties of any reasonable occupation. A reasonable 
occupation is one the insured could be expected to perform by 
virtue of education, training, and work experience. Some insurers 
modify the definition of a reasonable occupation by asserting that 
due regard must be given to the insured's earnings before disabil-
ity began. The intent is to protect the insured from being forced 
into an occupation in which he or she would suffer a substantial 
loss of income. 
Let us illustrate the difference between these two definitions with 
a realistic example. Suppose an insured's regular occupation is 
that of a surgeon. The insured begins to suffer from an impair-
ment in her or his right wrist, perhaps carpal tunnel syndrome 
or arthritis. He or she no longer can perform surgery. But by en-
tering general medical practice, the surgeon still can earn a much 
higher income than that of the average individual. Is the surgeon 
disabled? By the reasonable occupation definition, the answer is 
no; the surgeon now can perform the duties of what is for her or 
him a reasonable occupation. By the regular occupation defini-
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tion, however, the surgeon is considered to be disabled because 
he or she cannot perform the duties of his or her regular occupa-
tion. Therefore, the surgeon can collect benefits while she or he 
earns income from a new occupation! 
Some policies offer a hybrid of the two definitions. For example, 
the regular occupation definition may apply only during the first 
24 months of a claim. After 24 months, a claimant can continue to 
collect benefits only if he or she meets the reasonable occupation 
definition. 
6. Partial or Residual Disability: The above definitions refer to to-
tal disability, the complete inability to perform the substantial and 
material duties of the insured's regular or some other reasonable 
occupation. What if the disabled insured can work, but only on 
a part-time basis? What if she or he can work full-time but can 
perform only some of the key duties of the job? If a contract only 
covers total disability, he or she is not eligible for benefits. Some 
contracts will pay a fraction of the policy's full benefit amount 
under a partial or residual disability clause. Under a partial dis-
ability clause, the benefit is a function of time unable to work. 
Under a residual disability clause, the benefit is a function of in-
come lost. Contracts providing residual benefits are common and 
will be discussed later. 
7. Presumptive Disability: Some contracts will assert that for cer-
tain conditions, the policyholder will be presumed disabled and 
able to collect benefits even if he or she continues to work and 
suffers no loss of income. Such conditions might include total 
blindness in both eyes, loss of use of both hands or both feet, to-
tal deafness, etc. The presumptive disability provision also might 
extend the benefit period under such circumstances, e.g., pay ben-
efits for life in case of blindness. 
8. Protection Against Overinsurance: The insured is not supposed 
to profit from a disability claim. Therefore, the insurer should not 
issue so much coverage that when social insurance and any other 
private insurance is added, the insured's income on claim is higher 
than the income before disability. There are policy provisions that 
can be added to a disability contract to provide the insurer with 
added protection against overpayment. 
One example is a coordination with social insurance clause. Un-
der such a clause, the amount the insured is paid by his or her 
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private insurer can be reduced dollar for dollar by what he or she 
receives from social insurance. If a contract has a benefit amount 
of $1000 per month and a claimant receives $400 a month from 
OASDI, then he or she will receive only $600 per month from pri-
vate insurance. Other variations are possible. The formula for 
coordination of benefits need not be a dollar-for-dollar offset. It 
may be a percentage reduction in the event social insurance is 
received. 
The above provision applies only to social insurance. It does not 
take into account other private insurance policies the insured may 
own. A more comprehensive provision is the relation of earnings 
to insurance clause, an optional provision under the NAIC'S6 Uni-
form Individual Accident and Sickness Policy Provision Law. For 
a discussion of the Uniform Law, see O'Grady (1988, Appendix 2). 
Such a clause allows the benefit the insurer would pay to be re-
duced proportionately. Suppose that the insured's income before 
disability is only 90 percent of the sum of all of his or her disabil-
ity income insurance benefits. If a contract contained the relation 
of earnings to insurance clause, the insurer would pay only 90 
percent of the policy's benefit amount. Neither of the above pro-
visions typically is found in contracts sold to the industry's target 
market, the self-employed professional; intense competition has 
pushed the industry to produce very generous contracts. 
9. Waiver of Premiums: The typical waiver of premium provision 
specifies that once a disabled insured has satisfied a certain wait-
ing period (typically longer than the elimination period), premi-
ums will be waived for the duration of disability and any premium 
paid after commencement of disability will be reimbursed. 
10. Riders: Various optional benefits can be purchased to supplement 
the basic contract. A rider can be purchased to adjust benefits 
for cost of living increases while the insured is on claim. The 
insured can pay for the right to purchase additional coverage in 
the future without evidence of medical insurability. The insured 
could purchase a social insurance contingency rider; if he or she 
applies for Social Security and is turned down, he or she can collect 
benefits under this rider. Halpern (1979) discusses how to price 
such a rider. 
6The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is an association con-
sisting of state insurance commissioners. The NAIC drafts model laws and recom-
mends their adoption by state legislatures. The NAIC has no legal authority to force 
states to enact its recommendations. 
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1.3 Risk Variables 
Claim experience is affected by many variables including the fol-
lowing: age, gender, elimination period, benefit period, relationship 
of benefit amount to income, occupation class, and state (geographi-
cal location) of residence. The effects of some of these variables are 
quantified in the rate manual. For example, premium rates increase 
with issue age and benefit period, and they decrease with elimination 
period. Some insurers use a single rate manual for the entire nation, 
others have surcharges in high risk states and discounts in low risk 
states. Women, especially those in the child-bearing ages, tend to be 
charged a higher rate than men, a practice justified by higher claim in-
cidence rates. Occupation class is a crucial risk variable in disability 
income insurance. As a life insurance risk, a carpenter may be no dif-
ferent from an office worker; however, this is not the case in disability 
income insurance. Disability insurers therefore group occupations into 
broad risk classes. The class charged the lowest premium rate normally 
contains highly skilled professionals: physicians, lawyers, accountants, 
etc. The class charged the highest premium rate normally contains oc-
cupations involving substantial manual labor. 
Unfortunately, the risk variable that is the hardest to measure (and 
is probably the most significant) is the motivation to work. A highly 
motivated insured with some health problems may be a better risk than 
a healthy insured who is willing to turn a questionable condition into a 
claim. The problems associated with malingering make it more difficult 
for the underwriter to judge the disability risk than to judge the life risk. 
It is crucial that no applicant be allowed to purchase a higher benefit 
amount than is justified by his or her income. 
1.4 Overview 
We will explore some of the mathematics of disability income in-
surance in the U.S. and Canada. In particular, Section 2 describes the 
underlying model and the basic notation used throughout the paper. 
Section 3 describes the concept of claims costs and contrasts it with 
benefit cash flows. The statutory active life reserve and the disabled life 
reserve are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 describes two approaches 
to calculating profits: the claim cost profit model and the statutory profit 
model. Section 6 provides an overview of the techniques used in pricing 
disability income insurance: the loss ratio technique, the percentage of 
premium profit method, and the asset share and the return on invest-
ment techniques. Section 7 shows how to calculate cash flows. Section 
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8 deals with waiver of premiums. Section 9 investigates the impact of 
relaxing some of the assumptions (in Section 2) on the model. Section 
10 reviews a sample asset share calculation presented by Bluhm and 
Koppel (1988, Chapter 4). The appendix contains a numerical example. 
For an overview of the mathematics of disability income insurance 
in Europe, see Gregorius (1993), Hertzman (1993), Mackay (1993), and 
Segerer (1993). 
2 The Model 
Consider a closed block of individual disability income insurance 
poliCies (to be described in Section 2.1). This block is assumed to consist 
of homogeneous business cells in which all policyholders have common 
parameters (characteristics) such as issue age, occupation class, elimi-
nation period, waiting period for waiver of premiums, and gender. Each 
cell is defined by the value of e, a vector of parameters. To be precise, 
e = (issue age, gender, occupation class, elimination period, waiting 
period for waiver of premiums). For example, a cell may consist of 
policies sold to female surgeons with issue age 45, a 30 day elimina-
tion period, and a 180 day waiting period for waiver of premiums. This 
yields e = (45, female, surgeon, 30, 180). 
Throughout the rest of this paper, the symbol e will be used to de-
note a particular business cell. We will develop functions and expres-
sions that are dependant on e. In most of these cases, e appears as a 
subscript. 
2.1 The Policy 
Consider an individual disability income insurance policy with the 
following features: 
1. The policy is sold only to those individuals who are active (not 
disabled) at the time of issue. 
2. An insured receives benefits if and only if the insured is disabled 
for a continuous period of time in excess of the elimination period. 
The definition of disability is not important here, suffice to say 
that the definition chosen will affect the probabilities of disability 
and recovery. 
3. Premiums are not necessarily level and are paid annually. 
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4. There is a waiver of premium if the insured remains disabled for 
a period of time in excess of the waiting period for waiver of pre-
miums. Premium payments resume upon recovery. 
5. Benefits are paid up to age 65. 
6. The unit of benefit is $1/12 per month. 
2.2 Mortality, Morbidity, Recovery, and Lapses 
There are three sources of decrement at work on the in-force popu-
lation: (i) voluntary lapsation; (ii) death while on claim; and (iii) death 
while not on claim. The mortality rates of insureds on claim are dif-
ferent from those of insureds not on claim. In addition, the mortality 
rates of insureds who have been on claim and who since have recovered 
may be different from those who have never been on claim. Finally, the 
voluntary lapse rates of insureds who have been on claim are almost 
certainly lower than the voluntary lapse rates of insureds who have 
never been on claim. Those who have benefited from the contract are 
more likely to hold onto it. 
In practice, the disability income insurance actuary uses a single 
set of tables, called lapse tables, to decrement the in-force population. 
These tables express the three sources of decrement mentioned above 
as a single aggregate source of decrement. Separate lapse tables for 
insureds who have been on claim and insureds who have never been on 
claim are not used. 
The in-force population can be divided into two subpopulations: the 
active population and the claim population. 
1. The active population is the population exposed to the risk of dis-
ablement. There are three sources of decrement and one source 
of increment on the active population: 
(a) Voluntary lapsation; 
(b) Death while not on claim; 
(c) Migration from the active population to the claim population; 
and 
(d) Recovery from claim (the one source of increment). 
We will assume initially that we can identify the active population 
with the in-force population. That is, the population exposed to 
risk will be calculated by taking the in-force population at time 
of issue and decrementing only for voluntary lapsation, death on 
claim, and death not on claim. 
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2. The claim population consists of those persons who are receiving 
disability benefits. Thus, disabled persons who are not receiving 
a benefit are not considered as being on claim. There are two 
sources of decrement and one source of increment on the claim 
population: 
(a) Death while on claim; 
(b) Recovery from claim; and 
(c) Going on claim (the one source of increment). 
When measuring the size of the active population during the year, 
migration to the claim population and return from claim to the active 
population will be ignored. We make this assumption for two reasons. 
First, the claim population is very small relative to the active population, 
so little error results from identifying the active population with the 
entire population in-force. Second, tracking the continuous two way 
migration between active and claim population is a tedious process, 
and we want to keep the model as simple as possible. In Section 9.2, we 
will describe a way to track this two way migration at discrete intervals. 
A set of morbidity tables with two decrements (death on claim and 
recovery from claim) is used to project increments and decrement to 
the claim population. Claim incurral is the sole source of increment. As 
with lapse rates, the disability income insurance actuary does not use 
a multiple decrement table. Instead he or she uses claim termination 
rates that combine termination due to death and recovery. 
The rate of claim incurral for insureds who have never filed a claim 
is undoubtedly different from the incurral rate for those who have filed. 
claims in the past. In practice, the disability income actuary uses ag-
gregate rates of claim incurral drawn from a single set of morbidity 
tables that do not distinguish the two groups of insureds. In addition, 
because policyholders are assumed to pay premiums annually, volun-
tary lapsations only occur at policy anniversaries. While premiums are 
being waived for a disabled insured, the policy cannot lapse. 
Given these three decrements (mortality, morbidity, and lapses) and 
the increment (recovery), a separate combined mortality-dis ability-lapse 
table is w~ed for each occupation class and gender. The mortality-
recovery table for disabled lives will be a select table with age at time 
of disability and duration of disability as the parameters in the table. 
For ease of computation, the following assumptions are made: 
1. The incidence of claim is distributed uniformly throughout the 
year. Thus, given that there are Ee(n) units of claim at the start 
of the nth policy year and that re (n) is the incidence rate of claim, 
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then the expected number of claims in the interval (t, t + dt), with 
0< t < 1, is Ee(n)re(n)dt. 
2. Deaths and lapses in the in-force population occur at the end of 
the policy year. 
3. The population on claim is so small relative to the active pop-
ulation that we initially will assume that the units of insurance 
exposed to risk are unaffected by claim incurrals and recoveries. 
The effects of relaxing these assumptions are investigated in Section 9. 
2.3 Notation 
Some of the more basic symbols used in the model will be defined 
and assumptions for the model presented. 
e = A vector of parameters that characterize each business 
cell; 
i = The valuation rate of interest; 
v = The annual discount factor, i.e., v = 1/(1 + i); 
x = The issue age, x = 15,16,17, ... ; 
z = The attained age = x + n - 1; 
n = The policy year of disablement, n = 1,2,3, ... ; 
m = The current policy year m = n, n + 1, ... ; 
e = The length of the elimination period (measured in years). 
It is the minimum length of time the insured must be 
disabled in order to qualify for benefits; 
w = The length of the waiting period (measured in years) to 
qualify for waiver of premium, with w > e; 
b = The length of the benefit period (measured in years). 
Usually the benefit period extends to age 65. Note, 
b > w > e; 
re(n) = The incidence rate of claim in the nth policy year for 
a policy with parameter e, i.e., the probability that an 
active insured (currently age x+n-1) from the business 
cell with parameter e becomes disabled and remains 
disabled for at least the length of the elimination period; 
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Ee(n) = The number of units7 of insurance exposed to risk in 
the nth policy year for a policy with parameter e; 
Pe (n) = The annual premium per unit of insurance in-force dur-
ing the nth policy year for a policy with parameter e; 
se(Y, n) = The probability that a policyholder (with parameter e) 
who is disabled in the nth policy year and remained 
disabled throughout the elimination period will stay on 
claim (Le., receive benefits) for at least Y consecutive 
years into the future. Also, Se (y, n) = 0 when y is 
greater than the length of the benefit period; 
BCe(n, m) = The benefit cash outflow in the mth policy year to claim-
ants (with parameter e) who are disabled in the nth pol-
icy year; and 
Ween, m) = The amount of premium waived at the beginning of the 
mth policy year on claimants (with parameter e) who 
are disabled in the nth policy year. 
3 Claim Cost 
Before introducing the concept of a claim cost, let us review the way 
PDBe(n), the projected death benefit cash outflow in the nth policy 
year on a single life insurance policy with parameter e, is calculated. 
Once mortality and lapse assumptions are chosen for pricing purposes, 
the life actuary easily can determine PDBe(n) as follows: 
PDBe(n) = qe(n)DBe(n) 
where qe(n) is the mortality rate in the nth policy year, and DBe(n) is 
the number of dollars of death benefit exposed to risk during the nth 
policy year for a policy with characteristics e. 
For a disability income product, however, the calculation is more 
complex because the benefit is an annuity, not a single lump sum pay-
ment. The pricing actuary Simplifies the problem by calculating a claim 
cost. For poliCies issued at age x, the claim cost associated with the nth 
policy year, CCe(n), is given by: 
CCe(n) = v e re(n)Ee(n)ae(z) 
7 A unit of insurance is defined as $1 of annual benefit paid monthly until recovery 
or the end of the benefit period. 
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where ae(x) is the actuarial present value of an annuity paying $1 per 
year (paid monthly) after the elimination period ends to a life who is 
disabled at age z in the nth policy year.8 In other words, a claim cost 
associates with a policy year the present value of all future monies that 
will be paid to a policyholder whose date of disablement is in that year. 
In life insurance, future death benefits in a closed group of co-
horts are a function of two random processes: lapses and mortality. 
In disability income insurance, the extent of future claim payments in 
a closed group of cohorts depends on lapses, the incidence of claims, 
and the severity of claims. The fact that the claim severity is random 
is one of the reasons why the claim experience on disability income 
insurance is inherently more volatile than the claim experience on life 
insurance. It is also one of the reasons why disability income insurance 
has more in common with property/casualty insurance than it has with 
life insurance. 
Lapses, the incidence of claims, and the severity of claims vary by 
age, gender, occupation class, elimination period, policy age, and the 
contract's definition of disability. They also are affected by many other 
factors, some of which the pricing actuary cannot quantify easily (such 
as the state of the economy, for example). The claim incidence rate 
increases with age. In addition, the claim incidence rate decreases as 
the elimination period increases; it is higher for women than for men, 
at least when women are in their child-bearing years-it is possible this 
relationship reverses at advanced ages. The greater the physical stress 
of an occupation, the higher is the claim incidence rate. 
The severity of a claim (Le., the annuity factor) also varies with the 
benefit period and the interest rate. The seriousness of a claim gener-
ally increases with age. On the other hand, the benefit period shrinks 
as the insured ages. A policyholder with a benefit period to age 65, for 
example, can stay on claim for ten years if disabled at age 55. He or she 
can stay on claim only for five years if disabled at age 60. This can lead 
to a curious pattern: as a block Of poliCies ages, claim costs first will 
increase. As insureds reach their late fifties or early sixties, claim costs 
can decrease as the shrinking benefit period causes claim severity to 
become smaller. 
Unlike claim incidence, claim severity rises as the elimination pe-
riod increases. This is because a long elimination period screens those 
claims that would have closed relatively early. For example, in compar-
ing an insured with a 30 day elimination period to an insured with a 
90 day elimination period, the latter must be disabled more seriously 
BEy convention, CCe(n) is valued as of the date of disablement. 
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than the former to get on claim. But if they get on claim, the latter 
is expected to remain on claim longer. The author frequently has ob-
served that claim severity in the less skilled occupation classes is less 
than that in the highly skilled occupation classes. In other words, blue 
and gray collar workers return to work faster than white collar work-
ers. This is the case even when differences in elimination period and 
age distribution are accounted for.9 
Let He (z) denote the claim cost per unit at attained age z, then: 
He(z) = vere(n)ae([z + 1/2] + e, b) (1) 
where ae ([z + 1/2] + e, b) = the actuarial present value of an annuity of 
$1 per year (paid monthly) for at most b years starting at age z + 1/2 + e 
to a life (with parameter 9) disabled at age z + 1/2. Age at disability is 
taken to be z + 1/2 because it is assumed that, on average, disability 
begins in the middle of the policy year. The annuity starts at z + 1/2 + e 
because payment commences after the elimination period is completed. 
The annuity is contingent on the insured remaining disabled. The claim 
cost now can be rewritten as 
CCe(n) = Ee(n)He(z). (2) 
4 Reserves 
First let us introduce two important items that appear on the bal-
ance sheet of the disability income insurer: the active life reserve and 
the claim reserve. Roughly speaking, the active life reserve is that part 
of the liability for future claims (yet to occur) that must be prefunded, 
and the claim reserve is the liability for claims that already have been in-
curred. In more precise language, the active life reserve is the expected 
present value of future claim costs minus the expected present value of 
future net premiums. It is analogous to the policy reserves held on life 
insurance contracts. The claim reserve is another item that makes dis-
ability income insurance similar to property/casualty insurance. It is 
the expected present value of all future payments, both contingent and 
noncontingent, that will be made on claims that have been incurred. 
For a more thorough discussion of the active life reserve and the claim 
reserve, see Bartleson (1968) and Shapland (1988, Chapter 5). 
gOne explanation may be that the higher claim incidence rate among blue collar 
workers causes the lower severity. High claim incidence means there are many claims 
for conditions that are not serious, so they close quickly. Another is that insureds in the 
lower skilled occupations have less generous contracts, giving them greater incentive 
to return to work. 
62 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.1, 1994 
The formula for the statutory active life reserve at the beginning of 
the nth policy year, V~aa) (x, n), on a single unit of insurance issued at 
age x and continuable until attainment of age 65 is: 
65-z 
V~aa)(x,n) = I vkkP~aa)[vl/21/2p~~1)He(z+k) -P;] (3) 
k=O 
where He is defined in equation (1), and kP~aa) is the probability that 
an active life age in cell e (with issue age x) survives k years. 10 To avoid 
cumbersome notation, the e is not shown; P; is the statutory net level 
premium payable to age 65 for a unit of insurance issued an active life 
age in cell e. 
Again, a claim is assumed to be incurred, on average, in the middle 
of the policy year; hence, the presence of 1/2 in the exponent of v 
and the subscript of the probability of survival p. We assume that the 
reserve is established on a level premium contract. The terminal active 
life reserve is calculated by multiplying the above reserve per unit by 
the number of units in-force. As equation (3) is to be used to calculate 
statutory reserves, values of H, v, p, and P will be specified by state 
regulation and may bear little resemblance to the actuary's best guess 
assumptions about interest rates and future morbidity. 
The claim reserve is more complex. At any given time, the popu-
lation of insureds on claim will be the sum of several closed cohorts. 
Each cohort is defined by the amount of time it has been on claim. Let 
Re(n, m) be the statutory claim reserve at the beginning of the mth 
policy year (or the end of the (m - 1) st policy year) on those claimants 
disabled during the nth policy year. The total claim reserve at the be-
ginning of the mth policy year, Re(m), is the sum of the claim reserve 
on m - 1 cohorts, 
m-l 
Re(m) = I Re(n, m). 
n=l 
Now Re(n, m) is a function of two quantities: (i) the number of units 
of insurance disabled in the nth year still on claim at the beginning of 
the mth year; and (ii) the claim reserve established on a single unit 
disabled in the nth year and still on claim at the beginning of the mth 
year. Later we will develop the formula for the number of units disabled 
in the nth year still on claim at the beginning of the mth year. The claim 
lOOnce a person is insured, a reserve is maintained for her or him. Even if she or he 
is on claim, an active life reserve is maintained for her or him because she or he could 
go on claim again after recovery. 
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reserve factor for a single unit of insurance disabled in the nth year and 
still on claim at the beginning of the mth year is V~ii) (n, m), i.e., 
12(b-(m-n-e-l/2» 
V(ii) ( ) _ '" ~ k/12 (ii) e n, m - L 12 V k/12P[z+1/21+m-n-l/2 
k=l 
(4) 
which is the present value of a $1/12 per month annuity. The notation 
k/2P~~ill/21+t denotes the probability an insured who became disabled 
at exact age z + 1/2 and has remained disabled for t years will remain on 
claim for at least another k months. The term 12 (b - (m - n -1 /2 - e» 
is the number of months remaining in the benefit period. Again, we 
assume that disablement occurs on average in the middle of the policy 
year. The values of p(ii) and v are specified by statutory regulation and 
may not coincide with the pricing actuary's best guess estimate of what 
will happen. 
Let De(n, m) be the number of units of insurance disabled in the 
nth year and still on claim at the start of the mth policy year; then 
(ii) Re(n,m) = Ve (n,m)De(n,m). (5) 
5 Profits 
We present here two general approaches to measuring profit (for a 
homogeneous group of policies with parameter e) in disability income 
insurance. Each provides a formula for annual recognition of profit. It 
should be evident by the end of this discussion that the two approaches 
do not recognize the same profit year by year. Throughout this section, 
we will drop the subscript from the symbols to reduce clutter. We must 
remember, however, that the totals in this section apply to the business 
cell with parameter e. 
5.1 The Claim Cost Profit Model 
Under a claim cost pricing model, the total profit from cell e in the 
nth policy year, PROF}fC), is given by the following formula: 
PROF}fC) = Pn + In - EXPn - COMn - CCn - (ALR~) - ALR~» (6) 
where Pn is the total premium earned; In is the total investment income; 
EXP n is the total expenses; COM n is the total commissions from cell e; 
CC n is the total claim cost incurred during the nth policy year; ALR~) is 
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the total active life reserve at the end of the year; and ALR};') is the total 
active life reserve at the beginning of the nth policy year. Premiums, 
expenses, and commissions are calculated in much the same way as 
they are for life insurance. The AIR terms are calculated by multiplying 
equation (3) by the number of units of insurance in-force, i.e., 
ALR(b) 
n v~a) (n)Ee(n) 
ALR(e) 
n V~a) (n + 1)Ee(n + 1). 
We uncover a serious flaw in the claim cost pricing model when we 
try to calculate investment income, In. The reader may be tempted to 
calculate it as: 
where i is the assumed rate of interest. Again, we have assumed that 
claim costs are incurred in the middle of the policy year. It is a mis-
take to subtract the entire value v 1/ 2CCn , however, because CCn is a 
lump sum representing a series of cash flows that may be spread over 
many future years. Only the portion that is disbursed in the current 
year should be subtracted; the insurer is free to invest the remainder 
until payment is due. Because the claim cost pricing model does not 
divide that lump sum into money disbursed now and money disbursed 
later, it cannot correctly allocate investment income by policy year. The 
statutory profit model corrects this flaw. 
5.2 The Statutory Profit Model 
Statutory book profit, PROP~), is given by the equation: 
PROP(S) , n Pn + In - EXPn - COMn - BENn 
- (CR~) - CR};'» - (ALR~) - ALR};'» (8) 
where BENn represents the actual benefits paid in cell e, CR};') and CR~) 
are the total claim reserve at the beginning and the end of the nth policy 
year. The only apparent difference between equations (6) and (8) is that 
claim cost has been replaced by benefits paid plus the change in claim 
reserve. Are equation (6) and equation (8) equal? They typically will not 
be. Claim costs are projected using pricing mortality-morbidity tables 
and interest rates. Statutory claim reserves are measured using statu-
tory mortality-morbidity tables and interest rates. It is highly unlikely 
that quantities derived from different assumptions will be equal. 
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Under the statutory profit model, investment income is: 
In = i X (Pn + ALR}fl + CR}fl - EXPn - COMn - v 1/ 2BENn ). (9) 
Notice that in equation (9) investment income is counted on all monies 
held in reserve and that the active life reserve earns interest, but the 
claim reserve is ignored. In equation (9), benefits paid in a given year are 
subtracted from revenue before applying an interest rate, but money for 
future benefits earns interest until the benefits are paid. If the pricing 
actuary needs to project the year by year pattern by which statutory 
profit emerges, claim costs cannot be used. The pricing actuary instead 
must calculate benefit cash flows. 
6 Overview of Pricing Techniques 
This section discusses some of the methods used to determine pre-
mium rates for disability income insurance. The list is by no means 
exhaustive. 
6.1 The Loss Ratio Technique 
Before describing this technique, we must define what is meant by 
the loss ratio. The term loss ratio usually is understood to be the frac-
tion of the policyholders' premiums that is returned in benefits. That 
sounds simple enough, yet there is great confusion about what a loss 
ratio is and significant disagreement about how it is calculated. A loss 
ratio can be retrospective or prospective. It can be applied over the 
entire life of a block of business or to a single experience year. It 
can be calculated with GAAP reserves, statutory reserves, natural re-
serves, or no reserves at all. It can be calculated using a realistic in-
terest rate, a statutory interest rate, or no interest rate at all. Claim 
settlement expenses can be added to the numerator of the loss ratio 
(property/casualty insurance) or play no part in the calculation of the 
loss ratio (health insurance). (See Pharr, 1979, with discussion.) 
For our purposes, the term loss ratio is defined to be the ratio of 
the expected present value of future benefits that will be paid over the 
business cell to the expected present value of future premiums that will 
be collected from the business cell. This is a prospective lifetime loss 
ratio. When calculating the relevant present values, the author recom-
mends that we discount for voluntary lapsation as well as mortality and 
that we use a realistic rate of interest, not the statutory valuation rate. 
This view is not shared by all actuaries. 
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Once the question of how to calculate a loss ratio is settled, the loss 
ratio technique becomes the simplest approach of all. It can be broken 
down into three steps: 
1. Calculate the present value of future claim costs on a single unit 
of insurance. 
2. Calculate a level net premium rate by dividing the result of step 1 
by an annuity factor. 
3. Calculate a gross premium by dividing the net premium from step 
2 by a target loss ratio. For example, assume the present value of 
future claim costs is $50. Assume the present value of an annuity 
due of $1 per year over the life of the insurance contract is $ 5. 
Assume the target loss ratio is 50 percent. Then 50/ (5xO.5) = $20 
is that gross premium rate for which the expected present value 
of future benefits divided by the expected present value of future 
premiums is 50 percent. Note that in step 1 you could calculate 
the present value of future benefit cash flows in place of future 
claim costs. Claim costs, however, are suited perfectly for this 
technique. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to the loss ratio method. 
The most important advantage is its simplicity. The formulae are easy 
to understand, and no assumptions for future expenses are needed. 
One doesn't even need to know precisely what the commission scales 
are. This simplicity is also its most important disadvantage; the differ-
ence between gross and net premiums may not be sufficient to cover 
expenses and commissions. Nevertheless, if a company's expenses or 
commissions are unacceptably high, the pricing actuary may be com-
pelled to use the loss ratio technique. 
A minimum loss ratio is required by law or regulation in most states. 
Taking the minimum loss ratio as a pricing target, the actuary can solve 
for the maximum premium that legally can be charged. Once the actu-
ary knows how much premium is left after paying benefits, he or she 
can solve for target expense and commission levels down to which ac-
tuallevels should be managed. Another advantage is that if the target 
loss ratio is set high enough, the method automatically produces a rate 
manual whose anticipated loss ratio exceeds the required minimum. 
This has not been a significant advantage of late. Anticipating a certain 
loss ratio is one thing, experiencing it is another. Despite all the confu-
sion regarding correct loss ratio calculation, one unambiguous lesson 
has emerged from the last half of the 1980s: the least of the industry's 
worries is that the loss ratio will be too low. 
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6.2 Percentage of Premium Profit Method 
This method is similar to the equation method in life insurance ex-
cept that the present value of future death benefits is replaced by the 
present value of future claim costs. The pricing actuary takes as his or 
her target a certain percentage of the present value of premiums that 
will go to profit. The actuary projects the present value of claim costs, 
expenses, etc., and solves for that premium rate at which a sufficient 
percentage of premium will be left to meet or exceed the target set. 
Claim costs are suited perfectly to this technique. Again, the present 
value of future claim costs could be replaced by the present value of 
future benefit cash flows to obtain the same result. 
Because the percentage of premium profit method makes explicit 
provision for commissions, expenses, and taxes, it is superior to the 
loss ratio technique. A major shortcoming of the percentage of pre-
mium profit method is that it does not quantify the risk/reward re-
lationship. How great a percentage of premium profit is sufficient to 
compensate the insurer for taking the disability risk? How does a risky 
disability income portfolio with a 10 percent of premium profit com-
pare with a risk-free Treasury bill paying a 3 percent return? 
As noted earlier, disability income insurance has volatile claim ex-
perience. In part this is due to the extra random process in morbidity, 
the claim severity, and the fact that the insured exercises some control 
over morbidity, possibly electing to be on claim rather than being put 
on claim by forces beyond his or her control. Disability income insur-
ance is risky business for a variety of reasons, and the faint of heart are 
driven from the marketplace. A pricing method should produce a rate 
manual that is not merely profitable, but is more profitable than one 
for a less risky line of business. 
6.3 The Asset Share Technique 
As with life insurance, the profit target for disability income insur-
ance can be set as a certain asset share by a certain policy year. Al-
ternatively, the target could be set as a certain level of surplus by a 
certain year, where surplus could be defined as the difference between 
the asset share and the total statutory reserve. Claim costs are not 
appropriate for the calculation of asset shares. One cannot take the as-
set share equation for life insurance, substitute claim cost incurred for 
death benefits paid, and consider the result to be the disability income 
insurance asset share equation. 
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An asset share is the a<::cumulation, per unit of insurance in-force, of 
all cash inflows to date minus all cash outflows to date. Every variable 
in the equation for asset share represents a cash flow. A claim cost is 
not a cash flow, hoWever; it is a lump sum assigned to a single policy 
year and is equal to the present value of a series of cash flows that may 
spread over several future years. In the first policy year, the claim cost 
is higher than the benefit cash flow because the claim cost includes 
payments that will be made in future years. A claim cost pricing model 
understates the first year asset share. There may be subsequent years 
in which the claim cost is less than the benefit cash flow because some 
claimants disabled in prior policy years will be collecting benefits in 
the current year; each year's claim cost measures payments only to 
claimants whose disal;Jilities commenced in that year. 
Bluhm and Koppel (1988) present a sample asset share calculation. 
An attempt is made to calculate benefit cash flows using claim costs and 
changes in claim reserve. After developing our own model to project 
benefit cash flows, we will discuss some of the problems inherent in 
their method and show how it can be rehabilitated.!l 
6.4 The Return on Investment Technique 
With this method, the pricing actuary projects future book profits 
and then solves for the return on investment (ROI). The ROI is the dis-
count rate at which the present value of renewal year profits equals 
the loss in the first policy year. The profit target is a threshold ROI. In 
the author's opinion, this technique is superior to the other methods 
presented above because it quantifies the insurer's reward for bearing 
the significant risk of competing in the disability income marketplace. 
The rational investor only increases risk if he or she has a reasonable 
expectation of a higher return (and insurance company shareholders 
are, we presume, rational investors). 
If the risk of selling disability income is higher than that of selling 
term life, then the insurer is entitled to expect a higher ROI from the 
former product than from the latter. The ROI pricing technique not 
only allows the insurer to compare disability income to other products, 
but allows the insurer to tailor individual rates to each particular risks 
that it bears. For example, the insurer bears more risk when it sells a 
contract with a lifetime benefit period than when it sells a contract with 
a benefit period of only one year. The rates should be set so that the 
llThese comments are not intended to detract from the qUality of the articles con-
tained in this excellent text. The author highly recommends the O'Grady textbook. 
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insurer's expected ROI on lifetime contracts is higher than that on one 
year benefit period contracts. 
It is here that we come to the most serious defect of a pricing model 
based on claim costs instead of cash flows. While claim costs can be 
used to project the present value of profit over the entire life of a block 
of business, they cannot be used to project the year by year pattern by 
which statutory book profit emerges. Consequently, a claim cost pric-
ing model cannot measure ROI correctly. This is because claim costs 
are calculated with pricing assumptions, while statutory claim reserves 
are calculated with assumptions specified by regulatory authorities. 
If pricing assumptions are more liberal than statutory assumptions 
(not a given in today's morbidity environment), then claim costs will be 
lower than benefits paid plus change in claim reserve in the early policy 
years. At this time a claim cost pricing model will overstate statutory 
book profit. In later years the inequality will reverse as money released 
from the claim reserve makes the real book profit higher than that pre-
dicted by a claim cost pricing model. Therefore, if pricing assumptions 
are more liberal than statutory valuation assumptions, a claim cost pric-
ing model will recognize profit earlier than would emerge unqer statu-
tory accounting and will overstate the ROI that will be realized. 
In summary, if an insurer places any importance on estimating the 
asset shares or the ROI of a new disability contract it contemplates 
introducing, the actuary must translate pricing assumptions into cash 
flows, not claim costs. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to 
a model for doing this. 
7 Cash Flows on the Base Policy 
We now develop a model to calculate BCe(n, m), the value of the 
benefit cash outflow in the mth policy year to claimants with dates of 
disablement in the nth policy year. As an example, consider a business 
cell consisting of disability income poliCies that will expire five years 
after issue. Let 
BCe(1,1) BCe (1 , 2) BCe (1 , 3) BCe(1,4) BCe(1,5) 
BCe(2, 2) BCe(2,3) BCe(2,4) BCe(2,5) 
BCe(3,3) BCe(3,4) BCe(3,5) 
BCe(4,4) BCe(4,5) 
BCe(5,5) 
be the matrix of benefit cash flows. 
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The total benefit cash flow in the first year is BCe(l, 1). In the second 
policy year, money is paid to some claimants with disablement dates 
in the first policy year, BCe(l, 2), and money is paid to claimants with 
disablement dates in the second policy year, BCe (2,2). The total benefit 
cash flow in the second policy year is BCe(l, 2) + BCe(2, 2), the sum of 
the entries in the second column of the array. Likewise, the cash flow 
~n the third policy year is the sum of entries in the third column, and so 
forth for all other policy years. It is interesting to note what happens 
if we move across a row of the array rather than down a column. If 
the series of cash flows BCe (1,1), BCe (1,2), BCe (1,3), BCe(l, 4), and 
BC e (l, 5) are discounted for interest back to policy issue, the result is 
the claim cost in the first policy year. The total cash outflow in the mth 
policy year, TCOe(m), is the sum of entries in the nth column, i.e., 
m 
TCOe(m) = I BCe(k, m). 
k=l 
In addition, the total claim cost in the nth policy year, TCCe(n), is the 
result of discounting the entries in the nth row back to the nth policy 
year, i.e., 
00 
TCCe(n) = I v m - n +1/ 2BCe(n,m). 
m=n 
This illustrates the flexibility of a cash flow model. From cash flows 
you can calculate claim costs. From claim costs you cannot calculate 
cash flows. 
Next we turn our attention to the calculation of BCe(n, m) for a unit 
of benefit. This task is divided into the three cases shown below. For 
simplicity, the benefit of $1 per year is assumed to be paid continu-
ously. 
Case 1, m = n: BCe(n, m) is the benefit cash flow in the nth policy 
year to claimants with dates of disablement in that same year. Ee(n) 
units of insurance are exposed to risk at the start of the nt):l policy 
year. The number of those units that will go on claim during the time 
period (t, t + dt) (with 0 < t < 1) by completing the elimination period 
is re(n)Ee(n)dt. At time t + e these claimants will begin to accrue 
benefits. The number of units disabled during the time interval [t, t + 
dt] that are still on claim at time t + e + y is re(n)Ee(n)se(Y, n)dt. 
Each unit of insurance that is on claim at time t + e + Y is paid dy 
during the interval [t + e + y, t + e + y + dy]. The final equation is: 
f
l-e fl-e-t 
BCe(n, n) = re(n)Ee(n) t=O y=O se(y, n)dydt. (10) 
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Note the upper limits of integration. If an insured becomes disabled 
after time t = 1 - e, he or she will not complete the elimination period 
before the end of the nth policy year. If an insured begins to accrue 
benefits at t + e, then when y > 1 - (t + e), he or she will have reached 
the end of the policy year. 
In practice, a mathematical expression for se(Y, n) may not be avail-
able. Hence, we must use tabulated values from weekly or monthly 
claim termination rates. Therefore, equation (10) is handled best by 
numerical integration. An example is provided in the appendix. 
Case 2, m = n + 1 : The calculation in this case is more complex than 
the previous case because there are two classes of claimants disabled 
in the nth policy year. One class consists of those who completed the 
elimination period before the end of the nth policy year. This class 
began to accrue benefits before the (n + l)st policy year began. The 
time of disablement for all members in this class is t < 1 - e. The other 
class consists of those with time of disablement t > 1 - e. Members of 
the latter class will not satisfy the elimination period and hence will not 
begin to accrue benefits until after the (n + 1) st policy year has begun. 
For claimants who complete the elimination period before the end 
of the nth policy year, the benefit cash outflow in the (n + l)st policy 
year is: 
BC~l) (n, n + 1) = re(n)Ee(n) f=-; I:~:~:-t se(Y, n)dydt. (ll) 
The integrand has remained the same as in Case 1, only the limits of 
integration have changed. As already pointed out for Case 1, a claim 
beginning at time t + e will have lasted for y = 1 - (t + e) years by 
the end of the nth policy year. Note that time 0 is the start of the nth 
policy year, 1 represents the end of that year, 2 represents the end of 
the (n+l)stpolicyyear, and 2- (t+e) is the time on claim for a claimant 
disabled at time t and persisting at least to the end of the (n + 1) st year. 
For those claimants disabled so late in the nth policy year they do 
not complete the elimination period until after the beginning of the 
(n + l)st year, the cash flow in the (n + l)st year is 
BCf) (n, n + 1) = re(n)Ee(n) f=l-e f:~:-t se(y, n)dydt. (12) 
It follows that 
BCe(n, n + 1) = BC~l) (n, n + 1) + BC~2) (n, n + 1). (13) 
Case 3, m > n + 1 : This is the simplest case of the three. Given, as 
we have assumed, that the elimination period is not more than one year, 
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by the end of the (n + l)st policy year all claimants with disablement 
dates in the nth policy year will have satisfied the elimination period. 
Thus 
I
I Im+l-n-e-t 
BCo(n, m) = ro(n)Eo(n) t=O y=m-n-e-t so(y, n)dydt. (14) 
8 Waiver of Premium Cash Flows 
Waiver of premiums can be modeled as a cash flow to the insured 
where the benefit is his or her premium; that is, we assume claimants 
pay their premiums and then immediately receive reimbursements from 
their insurer. Because some insurers do not pay commissions on waived 
premiums, the financial impact of the waiver benefit may be less than 
that of 100 percent reimbursement. We assume the benefit is equiv-
alent to 100 percent reimbursement and that the waiting period for 
waiver is less than one year. 
Calculating Wo(n, m) is easier than calculating BCo(n, m). While 
claim payments can occur at any time during the policy year, in our 
model premiums can be waived only on policy anniversaries, making 
Wo(n, n) = O. Thus, we only need to evaluate single integrals rather 
than double integrals. 
Case 1, m = n + 1 : Wo(n, n+ 1) is the amount of premium waived at 
the beginning of the (n + 1) st policy year on insureds with disablement 
dates in the nth policy year. Insureds disabled in the nth policy year 
divide into two classes, those disabled at time t < 1 - wand those 
disabled at time t > 1 - w. If an insured's disablement occurs at time 
t > l-w, she or he will not satisfy the waiver waiting period by the time 
the (n + 1) st premium is due, but she or he will be reimbursed once 
the waiting period is completed. If an insured's time of disablement is 
t < 1 - wand he or she still is disabled when the (n + l)st premium is 
due, it will be waived. 
First we will handle the case in which t > l-w. By our assumption of 
uniform distribution of claim incidence, the probability that an insured 
exposed during the interval 1 - w < t < 1 will go on claim is w x r 0 (n). 
But ro (n) merely gives the incidence rate of a disability lasting at least 
e units of time. In order to go on waiver, the insured must stay disabled 
an additional w - e units of time. (Recall our assumption that e :0; w.) 
Thus, the full probability that an insured will become disabled during 
the interval [1 - w, 1) and remain disabled long enough to satisfy the 
waiver of premium waiting period is w x ro(n)so(w - e, n). 
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Those insureds who were disabled in the interval (t, t + dt) with 
t < 1 - w will go on claim at time t + e and merely need to stay on claim 
for 1 - (t + e) units of time (until the start of the (n + 1) st policy year) to 
have their (n + 1)st premium waived. The probability this happens is 
re(n)se(1- e - t, n). Thus, the total premium waived on both of these 
types of insureds is: 
We(n,n + 1) Pere(n)Ee(n)[w se(w - e, n) 
f
l-W 
+ se(1 - e - t, n)dt]. 
t=O 
(15) 
Case 2, m > n + 1 : As w is not greater than one year, all claimants 
disabled in the nth policy year who still are disabled at the beginning 
of the mth policy year will be on waiver. These insureds will have 
remained on claim for m - (n + t + e) years. The premium waived 
is: 
We(n, m) = Pere(n)Ee(n) L~o se(m - n - e - t, n)dt. (16) 
In Section 2.3, we asserted that Se (t, n) = 0 when t is greater than the 
length of the benefit period. The pricing actuary must bear in mind 
that the benefit period for waiver of premium need not be equal to the 
policy's base benefit period. If periods are not equal, then the survivor-
ship function used to project We (n, m) will be different from that used 
to project BCe(n, m). 
Even a contract with a benefit period as short as one year typically 
will permit the insured to remain on waiver until he or she attains the 
age at which the policy expires. If a claimant still is disabled after he 
or she reaches the end of the benefit period, the waiver of premium 
provision will keep the policy in-force. The policy is still of value be-
cause he or she later may recover, return to work, resume payment of 
premiums, and then go on claim again. The benefit period is a limit on 
the amount of time the insured can collect for a single claim, not a limit 
on the total time the insured may collect during the life of the pOlicy.12 
9 Modifications to the Model 
With slight modifications, the model can be adapted to situations 
that do not fit all of the assumptions listed in Section 2. 
12 During a claim audit, the author came across some insureds who twice had collected 
benefits successfully for the maximum length of time. 
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9.1 Nonannual Premium Payments 
If premiums are paid j times per year, the units of insurance exposed 
to risk no longer will be constant between policy anniversaries. In this 
case, we need to make Ee(n) a function of the variable t as well as the 
variable n. For the time being, let us ignore the effects of claim inci-
dence and recovery. In this case, let q~W) (n) be the policy withdrawal 
rate in the nth policy year and EV) (n, t) be the expected number of 
units in-force t (0 :0:; t :0:; 1) years after the start of the nth policy year 
given that premiums are paid j times per year. It easily is seen that 
assuming lapses occur at the time of premium payment. The [y] nota-
tion refers to the greatest integer less than or equal to y. 
9.2 Claim Incidence and Recovery 
Insured lives constantly are migrating between the population ex-
posed to risk for being on claim and the actual population on claim. In 
Section 2 and in equation (17) we chose to ignore this continual decre-
ment and increment under the assumption that in any given policy year 
the population on claim is small relative to the active population. If this 
assumption is relaxed, however, the expected exposure is given by the 
following: 
EU)(n ~ + t) e 'j 
EU) ( k + 1) e n, . 
J 
(1- tre(n))EV)(n,~) for 0:0:; t < IIJ (18) 
J 
(1- ~(re(n) + q~W)(n)))EV)(n,~) (19) 
J J 
for k = 1,2, ... , (j - 1). Again, we have assumed the uniform distribu-
tion of claims hypothesis. 
Tracking the inflow of insurance units as claimants recover and re-
turn to work is more complex. In order to track this inflow continu-
ously, we need an aggregate rate of claim recovery. Remember that the 
claim population consists of distinct cohorts of individuals who were 
disabled at different attained ages and at different policy durations. 
The rate at which a cohort recovers is a strong function of how long 
that cohort has been on claim. In general, the longer an insured has 
been on claim, the less likely he or she is to recover in the near future. 
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The aggregate inflow of recovering insureds is a mixture of lives from 
cohorts that are recovering at different rates. 
To simplify matters, we will assume that premiums are paid once 
per year, i.e., j = 1. In addition, we assume that the net inflows and 
outflows over one year's time from policyholder mortality, claim inci-
dence, and claim recovery are so small that we can wait until the end 
of the policy year to count them. So, instead of tracking the two way 
migration continuously, we only need to do so on policy anniversaries. 
Define De(n, m) to be the number of units of insurance disabled in 
the nth policy year and still disabled by the beginning of the mth policy 
year. 
Case 1, m> n + 1 : An insured disabled between time n + t and 
n + t + dt must have been on claim at least m - n - e - t units of time in 
order to be disabled at the beginning of the mth policy year. Therefore: 
De(n, m) = re(n)Ee(n) Ii Seem - n - e - t, n)dt. (20) 
t=O 
Case 2, m = n + 1 : This case is different because some disabled 
insureds may not have completed the elimination period by the time 
the mth policy year has begun. In this case the value of De(n, m) is: 
De(n, m) = re(n)Ee(n)[e + f=-: se(1 - e - t, n)dt]. (21) 
The first term in equation (21) accounts for those insureds who be-
come disabled during the interval (1 - e, 1) in the nth policy year. The 
net change in exposure due to incurrals/recoveries is the sum of the 
change in the number of units on claim and the number of claims ter-
minated in the preceding year by death. 
9.3 Residual Disability 
Up to this point we have assumed that a unit of insurance on claim is 
paid at the rate of $1 per year. If the insured is on residuaP3 disability, 
this may not be the case. Many disability income contracts sold today 
provide a residual disability benefit. Under such contracts, an insured 
can collect some fraction of his or her full benefit if a disability causes 
the individual to lose a portion of income but does not completely re-
move him or her from the work force. If an insured suffers a 60 percent 
loss of income because a disability renders him or her able to work only 
l3In Goldman (1990) the term residual is used in a different sense. Group and indi-
vidual terminology are not always equivalent. 
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part time or unable to do all of the duties of the occupation, he or she 
can collect 60 percent of the policy's full benefit. The benefit is a func-
tion of income lost, not amount of time unable to work. It is this fact 
that distinguishes the residual disability benefit from a partial disabil-
ity benefit. A partial benefit is based on time lost rather than income 
lost. An insured who can put in a full day's work but loses income be-
cause he or she cannot perform certain key duties could qualify for a 
residual benefit. 
To deal with residual disability benefits, we define a residual benefit 
function, Pe (y, n) to be the fraction of the total benefits paid Y years 
from now to persons who were on residual disability in policy year n. 
For example, suppose 75 percent of all claimants begin their claims on 
total disability and the remaining 25 percent begin on 50 percent of the 
base benefit, then 
Pe(O, n) = 0.75 x 1 + 0.25 x 0.5. 
Once pe(Y, n) is known, we computeBCe(n, m) bymultiplyingse(Y, n) 
and Pe(Y, n) in the integrands. For example, in the case of residual 
disability, equation (14) becomes: 
[1 fm+1-n-e-t 
BCe(n, m) = re(n)Ee(n) Jt=o y=m-n-e-t Pe(Y, n)se(Y, n)dydt. 
10 Analysis of Alternate Method 
As mentioned earlier, Bluhm and Koppel (1988, Chapter 4, pp. 83-
88) present a sample asset share calculation that purports to calcu-
late benefit cash flows using claim costs and statutory claim reserve 
changes. We will point out deficiencies in this method and indicate 
how to correct the method. In addition, we will compare the Bluhm and 
Koppel method and the method presented in this paper. 
Recall the notation used in Section 5.2. The equation used by Bluhm 
and Koppel can be restated as 
(22) 
There are two problems with this equation. First, if the CR terms are 
the statutory reserve, then the equation is not based on assumptions 
that purport to be realistic. Statutory assumptions are supposed to 
be more conservative than rpalistic assumptions in order to ensure re-
serves contain a safety margin. For equation (22) to be correct, the CR 
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terms must denote the natural claim reserve, a reserve based on realis-
tic assumptions.14 
The second problem is that the change in claim reserve needs to be 
adjusted for interest. Equation (22) now will be corrected. Let Re (n, m) 
be the natural claim reserve at the beginning of the mth policy year on 
insureds disabled in the nth policy year, let CCe(m) be the claim cost 
incurred in the mth policy year, and let i be a realistic rate of interest. 
We will calculate BCe(n, m), the benefit cash flow in the mth year to 
insureds disabled in the nth year. 
Case I, n < m: Consider Re(n, m) to be the current balance of a 
fund established to pay benefits to those insureds disabled in the nth 
policy year. Withdrawals are made to pay benefits. Interest is added, 
but no other deposits are made because the original balance of the 
fund exactly matches the present value of the benefits to be paid to the 
cohort of claimants. Then: 
Re(n, m + 1) = (1 + i)Re(n, m) - (1 + i)1/2BCe(n, m). 
We accumulate the reserve at the start of the year for a full year of inter-
est and then subtract the money withdrawn to pay benefits (accounting 
also for the half year of interest lost when the withdrawal is made). 
The result is the fund balance at the end of the year. Rearranging this 
equation yields: 
BCe(n, m) = -(1 + i)1/2[vRe(n, m + 1) - Re(n, m)]. (23) 
Case 2, n = m : At the start of the mth policy year no one could have 
been disabled in the mth policy year. Thus, the fund balance on this 
empty cohort is zero. A deposit must be made to the fund when the 
cohort is established. That deposit is the claim cost. This gives 
Re(m, m + 1) = (1 + i)1/2[CCe(m) - BCe(m, m)] 
which yields 
BCe(m, m) = _[v1/2Re(m, m + 1) - CCe(m)]. (24) 
14This criticism does not strictly apply to the sample calculation presented by Bluhm 
and Koppel because in their example the claim reserves are calculated using pricing 
assumptions. For claims less than two years old, the valuation actuary is allowed to 
measure claim reserves using experience assumptions in place of the statutory valu-
ation table. The Bluhm and Koppel example is for a disability income policy with a 
benefit period of two years. For benefit periods longer than two years, if the pricing 
actuary wishes to use this method, he or she will be obliged to calculate two sets of 
reserves: one realistic, the other statutory. 
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Summing the BCe(n, m) terms from n = 1 to n = m yields the correct 
expression for BENm (as opposed to the expression in equation (22)), 
i.e., 
BENm = CCe(m) - (1 + i)1/2(VCR~) - CR~)). (25) 
Equation (25) may appear to be a lot easier to evaluate than those 
equations with double integrals in Section 7. This is not necessarily the 
case. To use the method in Section 7, the pricing actuary must calculate 
a two dimensional array BCe(n, m)]. To project statutory book profit 
the pricing actuary also must project statutory claim reserves, among 
other things. To use equation (25), the pricing actuary must calculate 
a two dimensional array Re(n, m)] of natural claim reserves as well 
as an array of claim costs. If statutory claim reserves are different 
from natural reserves, the pricing actuary must project statutory claim 
reserves separately. The number of quantities to be calculated using 
equation (25) is larger, not smaller. 
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Appendix 
The following example will demonstrate how the formulae can be 
evaluated to estimate cash flows. We project the amount paid in ben-
efits in the first policy year and the amount of premium waived at the 
beginning of the second policy year. Ee(1) = 1000 units of insurance 
each with $100 per month of benefits ($100,000 per month in-force), 
e = 1/12 (30 day elimination period), W = 1/4 (90 day wait to qualify 
for waiver of premium), re(1) = 0.03, and tabulated values of se(Y, 1) 
are given below: 
Table Al 
Data on Se 
Y se(Y,I) Y se(y,l) 
0/12 1.00 6/12 0.38 
1/12 0.80 7/12 0.36 
2/12 0.66 8/12 0.34 
3/12 0.54 9/12 0.33 
4/12 0.44 10/12 0.32 
5/12 0.40 11/12 0.31 
6/12 0.38 12/12 0.30 
We can use equation (10) and a repeated trapezoidal rule (with monthly 
intervals) to calculate Bee (1, 1). 
From the data given, Bee (1, 1) = $9,255. 
Next we will estimate We (1, 2), the amount of premium waived at 
the start of the second policy year. Assume the annual premium rate, 
Pe, is $10 per unit. From equation (15), 
We(1,2) = Pere(1)Ee(l)[wse(w - e, 1) 
1 11-12w 1 j j - 1 
+ 12 ~ 2"[se(1-e- 12 '1)+Se(1-e----u-,I)] 
}=o 
$l32.00. 
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 2, No.1, 1994 
Cost Containment in Workers' Compensation: 
Evaluating Medical Fee Schedules 
David L. Durbin and Barry I. Llewellyn* 
Abstract 
Medical expenditures in workers' compensation programs have been subjected 
to few cost containment strategies. As workers' compensation costs have es-
calated, however, increasing attention is being given to the role of medical fee 
schedules in containing the prices of medical services. To this end, we develop 
a model for estimating the potential cost savings from implementing medical 
fee schedules. A market basket of medical services received by injured workers 
is constructed. This basket is used to estimate the parameters of the model. In 
addition, the basket is used to determine the impact of imposing a fee sched-
ule linked to usual and customary charges or to the Medicare resource-based 
relative value schedule (RBRVS). 
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relative value schedule (RBRVS) 
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1 Introduction 
The continuing rise in medical expenditures has led to significant 
public policy interest in methods to contain costs. Approximately $900 
billion was spent on health care in the United States in 1993, slightly 
more than 14 percent of the United States' gross domestic product 
(Burnier, Waldo, and McKusick, 1992). Total health care expenditures 
have grown more than 10 percent per year over the past decade. Growth 
rates in expenditures also have been significant for the various social 
insurance programs where medical care either is funded directly by gov-
ernment programs (e.g., Medicaid and Medicare) or mandated by public 
policy (e.g., workers' compensation and private passenger automobile 
insurance). 
For example, the medical cost portion of workers' compensation in-
surance, with payments of more than $20 billion in 1992, is estimated to 
have increased one and one-half times faster than health expenditures 
generally (Nelson, 1992). The absence of formal cost containment pro-
grams in workers' compensation may have contributed to this increase. 
As medical benefits under workers' compensation insurance are es-
sentially unlimited first dollar coverage1 with virtually no restrictions on 
covered services, there have been few opportunities for cost sharing. 2 
Cost-sharing programs have been used widely to contain group and in-
dividual health insurance costs. Newhouse, Phelps, and Marquis (1980) 
and Jacobs (1991) have shown that consumers (patients) of health care 
are price conscious, i.e., they respond to economic incentives provided 
through the price of care.3 This suggests that there is a downward 
sloping demand for medical care. 
As with every other form of medical care, there has been increased 
attention paid to workers' compensation medical costs. There have 
been two main avenues by which cost containment traditionally has 
been pursued. The first involves setting fee limits on the speCific medi-
cal services provided. Twenty-eight states currently have formal medi-
cal fee schedules in place regulating the price per service performed by 
I Unlimited first dollar coverage refers to coverage with no copayments, deductibles, 
or policy limits. 
20ver the past year or two, a couple of states have removed the prohibition on 
cost sharing in limited circumstances (e.g., where medical care is provided by a man-
aged care network and the claimant has reached the point of maximum medical 
improvemen t.) 
3Research from the Rand health experiment estimates that the price elasticity of 
demand for health (when consumers have less than a 25 percent co-pay) is -0.2; thus, 
for a 10 percent increase in price to the consumer, consumption will fall 2 percent. 
Increases in the co-insurance rate also are found to affect consumption. 
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medical providers for care rendered to injured workers (Telles, 1993). 
The second involves restricting the injured worker's choice of physi-
cian. The premise is that employers, who are financially responsible 
for providing medical benefits to injured workers, will have incentives 
to seek the most cost efficient medical providers. Twenty-two states 
currently allow employer selection of medical provider, and 41 states 
have restrictions on switching providers once an initial selection has 
been made (Telles, 1993). 
The effectiveness of fee schedules and choice of physician on work-
ers' compensation medical costs may vary. It is clear from the little 
available research that each individual state program must be evalu-
ated on its own merit. (See Durbin (1993) for a review.) Savings from 
these cost containment strategies have been observed, but the extent 
of such savings appears to depend on the individual state's circum-
stances. In some situations savings may not be achieved. But there is 
continued interest in fee schedules and choice of physician as policy-
makers, insurers, and consumers seek ways to contain cost increases. 
Over the past year or so, more than 20 states have considered either 
changing their existing fee schedules or implementing new medical fee 
schedules. 
This paper presents the methodology used by the National Coun-
cil on Compensation Insurance (NCCI)4 for evaluating the cost effec-
tiveness of medical fee schedules in workers' compensation insurance. 
The data are based on the data provided to the NCCI for the evalua-
tion of almost 100 different fee schedule proposals between January 
1993 to April 1994. Several models are developed for estimating the 
potential cost savings for different types of fee schedules including the 
relatively new strategy of linking fees in workers' compensation to the 
Medicare5 resource-based relative value schedule. We also discuss the 
development of a basket of medical services received by injured work-
ers. Several common scenarios are presented as case studies. We con-
clude with a discussion of how estimated medical provider cost savings 
derived from fee schedules ultimately may affect the overall workers' 
compensation system's costs. 
4The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) is a nonprofit data gath-
ering, research, and ratemaking organization. NCCI compiles statistics on workers' 
compensation and provides advisory rates or information to be used for establishing 
rates in 32 states. It also serves as statistical advisor in about half of the remain-
ing states. NCCI is responsible for estimating the impact of workers' compensation 
reforms, including fee schedules, in some 40 jurisdictions. 
sMedicare is an United States social security program that provides health insurance 
protection for almost all Americans age 65 and over. 
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2 Fee Schedules 
There are three general methods for establishing medical provider 
(as distinct from hospital or clinic) fee schedules: (i) fees may be set at 
some percentile of the usual and customary reimbursement rate (UCR); 
(ii) fees may be targeted at some multiple of the resource-based relative 
value schedule (RBRVS); and (iii) fees may be targeted at some multi-
ple of another benchmark schedule (e.g., Blue Cross and Blue Shield). 
Any of these schedules may use specific information on actual charged 
amounts or, similar to RBRVS, they may use conversion factors to trans-
late information on the relative resource use into dollar amounts. Some 
states use a combination of methods. 
There are a number of factors that influence the design and con-
struction of any fee or reimbursement schedule. The major objective 
is to contain costs through managing the price per service. Secondary 
objectives include equity (all patients/claimants charged the same for 
similar service) and administrative efficiency. Eccleston, Grannemann, 
and Dunleavy (1993) provide a comprehensive review of the design of 
workers' compensation fee schedules and provide interstate compar-
isons concerning these issues. In addition to the principal considera-
tion of cost savings, they identify the following major design issues: 
speCific levels of reimbursement and the basis for determining relative 
payment for procedures; coverage of providers and services; and pro-
visions for updating prices. The study of such issues, while important, 
is beyond the scope of this paper as these questions are basically pub-
lic policy issues. This paper deals with the evaluation of various fee 
schedules after they are designed. 
Perhaps the most influential innovation in medical fee schedules 
has been the introduction of the RBRVS for Medicare. Designed by re-
searchers at Harvard University the conceptual underpinning is straight-
forward: prices per service are designed to reflect the real resources 
(including time, equipment, and physician training) needed to perform 
the service. These relative values are adjusted for geographical dif-
ferences in the cost of living. Thus, in essence, RBRVS is designed to 
reallocate resources among providers while retaining, at least as a first 
step, revenue neutrality.6 
A mUltiplicative factor of the RBRVS often is used in workers' com-
pensation. The rationale is that if Medicare is able to offer neces-
6For a brief overview of RBRVS, see Hsiao et al. (1988) or (lg90a). For more detailed 
information, see Hsiao et al. (l990b), or write to Professor William C. Hsiao, Harvard 
University, School of Public Health, 1350 Massachusetts Ave., Room 726, Cambridge 
MA 02138, USA. 
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sary and quality care, then this provides information on the minimum 
achievable price. Two states have implemented RBRVS for their work-
ers' compensation systems (Pennsylvania and Vermont), while several 
other states have or currently are contemplating such an approach.? 
3 Evaluation Issues 
Evaluating the impact of the imposition of a physician fee schedule 
is conceptually a straightforward exercise. In general, all fee sched-
ules, regardless of the type of schedule, specify a maximum allowable 
charge for each service rendered by a medical provider.8 Services typi-
cally are identified by the current procedural terminology (CPT) guide-
lines published by the American Medical Association. The list of CPTs 
is extensive. For example, there are individual codes for different of-
fice visits (initial examination, follow-up visits), different surgical proce-
dures (arthoscopy, laminectomy), medical tests, and physical therapy. 
There are five broad categories (medicine, physical mediCine, radiol-
ogy, surgery, and pathology) containing hundreds of individual service 
or CPT codes.9 
3.1 Percent of Usual and Customary 
To estimate the statewide impact of imposing a fee schedule limiting 
the maximum allowable charge for each service requires three pieces of 
information: (i) information on the fee schedule amount for each CPT 
code; (ii) information on the amount that would have been charged for 
this CPT code in the absence of the fee schedule; and (iii) information on 
the distribution of services or the distribution of expenditures. Let n be 
the set of all different medical services (CPT codes) relevant to treating 
injured workers; Wi be the premedical fee schedule expenditure weight 
or proportion of costs of the ith procedure in a given state; Fi be the 
fee schedule or maximum reimbursement amount for the ith service; 
and U be a measure of the usual and customary reimbursement rate 
7It is interesting to note that the American Medical Association recently supported 
the Medicare RBRVS approach as an alternative to price restrictions considered in the 
current health care debates in the United States. 
8Medical providers typically are defined by state statute. They include physicians, 
chiropractors, physical therapists, osteopaths, nurses, etc. 
9There is actually a sixth category for anesthesia. Anesthesia often is billed per unit 
of time, however, which complicates data reporting and analysis of reimbursement 
levels. 
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(UCR) for the ith service. The savings (S) can be represented as: 
S= L Wi(Ui-Fi). 
iEo' Vi 
(1) 
Note that in this formulation, if a particular service is not identified by 
a CPT code or if no schedule is specified (commonly referred to as a BR 
or by report), then F is assumed equal to V and no saving is attributed. 
Stated differently, the empirical estimation of the maximum potential 
savings is a weighted average calculation where the weights are the 
proportions of total costs spent on each individual procedure. 
Alternatively, S may be estimated as: 
S = LiEO,Ni(Ui - Fi) (2) 
LiEO,NiVi 
where Ni = the number of times the ith procedure is performed in a 
given state. The approach of equation (2) amounts to taking the differ-
ence between the total costs charged to all injured workers for a service 
before the fee schedule and the expected total costs after imposing the 
schedule as a proportion of total costs prior to the fee schedule. lO 
The computation of S requires extensive data, which often do not 
exist. With the exception of a few states that collect data on all services 
performed on injured workers, information on the number or distribu-
tion of services is not readily available. Similarly, aggregate expenditure 
information is generally not available. In many circumstances, little or 
no state-specific data are available. The difficulty in getting the appro-
priate data arises from the nature of workers' compensation claims. 
Each claim may consist of multiple treatments lasting a long period of 
time (Le., a claim is defined as the entire disability period). In contrast, 
group and individual health insurance define a claim to be a single visit 
to a medical provider. 
In order to estimate the savings poteT\tial from imposing a fee sched-
ule in instances where there is little information, NCC! uses the concept 
of a basket.!l The NCCI basket has been compiled from five separate 
lOImplicit in equations (1) and (2) is the simplifying assumption that the demand, the 
supply, and the distribution of medical services will not be altered by the imposition 
of a price ceiling (the fee schedule). As will be discussed later, there is strong evidence 
that challenges the appropriateness of this assumption. Violating this assumption has 
important implications for estimating the impact on total provider costs of imposing 
price limits per service. 
liThe NCCI basket consists of a relatively small group of services that commonly is 
used in treating injured workers. It is analogous to the basket used by economists to 
construct price indexes such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Baskets have the advan-
tage of providing reasonable approximations to the actual distribution or consumption 
of services without the prohibitive expense of massive data collection. 
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data sources containing information from 26 states with workers' com-
pensation fee schedules. The data are derived from both private and 
government data sources and relate to medical services rendered be-
tween 1989 and 1991.12 Over 800 different CPT codes are represented; 
the NCCI basket combines the individual frequency data from all five 
sources into a aggregate frequency distribution. The basket is effec-
tively a weighted average frequency distribution that provides the num-
ber and proportion of each service or CPT. 
As noted above, the actual saving from a new fee schedule is the 
weighted sum of savings per service, with the weights provided by the 
basket. Because, by definition, the fee schedule provides the maximum 
reimbursement rate, the remaining piece of information relates to the 
current level of charges. Once the current distribution of charges and 
the frequency distribution of services are known, it is easy to calculate 
the total amount of reimbursements. Substituting the fee schedule lev-
els for the UCR,13 it is again straightforward to calculate the expected 
reimbursements under the fee schedule. Using the basket, the esti-
mated savings, sib), are given by14 
'" (b)( ) S(b) _ L.iEO(b) Ni Ui - Fi 
1 - IiEO(b) Nib) Ui 
(3) 
where n(b) is the set of services (CPT codes) in the NCCI basket; and 
Nfb) = the number of times the ith procedure in the basket is per-
formed. 
For example, Tables Al and A2 (in the appendix) show an abbrevi-
ated hypothetical example of these calculations. Table Al shows sav-
ings calculations by CPT. For the illustrated CPT codes, the following 
is shown: the NCCI frequency distribution or basket; the fee schedule 
level; the percentile of the UCR distribution where the fee schedule falls; 
the average of the UCR distribution up to the fee schedule level; and the 
average of the UCR. Based on these statistics, estimates of costs under 
both the current and new fee schedules and the estimated savings are 
shown. 
The estimate of the new cost (NCi b ») is: 
Ndb) = p~b) N~b) AVC(b) + (1 - p(b) )N(b) FS~b) for i E n(b) (4) 
t t t t t t t 
12Because the CPT codes change periodically, the CPTs from earlier years are adjusted 
to reflect the CPT schedule as of 1991. 
13Data for the UCR, if not available from state agencies, often can be obtained from 
private medical bill audit vendors. 
14Throughout this paper the superscript (b) notation is used to denote quantities 
calculated using only those services that are in the NCCI basket. 
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where, for i E n(b), we have Nib) = frequency distribution of service i; 
pjb) = proportion of VCR that is less than the fee schedule's charge for 
service i; AVG~b) = average charge of all charges that are less than the 
fee schedule's charge for service i; and Fsfb) = fee schedule amount for 
service i. 
Table A2 summarizes the individual CPT calculations that yield the 
estimate of the overall system savings. In the example shown, the fee 
schedule is calculated to save 18.65 percent on total provider costs, 
with a range from 13.58 percent for the general medicine group to 37.58 
percent for pathology. These represent estimates of the maximum po-
tential savings on provider costs based on the restrictive assumption 
that the distribution of services will remain fixed. 
3.2 Impact on Overall System Costs 
In order to translate the impact of any fee schedule savings on physi-
cian costs to total workers' compensation system savings, two other 
pieces of information are needed. First, provider costs are only one 
component of overall medical costs. There are medical costs associ-
ated with at least two other broad categories: inpatient hospitalization 
and pharmaceuticals. Second, workers' compensation costs generally 
are separated into medical and indemnity (weekly disability benefits) 
components. Thus, information is needed on the proportion of medi-
cal costs that are provider-related and on the split between indemnity 
and medical benefits. 
Table A2 provides information on the proportion of medical costs 
that are physician-related and the medical/indemnity split for the hy-
pothetical example. In this example, physician costs are 48.4 percent 
of medical costs and medical costs are 58.0 percent of total costs. 
Thus, the estimated 18.65 percent savings on physician costs translates 
into a maximum workers' compensation system savings of 5.2 percent 
(0.0524 = 0.1865 x 0.4841 x 0.580). 
NCC! has compiled information on the distribution of medical costs. 
These costs are split into three general categories based on information 
from four sources lS and are shown in Table A3. Based on the averages 
from the available data sources, medical costs are distributed as fol-
lows: 48.4 percent are physician costs; 47.6 percent are hospital costs; 
and 4 percent are other costs (including pharmaceuticals). 
lSInformation on the sources and the data on the distribution of medical costs are 
available from the authors. 
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3.3 RBRVS Evaluation 
Evaluation of the potential impact of imposing the RBRVS in a partic-
ular state (or geographical region) requires essentially the same method-
ology as discussed in Section 3.1. The only difference is that the RBRVS 
must be converted into a maximum reimbursement amount for each 
CPT. Only after this conversion can comparisons be made to the cur-
rent level of reimbursements in the market. The determination of the 
RBRVS amount for a particular CPT code for a given locale within a 
state requires that the values of three RBRVS parameters be known. 
The three RBRVS parameters are: 
1. The conversion factor (CP) for the CPT code. There are three dif-
ferent conversion factors used for all states in 1994: $35.158 for 
CPT codes designated as surgical; $33.718 for CPT codes desig-
nated as primary care services; and $32.905 for nonsurgical ser-
vices. 
2. The relative value units (RVU) for the CPT code. The RVU for a 
given CPT is the same in all states. There are three RVUs for each 
code: a work RVU (RVUw ); a practice expense RVU (RVUp ); and a 
malpractice RVU (RVUm ). 
3. The geographic practice cost index (GPCI) values that are speCific 
to regions within a state. There are three GPCIs for each region: a 
work index (GPCIw ); a practice expense index (GPCI p ); and a mal-
practice index (GPCIm ). The GPCI for any region is used for all CPT 
codes and is used to transform the national RVUs into local RVUs. 
Let R be the RBRVS maximum payment for a CPT in a specific region; 
then 
RBRVS = [(RVUw x GPCIw ) + (RVUp x GPCIp ) (5) 
+ (RVUm x GPCIm )] x CP. 
Tables A4 and A5 show these calculations for selected CPTs in a hypo-
thetical state with three regions. Once these values are calculated, it is 
straightforward to compare them to current costs to estimate potential 
cost savings. 
3.4 Updates to Existing Fee Schedules 
The same methodology as outlined above may be used to evaluate 
updates or changes to existing fee schedules. Data availability issues 
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are not as pressing, because information will be readily available on 
both the old and new fee schedules. Equation (3) can be modified by 
replacing the measure of the VCR with the old fee schedule reimburse-
ment level. Savings S?) are estimated as a weighted average as before, 
i.e., 
" . N(b) (F(old) _ F~new») 
S(b) _ L.tEQ(b) itt (6) 
2 - " N(b)F(old) 
L.iEQ(b) i i 
where Fi(Old) and Fi(new) are the old and new service i fee schedules, 
respectively. 
4 Utilization Issues 
Economic theory and empirical research suggest that the demand, 
supply, and distribution of services will not remain fixed after imple-
mentation of a fee schedule. Microeconomic theory predicts that the 
imposition of fee schedules (price ceilings) for medical services will re-
sult in an increased demand for services and a reduction in the supply of 
these services. To meet this pent-up demand, substitutes to traditional 
medicine will be sought. Where substitutes are not readily available, 
alternative markets may result. 16 The market for medical services is 
unique because of information asymmetries. Health care consumers 
must rely heavily on medical providers to prescribe the services they 
require. Thus, to some extent, physicians and other providers control 
the demand and the supply of care. 
Research in health economics supports the notion that physicians 
may have a target or required income and that they act as profit maxi-
mizers (Ligon, 1994; Pauly, 1986). As a consequence, the imposition of 
a fee cap per service may alter physician behavior. Specifically, physi-
cians may encourage so-called bracket creep where, instead of charging 
for a limited office visit, they charge for a comprehensive visit. In ad-
dition, physicians may resort to unbundling or billing for each specific 
service rather than grouping the services together. Given the prohibi-
tion on injured worker cost sharing in workers' compensation, these 
practices will erode the potential savings of the fee schedule. 
16This is not to suggest that black markets for medical care necessarily will develop 
as a result of price ceilings; the availability of substitute goods in the form of other 
diagnoses and treatments most likely will be affected. The point is to illustrate that 
alternative markets will develop to satisfy the demand. In the context of other types 
of regulation of medical care (notaNy the prohibition of certain medical procedures or 
services) black markets do develop. Examples include cancer treatments or abortions. 
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The federal government explicitly recognized this phenomenon in 
its imposition of the resource-based relative value schedule used in 
Medicare. Essentially, the federal government, based on a review of 
the health care economics literature (Federal Register, November 1991), 
estimated that as much as 50 percent of the anticipated fee schedule 
savings may be eroded and that the volume of services may be increased 
to at least partially offset the effect of the price cap. 
There are two relevant studies that are workers' compensation spe-
cific. One conducted by the California Workers' Compensation Institute 
(1992) found that costs rose as a result of the imposition of a fee sched-
ule. A more recent study by Roberts and Zonia (1994) corroborates the 
literature cited by the federal government. They found that in response 
to fee schedules, health care providers "tend to provide more complex 
procedures in a shorter period of time and tend to exploit ambiguities 
allowed under the fee schedule." 
Because the above empirical analysis makes no explicit adjustments 
for the likely behavioral changes that may erode the savings potential, 
it may be appropriate to adjust the maximum savings level. For illus-
trative purposes, if a 50 percent adjustment factor similar to the one 
used by the federal government in RBRVS evaluations is applied in the 
hypothetical example, the anticipated overall workers' compensation 
system savings becomes 2.6 percent. 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper provides a framework for evaluating the impact of im-
posing medical fee schedules on provider services. The methodology is 
straightforward. The constraints are data availability constraints rather 
than methodological constraints. In some (rare) instances states have 
detailed medical service data available on use and prices per CPT per 
injured workers. (Calendar year or fiscal year data are the only way 
data are captured.) If either piece of information is not available, then 
the analyst must rely on reasonable proxies. 
Three pieces of information are required: frequency or expenditure 
weights per CPT; proportion of medical costs covered by the schedule; 
and a measure of current market prices - either VCR if evaluating a new 
fee schedule or information regarding the old fee schedule if evaluating 
a change in the fee schedule. Any schedules using relative values and 
conversion factors must be translated into dollar terms. 
The NCCI methodology relies on a basket of services rendered to in-
jured workers and further splits workers' compensation medical costs 
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into some general categories. This information is compiled from avail-
able data sources that, while generally suitable, may not be appropriate 
in all situations. In addition, the analyst must rely to a certain extent 
on judgment of the likely utilization offsets that will occur. Available 
research provides a guideline to probable behavioral changes. 
Fee schedule design issues are important. The methodology pre-
sented will permit analysts to evaluate alternative scenarios, thereby 
providing policymakers and other workers' compensation insurance in-
terested parties with benchmark information. 
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Table 1 "0 ..I::>. 
Fee Schedule Analysis "0 ([) 
Group = Medicine ::::l 0.. 
CPT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) >< 
90782 5,514 11.82 36.4428 9.811 15.225 $83,952 $61,139 $22,813 27.17 
90843 5,688 * * * 63.190 $359,425 $359,425 $0 0.00 
90844 57,995 * * * 85.362 $4,950,569 $4,950,569 $0 0.00 
'-
90853 5,052 * * * 55.430 $280,032 $280,032 $0 0.00 0 c 
90900 5,598 * * * 55.713 $311,880 $311,880 $0 0.00 
..... 
::l 
$l) 
90915 6,964 * * * 55.713 $387,983 $387,983 $0 0.00 -
0 
95860 11,717 142.97 65.8729 104.327 135.040 $1,582,259 $1,376,924 $205,335 12.98 
...., 
» 
95861 6,279 188.12 46.2437 155.320 221.465 $1,390,578 $1,085,967 $304,611 21.91 n .... 
95900 39,666 55.90 36.7641 47.827 71.301 $2,828,222 $2,099,596 $728,626 25.76 
c 
$l) 
$1,719,350 $976,957 $742,394 43.18 
~. 
95904 24,114 40.85 5.4220 34.655 71.301 ~ 
99025 17,749 30.10 53.8303 23.985 33.784 $599,631 $475,824 $123,807 20.65 " ..... 
99075 14,307 * * * 307.127 $4,394,062 $4,394,062 $0 0.00 
$l) 
n .... 
99201 7,603 35.47 37.5369 30.755 38.312 $291,283 $256,221 $35,062 12.04 n 
-(I) 
99202 131,439 44.07 36.5284 38.177 47.751 $6,276,311 $5,509,560 $766,752 12.22 < 
99203 81,344 62.35 56.4976 53.186 62.187 $5,058,542 $4,650,640 $407,902 8.06 0 
99204 11,871 75.25 20.5213 65.017 88.839 $1,054,603 $868,365 $186,238 17.66 N 
99205 93,463 133.30 75.9654 108.538 119.932 $11,209,216 $10,700,563 $508,654 4.54 Z 
99211 16,257 24.72 75.7813 20.230 22.210 $361,062 $346,563 $14,499 4.02 
0 
99212 165,229 33.32 64.6289 27.789 31.561 $5,214,807 $4,914,835 $299,971 5.75 
99213 492,230 38.70 46.4705 33.596 40.328 $19,850,678 $17,881,771 $1,968,907 9.92 1.0 
99214 478,593 50.52 22.7081 43.825 58.446 $27,972,064 $23,450,905 $4,521,160 16.16 
1.0 
~ 
99215 176,853 74.17 13.7014 64.763 93.514 $16,538,290 $12,889,237 $3,649,053 22.06 
99223 15,727 133.30 55.8102 110.784 140.107 $2,203,470 $1,898,781 $304,689 13.83 
99231 27,968 37.62 35.1822 32.709 44.672 $1,249,385 $1,003,833 $245,552 19.65 
99232 21,322 48.37 24.2045 42.196 60.916 $1,298,857 $999,481 $299,376 23.05 
99233 8,302 64.50 11.9282 55.509 89.852 $745,947 $526,575 $219,372 29.41 
99238 8,348 59.12 47.3425 50.676 65.993 $550,907 $460,161 $90,746 16.47 
99243 11,399 * ;, * 106.618 $1,215,335 $1,215,335 $0 0.00 
99244 37,195 * * * 141.801 $5,274,306 $5,274,306 $0 0.00 
99245 36,646 * * * 182.316 $6,681,159 $6,681,159 $0 0.00 
99281 20,726 34.40 17.9612 28.177 47.169 $977,627 $689,810 $287,817 29.44 
99282 56,669 46.22 20.7523 37.388 60.473 $3,426,957 $2,515,375 $911,583 26.60 
99283 50,132 56.97 9.0695 47.194 90.710 $4,547,466 $2,811,570 $1,735,896 38.17 
99284 11,197 69.87 4.2828 58.738 136.669 $1,530,288 $776,996 $753,292 49.23 
Note: Column headings are as follows: (1) NCCI Frequency; (2) Maximum Fee; (3) Maximum Fee Percentile; (4) UCRP Average up to the 
Maximum Fee Percentile; (5) Overall UCRP Average; (6) Estimated Old Costs; (7) Estimated New Costs; (8) Estimated Savings; and (9) Estimated 
Savings as a Percentage of Estimated Old Costs. 
Estimated New Costs = [(I)x(3)x(4)]+ [(100% - (3»x(l)x (2)]. 
* denotes a "missing" value. 
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Table 2 
Workers' Compensation Fee Schedule Analysis: 
Effect on Overall System Costs 
Total Total Total 
NCCI Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Group Frequency Old Costs New Costs Savings 
Medicine 2,161,156 $142,416,503 $123,082,397 $19,334,106 
Phys. Med.* 4,435,507 $111,640,859 $94,398,533 $17,242,326 
Radiology 651,524 $88,641,538 $60,125,246 $28,516,292 
Surgery 282,239 $140,650,077 $116,490,967 $24,159,110 
Pathology 200,365 $4,679,678 $2,921,047 $1,758,631 
Total 7,730,791 $488,028,655 $397,018,190 $91,010,465 
*Phys, Med. = Physical Medicine. 
Percent Savings of Physician Costs: (from Total) 
Physician Average Costs as a Percentage of Total Workers' Compo Medical Costs (from Table 3 ) 
Percent Savings of Total Medical Costs (0.0903 = 0.1865 x 0.4841) 
Medical Costs as Percent of Total Workers' Compensation System Costs (hypothetical value) 
Percent Savings of Total System Costs (0.0524 = 0.0903 x 0.58 ) 
Total 
Estimated 
Savings (%) 
13.58% 
15.44% 
32.17% 
17.18% 
37.58% 
18.65% 
18.65% 
48.41% 
9.03% 
58.00% 
5.24% 
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Table 3 
Distribution of Workers' Compensation Medical Costs 
Source Physicians Hospitals Others 
NCCI Special Medical Study 57.80% 39.30% 2.90% 
NCCI Closed Claim Study 44.53% 48.77% 6.70% 
HCFN 46.01% 50.31% 3.68% 
NCIe 45.30% 52.00% 2.70% 
Average 48.41% 47.59% 4.00% 
iHCFA = Health Care Financing Administration; administrative costs have been 
deleted from the HCFA data. 
2NCIC = North Carolina Industrial Commission 
Table 4 
Calculation of RBRVS Fee Schedule Amounts 
1994 1994 Geographic Practice 
Conversion Factors Cost Index Value 
IVA CFV Area Work PE MP 
P $33.718 R1 1.053 1.139 1.231 
S $35.158 R2 0.947 0.912 0.716 
N $32.905 R3 0.956 0.980 0.716 
Note: Colunm headings are as follows: IVA = Indicator Value; CFV = Conversion 
Factor Value; PE = Practice Expense; and MP = Malpractice; 
Under colunm (IVA), the notation is as follows: P = Primary Care Services; 
S = Surgical Procedures; and N = Other Nonsurgical Services. 
Under colunm (Area): R1 = Region 1; R2 = Region 2; and R3 = Rest of the State. 
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Table 5 
Calculation of RBRVS Fee Schedule Amounts 
RVUs Geographically Adjusted RVUs 
CPT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
22102 S 8.88 4.43 0.63 Rl 9.351 5.046 0.776 
R2 8.409 4.040 0.451 
R3 8.489 4.341 0.451 
63064 S 23.49 24.1 4.14 Rl 24.735 27.450 5.096 
R2 22.245 21.979 2.964 
R3 22.456 23.618 2.964 
99202 P 0.76 0.46 0.05 Rl 0.800 0.524 0.062 
R2 0.720 0.420 0.036 
R3 0.727 0.451 0.036 
99215 P 1.53 0.77 0.07 Rl 1.611 0.877 0.086 
R2 1.449 0.702 0.050 
R3 1.463 0.755 0.050 
(9) (10) 
15.172 $533.42 
12.901 $453.56 
13.282 $466.96 
57.281 $2,013.89 
47.188 $1,659.05 
49.039 $1,724.10 
1.386 $46.73 
1.175 $39.62 
1.213 $40.91 
2.574 $86.80 
2.201 $74.22 
2.267 $76.45 
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99252 N 1.14 0.77 0.09 Rl 1.200 0.877 0.111 2.188 $72.00 
R2 1.080 0.702 0.064 1.846 $60.75 
R3 1.090 0.755 0.064 1.909 $62.81 
72114 N 0.36 1.31 0.09 Rl 0.379 1.492 0.111 1.982 $65.22 
R2 0.341 1.195 0.064 1.600 $52.65 
R3 0.344 1.284 0.064 1.692 $55.69 
Notes: Column headings are as follows: (1) Indicator; (2) Work; (3) Practice Expense; (4) Malpractice; (5) Area; (6) Work; (7) Practice Expense; 
(8) Malpractice; (9) Total; (10) RBRVS Fee. 
In column (5), R1 = Region 1; R2 = Region 2; and R3 = Rest of the State. 
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The Markov Chain Interest Rate Scenario Generator 
Revisited 
Sarah L.M. Christiansen* 
Abstract 
This paper furthers the development of the Markov chain interest rate genera-
tor. Though the basic technique remains essentially unchanged, there are still 
many significant changes to the model. For example: (i) the long (key) rates are 
now are generated by a mean reversionary process; (ii) the number of shapes 
is increased from seven to 11; (iii) the limitation of changing by only two shape 
codes per year is removed; and (iv) the random walk matrix that dptermines 
the shapes is revised to be more realistic. An algorithm is developed to de-
termine the shape code of the original yield curve, thus eliminating an input 
and assuring consistency. Flexibility in the choice of the key rate is introduced. 
Implications of the choice of the key rate are discussed. 
Key words and phrases: curve shape, yield curve, key rate, shape codes 
1 Introduction 
The Markov chain interest rate generator (MCG)l was introduced by 
Christiansen (1992) as a model of the underlying term structure of in-
terest rates. The MCG interest rate generator produces scenarios of 
* Sarah L.M. Christiansen, Ph.D., F.S.A. (1991), M.A.A.A., received her B.A. in math-
ematics from the University of California, Riverside (1966) and her M.A. (1968) and 
Ph.D. (1971) from the University of New Mexico. Before starting her actuarial career 
in 1985, she taught mathematics at Drake University, Des Moines Area Community 
College, and Grandview College. She is currently an assistant corporate actuary at the 
Principal Financial Group, vice-chair of the Society of Actuaries' committee responsible 
for the F-480 examination entitled Derivative Securities: Theory and Application, and 
vice-chair of the Education and Research Section Council. 
Dr. Christiansen's address is: The Principal Financial Group, 711 High Street, Des 
Moines lA 50392-0001, USA. 
The author is grateful to Warren Adams, David Brown, Don Sanning, the editor, and 
the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. 
1 An interest rate generator is an algorithm or an equation that produces scenarios 
of future interest rates. 
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complete yield curves for up to 30 years into the future. As a result 
it can be used to produce scenarios of spot yield curves of int~rest 
rates. These interest rates then can be used for cash flow testing, for 
asset/liability studies, for pricing purposes, to compare different in-
vestment strategies, or to test pricing assumptions for some annuity 
products. The MCG most often is used with rates that already incorpo-
rate the spreads earned over Treasury (risk-free) rates, but can be used 
with Treasury rates. 
The objective of this paper is to present improvements to Chris-
tiansen's (1992) model. But before discussing these improvements, the 
basics of the original model are reviewed and summarized briefly in 
Section 2. (We hope that this review makes the current paper self-
contained.) These improvements (discussed in Section 3) have increased 
the model's flexibility, while improving the realism of the yield curves 
and their distribution. Section 4 shows how the revised model can be 
implemented. The revised MCG model also has several other desirable 
characteristics (discussed in Section 5) such as producing reasonable 
rates and spot and forward rates that are never negative. Section 6 
contains the conclusions and the appendices follow. 
2 Review of Original Model 
In the original model, the sequence of interest rates for the kth 
scenari02 is generated for n years and for different maturities using 
a particular long rate (or key rate). Without loss of generality, the sce-
narios were generated for n =: 30 years with a 20-year long rate, and 
for maturities of 1/2, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 15, and 20 years. The sequence 
of interest rates for the kth scenario is determined in six steps. 
Step 1, Get Sample of Uniform Random Numbers: For scenario k, we 
obtain a sample of 30 uniform random numbers between 0 and 
(Rmax - Rmin - 0.03) 
Uk,t - U(O, (Rmax - Rmin - 0.03» 
where t =: 1,2, ... ,30; U(a, b) is the uniform distribution on (a, b); 
Rmax =: the overall maximum rate to be permitted by the genera-
tor; and Rmin =: the minimum rate to be permitted. 
Step 2, Determine MCG Key Interest Rate: Let 
ik,t =: MCG 20-year interest rate at time t for scenario k; 
20ne hundred different scenarios were run. 
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h,o Current 20-year interest rate; and 
p Maximum annual proportional change allowed. 
The MCG interest rate at time t for scenario k is defined to be 
h,t = max{(1 - P)h,t-1, min[(l + P)h,t-1, 0.015 + Uk,d} (1) 
for t = 1,2, ... ,30. The parameters Rmax , Rmin, and p are deter-
mined by the user. Christiansen (1992, p. 127) uses the following 
values:3 
p = 0.20, Rmax = 0.25, Rmin = 0.03. 
Shape Codes: The shape of the spot yield curve is determined by the 
assumed shape of the curve. Seven shapes are identified from his-
torical spot curves, and a symmetric envelope of shapes is iden-
tified. The shapes are coded from 1 for a steep normal (upward 
sloping) yield curve to 7 for a steeply inverted yield curve (see 
Figure 1). The user determines the code that best represents the 
shape of the original curve. The shape codes for each scenario 
then are determined iteratively. The original yield curve is used 
for all scenarios for time O. 
Step 3, Get Random Walk Matrix: Get the original random walk matrix 
of transition probabilities of moving from one shape yield curve 
to another shape yield curve from Table 1. 
Step 4, Determine Shape Code: The random walk matrix then is trans-
lated into a look-up matrix containing the shape code for the previ-
ous curve; see Table 2. The shape code for the current curve under 
scenario k is determined as follows: let Bk = (bk,l, h,2, ... , h,30) 
be a 1 x 30 vector4 of random integers between 1 and 10 inclusive 
and ()(k,t be the shape code for scenario k at time t. In addition, let 
L be the look-up matrix, i.e., L is a 10 x 7 matrix with the ith row 
of L corresponding to the ith row of Table 2. For example, from 
Table 2 two elements of L are L1,7 = 5 and LlO,4 = 6. The shape 
code, ()(k,t, is found from the look-up matrix at the intersection of 
the column headed by the shape code for time t - 1 and the row 
containing h,t, that is, 
()(k,t = Li,j where i = h,t and j = ()(k,t-1. (2) 
3In this paper p is used instead of ADjRMAX, which is the original notation of 
Christiansen. 
4Throughout this paper, only vectors and matrices are denoted in bold uppercase 
letters. Their elements are written in corresponding nonbold lower case letters. Only 
scalars are written in nonbold lower case letters. 
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Figure 1 
Original Curve Shapes 
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Legend: (1) = steep normal; (2) = early peak; (3) = oscillating starting up; (4) = level; (5) 
= oscillating starting down; (6) = early valley; and (7) = steeply inverted. 
Step 5, Determine the Intermediate Yield Curve Ik,t: Each shape code 
ak,t is associated with a vector of shape factors corresponding to 
points of maturity on the yield curve. In particular, ak,t generates 
the row number of the factor shape table. 
Let 0 be the set of maturity points given by 
0= {1/2, 1,2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 15, and 20 years} 
and let Gk,t be the 1 x 9 vector of shape factors generated by ak,t 
for the maturities of 0, i.e., 
Gk,t = (Bk,t(1/2),Bk,t(1), ... ,Bk,dm), ... ,Bk,t(20» (3) 
for m E O. The factors for 20-year rates are given in Table 3. The 
product of these factors and the 20-year rate is the intermediate 
yield curve (a vector of rates), h,t, i.e., 
h,t = h,20 Gk,t. 
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Thus, for a specific maturity m E 0, we have the intermediate 
rate is given by 
ik,t(m) = i k,20 x Bk,t(m). (4) 
Step 6, Determine the Final Yield Curve Ik,t: The yield curve of final 
interest rates, Ik,t are determined after checking the following con-
ditions: (i) for each maturity m, the rates do not vary from the 
previous years' rate by more than a preset fraction (8(m)) of the 
previous rate; and (ii) the rates are subject to the overall maximum 
and minimum of Rmax and Rmtn, respectively. For each maturity, 
the final interest rates are given by 
h,tCm) max{Rmtn, (1 - 8(m))h,t-l (m), min[ik,tCm), 
(1 + 8(m))h,t-ICm),Rmax ]) (5) 
for mE O. (Note that in Christiansen's original model, 8(m) is a 
constant, i.e., independent of m.) 
Table 1 
Transition Probabilities of the 
Original Random Walk Matrix 
Old New Shape 
Shape 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0 0 0 0 
2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 
3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0 
4 0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 
5 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 
6 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
7 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.5 0.2 
From Christiansen, S.L. "A Practical Guide to Interest Rate 
Generators for C-3 Risk Analysis." Transactions of the Soci-
ety of Actuaries XLIV (1992): 101-134. Copyright ©1992, 
the Society of Actuaries. Reprinted with permission. 
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Table 2 
Look-up Matrix 
Random Previous shape 
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 
2 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 
3 1 1 2 3 3 4 5 
4 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 
6 2 2 3 4 4 5 6 
7 2 2 3 4 5 6 6 
8 2 3 4 5 5 6 6 
9 3 3 4 5 6 7 7 
10 3 4 5 6 7 7 7 
From Christiansen, S.L. "A Practical Guide 
to Interest Rate Generators for C-3 Risk 
Analysis." Transactions of the Society of Ac-
tuaries XLIV (1992): 101-134. Copyright 
©1992, the Society of Actuaries. Reprinted 
with permission. 
Table 3 
Factors for Shapes: 20-Year Rate 
Maturities 
SC 0.5 1 2 3 4 5 7 10 15 20 
1 0.61 0.67 0.76 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.96 1 
2 0.75 0.90 l.05 l.12 l.09 l.07 l.05 l.03 l.02 1 
3 0.94 l.00 l.05 l.00 0.98 0.96 0.98 l.00 l.02 1 
4 l.00 l.00 l.00 l.00 l.00 l.00 l.00 l.00 l.00 1 
4 l.06 l.00 0.95 l.00 l.03 l.04 l.02 l.00 0.98 1 
6 l.25 l.10 0.95 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 1 
7 l.39 l.33 l.24 l.17 l.15 l.13 l.10 l.07 l.04 1 
From Christiansen, S.L. "A Practical Guide to Interest Rate Generators for C-3 Risk 
Analysis." Transactions of the Society of Actuaries XLIV (1992): 101-134. Copyright 
©1992, the Society of Actuaries. Reprinted with permission. 
Note: SC = Shape Code. 
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3 Improvements to the Original Model 
We now discuss the improvements that have been made to Chris-
tiansen's (1992) model since the original research was done in 1989-
1990. 
3.1 Determination of the Key Rate Scenarios 
The assumption of a uniform distribution of the 20-year rates is re-
placed by an updated form of the log-normal mean-reverting process. 
This process is used for the composite generator in Christiansen (1992). 
Though the uniform distribution appears to be effective in keeping 
rates in bounds without clustering at the bounds, there is no evidence 
in favor of a uniform distribution of interest rates. Doll (1991) does 
provide support, however, for the use of a mean reversionary interest 
rate generator. 
All mean-reverting interest rate generators require a mean rate for 
the rate being modeled. It is considered desirable to have this mean 
be independent of the model's user. Murphy (1990, chapter 9, page 
77) implies that the best goal is the current rate. This choice ensures 
that the mean rate is independent of the user. It also ensures that key 
rates are not biased upward when rates appear to be low or downward 
if recent history has periods of high rates. 
For the kth scenario, the correction factorS at time t, CFk,t, for the 
mean-reversionary process selected is a parameterization of the one 
used by Jetton (1990). It is given by: 
where 
CFk,t = sign(D) x SFk,t x min(0.5IDI, 0.0151D3 1) 
sign(D) = { ~ 
-1 
if D > 0; 
if D = 0; 
if D < 0, 
D = mean rate - previous rate, and SF k,t is the strength factor6 at time 
t. The goal rate and the previous rate must be expressed as percentages, 
5 A correction factor is used to bring outliers partially back toward the mean and to 
prevent the repeated use of normal random variables with mean zero and variance one 
(N(O, 1» from becoming N(O, n), which leads to unreasonable interest rates. 
6The strength factor is a number from 0 to 1 which impacts how fast the correction 
factor pulls back toward the mean. If the strength factor is too high, there is insufficient 
volatility in the rates, while a strength factor of 0 eliminates the mean-reversionary 
process and leaves a pure log-normal interest rate generator. 
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i.e., 6 percent is entered as 6 and not as 0.06. The strength factor may be 
constant or vary with time. The result is used as the mean-reversionary 
correction factor in the key rate calculation. Thus, for the kth scenario, 
the current mean-reversionary interest rate, MRh,t+l, is given by 
(6) 
where MRh,t is the previous mean-reversionary interest rate, (J" is the 
volatility assumption, and Zk,t is a random number from the standard 
normal distribution. 
3.2 The Number of Shapes 
The original seven shape factors include both a steep normal curve 
and a steep inverted curve and use maturities of 1/2, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 
15, and 20 years. Originally, there were no codes or probabilities for 
normal or inverted curves that were not steep, as it was thought that 
these shapes would result from the annual limitation on the permitted 
annual change. It became desirable to have shape codes and factors 
for the more usual forms of the normal curves and inverted curves, 
however, thus the increase to nine shapes. Also, the maturities used to 
specify the yield curve were changed to 1/2, 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 
and 30 years because Barra? changed the points that it speCifies on its 
curves. In addition, there was a desire for the 30-year rate. 
As the current curve steepened in 1993, it became clear that the 
steep normal curve is not sufficiently steep. Concern arose when it was 
noticed that the shortest rates always increased in the first year in all of 
the random scenarios. It was discovered that the product of the shape 
factor for the (then) steepest curve with the lowest possible long rate 
was above the current short rate! Part of the cause of this problem is 
the increase in the length of the curve from a 20-year maturity to a 30-
year maturity and using a 30-year key rate. Two possible solutions were 
considered: increasing the permitted percentage change in the long rate 
or increasing the number of shapes. Increasing the permitted change 
permitted almost no decreases in the shortest rate, so this appeared 
not to be a viable solution and was discarded. 
The second possible solution, increasing the number of shapes, in-
volved a study of what the steepest shape should be. A historical 
database of curves was consulted, and the curves were examined on 
a factor basis. As historically there are steeper curves than the steep-
est shape in the generator, two more very steep positively sloped curve 
7Barra is an international financial consulting firm. 
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Legend: (1) = very steep normal; (2) = another very steep normal; (3) steep normal; (4) = 
normal; (5) = early peak; (6) = oscillating starting up; (7) = level; (8) = oscillating starting 
down; (9) = early valley; (10) = inverted; and (11) = steeply inverted. 
shapes have been added to the generator, bringing the total number of 
curve shapes to 11. Adding new curve shapes solved the problem, Le., 
the short rates now are allowed to decrease in the first year. A decrease 
in short rates does not happen often, as it still requires a drop in the 
long rate along with a shape code for the following rate that does not 
exceed that of the original curve. The possible shapes are no longer 
perfectly symmetric, as it was neither necessary nor desirable to add 
more steeply inverted curves. Figure 2 displays these new curves. 
3.3 Permitted Annual Changes 
The annual permitted change in rates originally consisted of two 
parameters: the permitted annual change in the long (key) rate and 
the permitted annual change in any rate. The smaller parameter is the 
permitted annual change in the key rate, and the larger parameter is the 
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permitted annual change in any rate. The new version has a permitted 
annual change for each rate, which, like the new volatility assumption, 
is a non-increasing function of the maturity. The requirement for an 
appropriate volatility assumption for any choice of the key rate led to 
the new volatility assumption. 
3.4 Overall Maximum and Minimum Rates 
The overall minimum and maximum rates are specified as param-
eters. Due to the lower interest rates in 1992 and 1993, regulators 
expressed concern that the minimum interest rate was too high. The 
regulators proposed a new dynamic minimum rate for the New York 
seven interest rate scenarios.s The revised Markov chain generator 
made minor modifications to the new dynamic minimum rate for these 
scenarios. For assets other than Treasuries, the minimum is the lesser 
of 3.5 percent or 50 percent of the original rate for that maturity. For 
Treasury curves the minimum is the minimum of 2.5 percent and 50 
percent of the original rate. The maximum rate remains level. 
3.5 Frequency of Shapes 
When the historical database of shapes was examined for steepness 
and for the changes of shape, it was discovered that the yield curve 
shifted in 1981 from an inverted yield curve to a normal curve and 
back again on a quarterly basis. Thus, it is too restrictive to permit 
only an annual change in shape codes of two or less. Therefore, in 
addition to increasing the number of shapes, the random walk matrix 
is restructured so that it is possible to move from one shape to any 
other shape. Many investment officers feel that some of the shapes 
(early peak and early valley) occur very rarely. Because it is desired to 
be as realistic as possible, the random walk matrix currently reflects 
the fact that these shapes are more rare than inverted curves. 
The sum of probabilities assigned to the inverted curve shapes (8, 
9, 10, and 11) is approximately the probability of an inverted curve as 
determined by Becker (1992). Becker determines inversions by using 
BThe New York seven interest rate scenarios are the scenarios specified in New York 
Regulation 126. They are the following parallel shift scenarios: (1) no change; (2) rates 
rise 0.5 percent per year for the next ten years and then remain constant; (3) rates rise 
1 percent per year for five years, then fall 1 percent per year for the next five years, and 
remain constant thereafter; (4) rates rise 3 percent in the first year and then remain 
constant. Scenarios 5-7 are the opposite of 2-4 rates falling instead of riSing and rising 
instead of falling. 
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the ratio of the shortest rate to the 10-year rate; he considers a curve 
to be inverted if this ratio is at least 1.05. Because Becker does not 
look at the shape of the entire curve, it is difficult to determine the 
reasonableness of each individual curve type based on his data. 
An algorithm to determine the shape code (at time t = 0) for the 
current curve has been developed. The algorithm requires that all rates 
be expressed as multiples of the key rate and exploits the idea that the 
short-term rates are more important in determining the shape than the 
longer term rates. Details are given in Appendix B. 
Salomon Brothers Treasury bond equivalent yield curves,9 in yield 
to maturity form, are converted as closely as possible to eqUivalent 
spot yield curves. (It is necessary to use one 29-year rate instead of the 
30-year rate.) These yield curves are added to the data obtained from 
Barra in spot yield form. Each of these 338 curves10 is run through 
the algorithm to determine its shape code. Eleven of these curves are 
graphed (in factor form). Figure 3 illustrates real rather than theoretical 
shapes. Table 4 shows the frequency of curve types contained in the 
sample of 338 curves. 
CS 1 
FQ 3 
Table 4 
Curve Types and Frequencies 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
16 30 107 14 39 69 20 2 36 2 
Note: CS = Curve Shape, and FQ = Frequency. 
3.6 Key Rate 
The key rate is the one for which the original set of rates is gener-
ated by the mean-reversionary log-normal process. There are situations 
where the model is being used and a particular rate other than the long 
rate may be most important. In such a situation, it is possible to use 
that particular rate as the key rate. This flexibility requires the impo-
sition of a volatility assumption for each maturity, which impacts both 
the rate generation process at the key rate (where the volatility assump-
tion is used directly) and the adjustment process (where the permitted 
deviation from last year's rate varies by the maturity or duration of the 
rate studied). 
90btained from a database of Salomon Brothers yield curves from February 1965 
through March 1993. 
lOOne per month from the above database for 28 complete years from February 1965 
through January of 1993 plus February and March 1993. 
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Figure 3 
Historical Curve Shapes 
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Legend: Each four digit number represents the date of the curve in year-month format. 
The first two digits represent the calendar year, and the last two digits represent the 
month. For example, 7103 = 71:03 = March 1971; and 6912 = 69:12 = December 1969. 
The choice of the key rate determines the rate that will not be biased 
up or down in the process of generating rates. The key rate sequence is, 
by construction, equally likely to show increasing rates as decreasing 
ones. Unless the original yield curve is essentially flat, however, the 
shape of the original yield curve will impact the other rates. For exam-
ple, when starting with the 20-year rate as the key rate and a steeply 
normal yield curve, the shorter rates tend to be higher than the original 
shorter rate. In the spring/summer of 1992 the yield curve was steeply 
normal, and using the 20-year rate as the key rate the generator pro-
duces 20-year rates that are higher than the original 20-year rate about 
50 percent of the time. The 7-year rates produced are higher than or 
equal to the original 7-year rate about 70 percent of the time, however; 
see Appendix C. 
When using the generator to test pricing, the 7-year rate may be a 
critical rate. Because one does not want to bias the 7-year rates up-
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wards, the 7 -year rate is selected as the key rate. Each new shape factor 
is the old shape factor divided by that curve's key rate factor. Thus, the 
shape factors at the new key rate are all one. 
When the 7-year rate was used as the key rate, however, the standard 
deviations of the resulting rates no longer are decreasing with increas-
ing maturity; see Appendix C. This occurs even though the permitted 
percent change from one year to the next decreases with increasing 
time and the original volatility assumption is changed to depend on 
the key rate, and is non-increasing. When the longest rate is the key 
rate the standard deviations of the resulting rates generally decrease 
with increasing time until maturity. It does not appear to be possible 
to have both a key rate that is not the longest rate and to have de-
creasing standard deviations as the maturities lengthen. This appears 
to make intuitive sense from Figure 4. If the variation due to shape is 
squeezed out of one rate, it then must pop up in the others. Thus, there 
is a trade-off depending on which property is deemed to be the most 
important. 
It appears historically that the long-term rate has been the most 
stable.!l Murphy (1990, Chapter 17, page 181) implies that the longest 
maturities have the lowest volatility (over the same time interval). As it 
is desirable from many standpoints to have decreasing standard devi-
ations with increasing maturity (duration), the longest rate being mod-
eled usually will be the key rate. This does have the effect of biasing 
the shorter rates: they will tend to go up more than down if the original 
yield curve is normally sloped and down more than up in the inverted 
situation. 
4 Using the Revised Markov Chain Generator 
The steps to follow are essentially the same as those described in 
Section 2 for the original model. The major difference is that, instead of 
using uniform random numbers, we use a sequence of standard normal 
random numbers; the number of shape codes is now 11. Thus, the 
sequence of interest rates {h,t} at time t for the kth scenario again is 
determined in six steps. 
Step 1, Get Normal Random Sample: For the kth scenario, obtain a sam-
ple of 30 standard normal random numbers Zk,t for t = 1,2, ... ,30. 
Using these standard normal random numbers, compute the se-
11 In the Salomon database, the 30-year rate had the lowest standard deviation. 
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Figure 4 
Curve Shapes (7-Year Key) 
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Legend: (1) steep normal; (2) = normal; (3) = early peak; (4) = oscillating starting up; (5) 
= level; (6) = oscillating starting down; (7) = early valley; (8) = inverted; and (9) = steeply 
inverted. 
quence of mean-reversionary interest rate, MRh,t, using equation 
(11). 
Step 2, Determine MCG Interest Rate: The MeG 30-year interest rate 
at time t for scenario k, ht, is defined to be 
lk,t = max{(1 - p)h,t-l, min[(1 + p)h,t-l, MRh,d} (7) 
for t = 1,2, ... ,30, where h,D = the current 30-year interest rate. 
Step 3, Get Random Walk Matrix: Get the new random walk matrix of 
transition probabilities from Table 5. 
n 
:r 
~. 
V> 
!:t. 
Table 5 $lI ::::s 
V> 
Random Walk Probabilities' for Shape Codes tl> ::::s 
Original New Shape s:: $lI .... 
Shape 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 
7' 
1 5 11 0 < 
1 0.220 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.060 0.060 0.050 0.030 0.015 0.020 0.005 n :r 
2 0.120 0.250 0.250 0.120 0.060 0.060 0.050 0.030 0.020 0.030 0.010 
~. 
::::s 
3 0.100 0.120 0.315 0.180 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.030 0.020 0.040 0.015 5" .... 
tl> 
4 0.090 0.110 0.170 0.330 0.060 0.070 0.060 0.030 0.020 0.040 0.020 
.... 
tl> 
V> 
5 0.090 0.110 0.140 0.250 0.100 0.100 0.070 0.050 0.020 0.050 0.020 
.... 
;::0 
0.080 0.100 0.140 0.240 0.050 0.150 0.090 0.050 0.030 0.040 0.030 
$lI 
6 .... tl> 
7 0.060 0.090 0.140 0.240 0.050 0.150 0.120 0.050 0.030 0.040 0.030 C") tl> 
::::s 
8 0.040 0.080 0.120 0.210 0.050 0.150 0.120 0.080 0.040 0.070 0.040 tl> .... 
$lI 
9 0.020 0.060 0.090 0.170 0.040 0.150 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.110 0.060 .... 0 .... 
10 0.020 0.050 0.070 0.150 0.030 0.110 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.170 0.100 
11 0.010 0.030 0.050 0.130 0.020 0.100 0.150 0.090 0.070 0.200 0.150 
"The probabilities along the rows sum to one. 
I-' 
I-' 
VI 
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Step 4, Determine Shape Code: Let Bk = (h, 1, h,2, ... , h,30) again de-
note a vector of uniform random numbers between 0 and 1, and 
let l = (){k,t-l be the shape code for scenario k at time t - 1. 
Select row l from the random walk matrix found in Step 4. Let 
J(l) = (Jdl),j2(l), ... ,jll(l) denote the vector of cumulative 
sums of the 11 elements of row l. (Note jdl) = first element 
of row land jll (l) = 1.) Given h,t, the new shape code (){k,t is 
given by 
(){k,t = min {(){ : j ()( (l) ~ h,d. (8) 
The shape code for all scenarios at time t = 0 is determined by 
the algorithm given in Appendix B. 
New Shape Factors and Set of Maturities: Here the shape factors as-
sociated with (){k,t for 30-year rates are given in Table Al in Ap-
pendix A. The new set of maturities is now 
0= {1/2, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 15, 20 and 30 years}. 
Steps 5 and 6: Given the new shape factors and set of maturities, 0, 
follow Steps 5 and 6 in Section 2. 
5 Spot, Forward, and Yield to Maturity Rates 
5.1 Positive Spot Rates and Forward Rates 
Given the way this model is constructed, it produces only positive 
spot rates 12 because every rate on the yield curve is the product of a 
positive long-term rate and a positive factor. Tilley (1992) points out 
that positive spot rates imply positive yield to maturity (coupon) rates, 
but not necessarily positive forward rates. 13 Are any of the forward 
rates produced by this generator negative? 
The relationship between spot rates and forward rates is as follows: 
let Sn denote the n-year spot rate and let in be the I-year forward rate 
between years nand n + 1. It follows that 
f = (1 + sn+d n+1 - 1 
n (1 + sn)n . (9) 
12The n-year spot rate is the yield of a zero coupon (pure discount) bond maturing 
in n years. 
13The m-year forward rate beginning n years from now is the implied rate of interest 
to lend money n years from now to be repaid in a single payment of principal and 
interest m + n years from now. 
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Clearly, for a flat yield curve, the forward rates are equal to the spot 
rates. When the yield curve has a positive slope between two maturities, 
the associated forward rate will be positive and greater than the spot 
rate associated with the shorter maturity, Le., in > Sn, thus creating 
the expectation of rising rates with a positively sloped yield curve. For-
ward rates are lower than spot rates only when the rate for the shorter 
maturity is greater than the rate for the longer maturity, Le., only in a 
negatively sloped portion of a yield curve. 
If some spot rates are unknown, then the forward rate is defined dif-
ferently. For example, assume that the spot rates Sk and Sn are known 
(with k < n) but the intervening spot rates are unknown. Then the as-
sumption is made that the forward rates between k and n are all equal, 
giving 
. = [(1 + Sn)n]l/(n-k) _ 1 
iJ (1 + Sk)k (10) 
for j = k, k + 1, ... , n - l. 
It is important that interest rate generators do not produce nega-
tive forward rates. Testing the theoretical shapes associated with this 
Markov chain generator produced no negative forward rates. The test 
was conducted by setting up a spreadsheet that had the factors for 
the shapes of the curves. When a 30-year rate was input, the spread-
sheet computed (1 + sn)n and successive differences of (1 + sn)n, Le., 
(1 + Sn+dn+l - (1 + sn)n. From equation (??), it is clear that a negative 
forward rate implies that these successive difference must be negative. 
All successive differences tested, however, were positive, implying that 
all forward rates must be positive. The successive differences were 
smallest when the longest rate was at a minimum. All of the succes-
sive differences were positive, even with the 30-year rate as low as 2 
percent. Because the curves that were considered to be problematic are 
those with negative slopes, the effect of any minimum was ignored for 
this test only. 
Further tests were made by considering that the shapes could vary 
from the theoretical due to the adjustment process, and these tests 
still did not produce zero or negative forward rates. Using the same 
spreadsheet, a positively sloped yield curve was set up for time t, at 
a long-term rate of 3.5 percent, which is the minimum rate for this 
generator (ignoring minimums at other points). The follOwing period it 
was assumed that the long rate had dropped by the maximum allowed 
and the curve had tried to invert. The resulting curve did not have a 
perfect shape, and this curve was tested to see it the successive powers 
of (1 + sn) n were increasing. They increased regardless of the level of 
the long-term rate (6 percent also was tried, and they increased faster), 
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and each of the shapes of the positive curve was tried for the initial 
curve. Thus, it appears that this generator will produce only positive 
forward rates. 
5.2 Spot Rates and Yield to Maturity Rates 
The relationship between spot rates and yield to maturity rates de-
pends upon the pattern of cash flows. Let (Y1, Y2, ... , Yn) be the annual 
coupon payments from an interest -only bond maturing in n years at par 
($1) and let (Sl, S2, ... , sn) denote the sequence of spot rates. It follows 
t)1at Y1 = Sl and 
k-1 
1 = 1 + Yk + I Yk 
(1 + Sk)k j=l (1 + Sj)j 
(11) 
for k = 2,3, ... , n. Equation (??) is based on the fact that an interest-
only bond due at time k paying Yk annually and returning the principal 
at maturity should be valued at par using the spot yield curve. If the 
spot rates are known, the coupons easily can be found by solving equa-
tion (??) for Yk. which gives 
[1 - (1 + Sk)-k] 
Yk = k .' 
Lj=l (1 + Sj)-J 
(12) 
If, on the other hand, the coupons are known, then the spot rates 
can be found easily by solving equation (??) iteratively. Thus, assuming 
that (Sl, S2, •.. , Sk-1) are known, then 
(13) 
These formulas can be modified for interest rates and cash flows m 
times per year. 
When equation (??) with the usual assumptions14 is applied to the 
historical yield to maturity curves for curve of December 1981, it yields 
a complex number for the value of the 30-year spot rate (S30). (Note that 
Tilley (1992) mentions this problem when generators initially create 
YTM curves.) Because that result does not make sense, the 29-year rate 
is substituted. 
14The usual assumptions are (i) constant forward rates for intervals between speci-
fied points; (ti) semi-annual coupons; and (iii) compounding (adjusted for semi-annual 
payments and rates). 
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Using equation (17) is the only method available to convert curves 
when only one curve is available at a time. But the financial services 
and Wall Street firms do not determine the spot rate curves from the 
yield to maturity curves. Instead they determine the spot rate curves 
from the prices of on-the-run Treasuries, which are those priced closest 
to par. Their methods of fitting the spot rate curves are proprietary. 
6 Conclusions 
As with any other model, the Markov chain generator model con-
tinues to evolve as problems surface and questions arise. In order to 
further refine this model, a study is being made to reduce the num-
ber of scenarios from 1,000 to 50, while preserving the characteristics 
of the original set of scenarios. This study will test the results of the 
50 scenarios and compare them to the original scenarios in cash flow 
testing. 
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Table A2 
New Adjustment and Volatility Assumptions 
Maturity 0.5 yr. 1 yr. 2 yr. 3 yr. 4 yr. 5 yr. 
Max. Adjust. 0.400 0.350 0.330 0.300 0.270 0.250 
Volatility 0.170 0.165 0.160 0.140 0.l30 0.120 
Maturity 5 yr. 7 yr. 10 yr. 15 yr. 20 yr. 30 yr. 
Max. Adjust. 0.250 0.200 0.160 0.l30 0.100 0.100 
Volatility 0.120 0.115 0.110 0.100 0.100 0.095 
Appendix B: Algorithm to Determine Curve Shape 
Let ex be a number denoting the shape of the curve C, where C is the 
1 x 11 vector of the original rates. Also, let M be an 11 x 11 matrix of 
shape factors and Mi be the vector corresponds to curve i (the ith row 
of M) for i = 1,2,3, ... 11. The follOwing is the algorithm to determine 
the shape of the original curve: 
Step 1: Let R = C/530 where 530 is the 30-year rate. 
Step 2: Make an element by element comparison of the vectors R 
and MIl. If every element of R is greater the corresponding 
element Mu, then set ex = 11 and go to Step 7. Otherwise, go 
to Step 3. 
Step 3: Define the 1 x 11 vector P and the 11 x 11 matrices Q, V, and 
W follows: 
P = (0.1,0.075,0.05,0.04,0.035,0.03,0.02,0.01, 
0.005,0.0025,0.0); 
Q is a matrix where each row is P; 
V = M - Q and W = M + Q. 
Step 4: Define a new 11 x 11 matrix A as follows: 
{
I if Vij ~ rj ~ Wij 
ai' = 
J 0 otherwise 
for i,j = 1,2, ... ,11. 
Step 5: Define the 11 x 1 column vectors D and E as follows: 
d i = (12 - i)3, i = 1,2, ... ,11 and E is the product 
E=AD. 
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Step 6: ()( = k where k = max{i : ei ~ ej, for j = 1,2, ... , Il}, i.e., k 
is the index with the largest value of the elements of E. 
Step 7: The shape code has been determined. Quit. 
Appendix C: Summary Statistics 
The follOwing are summary statistics for all scenarios combined. 
The projection period is 30 years and all statistics are based on the 
entire period. 
Table A3 
Summary Statistics for Scenarios and Key Rates 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Dev. 
7-Year Key Rate 20-Year Key Rate 
0-499 500-999 0-499 500-999 
3.698 3.677 3.698 3.677 
2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 
2.686 2.661 2.686 2.661 
Minimum 1.000 
Maximum 9.000 
1.000 
9.000 
1.000 
9.000 
1.000 
9.000 
Note: 0-499 = Scenarios 0-499; and 500-999 = Scenarios 500-999. 
Note that: 
• For the scenarios 0-499 and the 7-year key rate, the percent of 
7-year rates that is greater than the original rate is 49.22 percent, 
while the percentage equal to the original rate is 3.23 percent; 
• For the scenarios 500-999 and the 7-year key rate, the percent of 
7 -year rates that is greater than the original rate is 46.74 percent, 
while the percentage equal to the original rate is 3.23 percent; 
• For the scenarios 0-499 and the 20-year key rate, the percent of 
7-year rates that is greater than the original rate is 68.55 percent, 
while the percentage equal to the original rate is 3.23 percent; and 
• For the scenarios 500-999 and the 20-year key rate, the percent of 
7-year rates that is greater than the original rate is 66.46 percent, 
while the percentage equal to the original rate is 3.23 percent. 
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Key Rate: 7-Year Rate 
Table A4 
Scenarios 0-499: Statistics for Rates 
Rate Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
6 mo. 7.4702 6.9429 2.8535 2.9836 25.0000 
1 yr. 7.6977 7.2715 2.7584 2.9836 25.0000 
2 yr. 7.9792 7.5970 2.6741 3.4161 25.0000 
3 yr. 8.1034 7.7652 2.6267 3.5000 25.0000 
5 yr. 8.3570 8.0155 2.6622 3.5000 25.0000 
7 yr. 8.4634 8.3282 2.6841 3.5000 25.0000 
11 yr. 8.5630 8.4110 2.6947 3.5000 25.0000 
15 yr. 8.6241 8.4625 2.6825 3.5000 25.0000 
20 yr. 8.7408 8.6612 2.6428 3.5000 25.0000 
Table A5 
Scenarios 500-999: Statistics for Rates 
Rate Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
6 mo. 7.3108 6.7879 2.7803 2.9836 25.0000 
1 yr. 7.5352 7.1258 2.6902 2.9836 25.0000 
2 yr. 7.8172 7.4594 2.6187 3.4161 25.0000 
3 yr. 7.9498 7.6245 2.5867 3.5000 24.2782 
5 yr. 8.2021 7.9485 2.6299 3.5000 24.4737 
7 yr. 8.3079 8.1680 2.6543 3.5000 25.0000 
11 yr. 8.4083 8.2645 2.6647 3.5000 25.0000 
15 yr. 8.4704 8.3297 2.6565 3.5000 25.0000 
20 yr. 8.5976 8.5405 2.6280 3.5000 25.0000 
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Key Rate: 20-Year Rate 
Table A6 
Scenarios 0-499: Statistics for Rates 
Rate Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
6 mo. 8.2880 7.7566 2.8506 2.9836 25.0000 
1 yr. 8.5445 8.0697 2.6599 2.9836 23.76l3 
2 yr. 8.8825 8.5735 2.4800 3.4161 23.5227 
3 yr. 9.0386 8.7955 2.3625 3.5000 22.4026 
5 yr. 9.3218 9.1213 2.3032 3.5000 22.1785 
7 yr. 9.4352 9.2517 2.2665 3.5000 22.1785 
11 yr. 9.5517 9.3750 2.2478 3.5000 22.4026 
15 yr. 9.6199 9.4401 2.2387 3.5000 22.8506 
20 yr. 9.7390 9.7140 2.2487 3.6004 22.4026 
Table A7 
Scenarios 500-999: Statistics for Rates 
Rate Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
6 mo. 8.1452 7.6545 2.7491 2.9836 25.0000 
1 yr. 8.4010 8.0557 2.5637 2.9836 25.0000 
2 yr. 8.7416 8.4416 2.3945 3.4161 24.7305 
3 yr. 8.9069 8.6571 2.2933 3.5000 23.3344 
5 yr. 9.1903 8.9933 2.2458 3.5000 22.5367 
7 yr. 9.3034 9.l303 2.2124 3.5000 21.9435 
11 yr. 9.4202 9.2455 2.1970 3.5000 22.4054 
15 yr. 9.4900 9.3163 2.1912 3.5000 22.6364 
20 yr. 9.6128 9.6045 2.2095 3.5000 23.0984 
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Managing the Costs and Risks of Housing Finance: 
A New Role for Actuaries 
Anthony Asher* 
Abstract 
Housing finance is a nontraditional field where actuarial expertise could be 
applied fruitfully. The development of mortgage instruments requires the ap-
plication of financial mathematics, while the evaluation and management of the 
financial risks to which borrowers and lenders are exposed require a knowledge 
of insurance principles. This paper splits the financial costs of home owner-
ship into several components: those that arise from inflation, risk, adminis-
tration, and the residual real interest charge. The risk component further is 
partitioned into life contingencies, economic contingencies, and various moral 
hazards. This analysis provides a basis for future financial innovation, high-
lights where government intervention may prove productive, and suggests a 
number of areas of possible actuarial involvement. 
Key words and phrases: mortgage, insurance, government guarantees, inf1a-
tion, life cycle 
1 Introduction 
In their search for new areas of involvement, actuaries may find the 
field of housing finance both accessible and fruitful. The accessibil-
ity stems from the convergence of financial markets and the fading of 
the boundaries between insurers and mortgage finance institutions. In 
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addition, there is a fundamental similarity between insurers and mort-
gage lenders: both are concerned with risk and security. Whether this 
becomes a fruitful area of expansion depends on the skills and energies 
of the actuaries concerned. 
In any event, it would help actuaries if they better understood why 
some of the risks associated with the various types of home mortgages 
can, and even should, be insured. The need for mortgage insurance 
(for both lender and borrower) offers opportunities for those actuaries 
involved in product development. This paper is intended to highlight 
some of those areas in the development and evaluation of new mortgage 
products (for borrowers and lenders) where actuaries can playa role. l 
In the following sections, the basic types of mortgage products are 
examined. To facilitate this examination, the interest charged by mort-
gage lenders is divided into four components: 
1. An allowance for inflation; 
2. Charges for risk of default; 
3. Costs of administration; 
4. Net real interest.2 
These components are discussed in Sections 2 to 5, respectively. 
2 Inflation 
2.1 The Need for Varying Payments 
International norms are that housing loan payments should not ex-
ceed 25 percent to 30 percent of gross income and that the total amounts 
borrowed be no more than three to four years' annual salary. For a 20 
year loan, these limitations are more or less compatible with nominal 
interest rates of 8 percent or less per annum. Once nominal interest 
rates exceed 8 percent (as is likely with double digit inflation rates), 
it is no longer possible to borrow three years' salary and still pay the 
1 Financial innovation in home lending markets also includes variations on the theme 
of securitization (of mortgages) described by Woolford (1991) at a Society of Actuar-
ies meeting. This subject has been covered extensively in the literature (see also, for 
instance, Schwartz and Torous (1992) and the March 1994 edition of Housing Finance 
International). It is not the business of this paper, however, which focuses more on the 
mortgage instruments themselves. 
2The interest charge will include an allowance for the profit of the mortgage lender. 
The considerations involved in determining the profit are too complex to discuss here. 
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interest charges from current income. Extending the term of the loan 
makes little difference. A 50 percent increase in the term, for instance, 
will increase the amount that can be borrowed by only 14 percent (at 
an interest rate of 8 percent). 
As the rate of inflation increases, it therefore would seem that lend-
ing institutions should be prepared to lend a portion of these inter-
est payments to the borrowers. This would restore them to the cash 
flow position they had enjoyed before the rise in inflation, assuming 
that the present value of future income remains unchanged. Malpezzi 
(1990) gives examples from a number of countries of experiments with 
a variety of mortgage products that allow for greater flexibility and af-
fordability, particularly in an inflationary environment. 
One obvious solution is a mortgage instrument where a proportion 
of the nominal interest due is added to the amounts outstanding and 
the mortgage repayments are increased in nominal terms each year. 
Several of these instruments have been devised and used in different 
countries, with the rate of increase being determined in a variety of 
ways. Though there appears to be no standard nomenclature, these in-
struments seem to fit into three broad categories: low start mortgages, 
progressive annuity mortgages, and indexed mortgages. Formulae for 
the different types of mortgage instruments ,~e given in the appendix. 
Given their expertise in manipulating interest rates, cash flow test-
ing, and matching assets and liabilities, actuaries should be able to 
make significant contributions in designing mortgage products and in 
matching mortgage assets with appropriate liabilities. 
2.2 The Slow Response 
Not all countries have institutions that have responded to an in-
crease in nominal rates by introducing appropriate instruments. For 
example, the annual inflation rate has averaged over 14 percent for the 
past 20 years in South Africa, with nominal mortgage rates averaging 
just under 16 percent. Yet no increasing mortgage product has been 
publicly offered. Malpezzi (1990) shows the problem is not unique to 
South Africa. 
Why have financial institutions been so slow in adapting? The an-
swer probably includes elements of inertia, lack of expertise, and (quite 
proper) prudence. In his chapter that examines the effects of infla-
tion on savings, Hadjimatheou (1987) records several studies that have 
found that higher inflation rates appear to create greater uncertainty 
and lead to greater savings by individuals. There is other evidence, pre-
sented later in this paper, that higher inflation may increase the risk of 
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borrowers defaulting on their loans. This lends some justification to 
the decisions by financial institutions to reduce their lending in times 
of higher inflation. 
To understand the issues better, the question needs to be placed 
within the broader problem technically described by economists as liq-
uidity constraints within the life cycle. Hadjimatheou quotes a summary 
of this idea by Hubbard and Judd (1986, p. 56): 
Hump-shaped lifetime earnings profiles rising towards mid-
dle age then leveling off and declining in old age imply that 
individuals will want to consume more than their current 
resources when young. They cannot do so if liquidity re-
straints are binding.3 
Even in the United States, which has not experienced long periods of 
double digit interest rates, the literature provides evidence that higher 
nominal rates reduce the demand for debt.4 Megbolugbe and Linneman 
(1993) describe several studies that find a negative correlation between 
inflation and home ownership. These appear to be related to liquid-
ity constraints. In economic terms, however, this represents a market 
failure. Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch (1987) point out that market fail-
ure can occur as a result<lof the absence of appropriate insurance mar-
kets. They ascribe this absence to the presence of antis election, 5 moral 
hazard,6 and general lack of knowledge about the risks. 
Actuaries have the expertise to address all of these questions (par-
ticularly those covering insurance) in a logically consistent manner. 
3Uquidity restraints result from unnecessary restrictions on the ability to borrow-
in this case on the strength of future earnings. 
4This reduction in the demand for debt is consistent with a failure to introduce new 
mortgage instruments. 
5 Antiselection is defined by the Society of Actuaries Committee on Actuarial Princi-
ples (1992) as a result of inadequate refinement of the risk classification system. 
6 Moral hazard occurs when the future. occurrence, timing, or severity of an insured 
event is controllable by the insured persons. Those risks that imply negligence rather 
than fraud are sometimes called morale hazard, but this distinction has not been used 
in this paper. 
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3 Risks 
3.1 Some Background 
3.1.1 Insurability: Private and Government 
The conditions under which a risk (or event) is said to be insurable 
have been established by the Society of Actuaries Committee on Actu-
arial Principles (1992, p. 587). An event is insurable if: 
1. It is associated with a phenomenon that is expected to display 
statistical regularity; 
2. It is contingent with respect to number of occurrences, timing, or 
severity; 
3. The fact of its occurrence is definitely determinable; 
4. Its occurrence results in undesirable economic consequences for 
one or more persons; and 
5. Its future occurrence, timing, or severity is neither precisely known 
nor controllable by these persons. 
Moral hazards are not entirely unmanageable. Profit sharing, no-
claim bonus, and the legal principle of indemnity all provide incentives 
to limit the number and size of claims. Careful definition of the insur-
able event that excludes those items under the control of the insured 
also allows for the extension of insurance markets. The courts can be 
used to challenge fraudulent claims. 
Government attempts to insure, rather than to manage, the risks 
due to moral hazards are likely to result in unintended subsidies to 
unintended beneficiaries. Recent examples can be seen in the collapse 
of the savings and loans deposit insurance industry in the United States 
and the insolvency of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund in South Africa. 
The latter has been driven to insolvency by, among other things, a large 
number of fraudulent claims. 
The insurer can manage antiselection by obtaining sufficient infor-
mation to refine its risk classification system adequately. Antiselection 
also can be managed through government intervention in the form of 
a mandatory insurance system. The need for personal information is 
reduced, if not eliminated. 7 
7Some persons' sense of equity might be offended if there were no differentiation 
between different risk classes. On the other hand, others might welcome the cross-
subsidies involved. 
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Cyclical risks, such as unemployment, do not always display the sta-
tistical regularity required for insurability. Williams and Heins (1976) 
give an argument for government intervention to insure such risks. 
Where there is mandatory insurance, economic viability can be ensured 
by increasing premiums or reducing benefits. 
Governments also may enter or create certain markets in countries 
where the private sector lacks the capital, technical capability, confi-
dence, or energy to introduce economically viable financial products. 
There appears to be no inherent reason why such initiatives could not 
be privatized subsequently. Grigsby (1990) points out that in the United 
States mortgage guarantee insurance was introduced by government 
and later was followed by private initiatives. 
3.1.2 Financial Planning 
Appropriate responses to the risks faced by both mortgage lenders 
and borrowers must be developed.8 Duncan (1988) provides an inter-
esting insight into the nature of the borrower's risks. His paper is based 
on a detailed longitudinal study from 1968 to 1979 of 5,000 families 
and is called the "Panel Study of Income Dynamics." He finds that fam-
ily income is surprisingly volatile, with nearly one third of the sample 
experiencing a drop in income of 50 percent or more. (Family, in this 
context, can refer to individuals living on their own.) His analysis of the 
life events that cause some of these financial reverses will be used be-
low. The results of the study highlight the need for financial planning 
and, where possible, appropriate insurance. 
Bragg (1992) suggests that actuaries can find a new role in finan-
cial counselling. Are they not in the best position to know which risks 
are important, what insurance is available, and how finances should be 
managed? 
Duncan's paper and the life cycle hypothesis of Modigliani (1986) 
provide a good foundation for such planning. The issues, as men-
tioned earlier, are lifetime earnings and consumption and their vari-
ability, as well as current liquidity. The life cycle hypothesis assumes 
individuals behave rationally. But without assistance in planning their 
expenditures, it is difficult to understand how they can make rational 
decisions. Actuarial involvement in the design of lifetime income and 
expenditure models could provide a link between research and practical 
applications. 
Bit is the author's conviction that the individual's risks need to be considered first 
and that the need for the security of financial institutions derives from this primary 
concern. 
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Proper financial planning may indicate that the risk to the borrower 
of a home loan is larger than was previously thought and that the insur-
ance necessary to manage the risk makes it too expensive. Thus, rather 
than making housing finance available to more persons, proper finan-
cial planning may reduce the demand for mortgages but fewer persons 
would suffer foreclosure. 
3.1.3 Life and Disability Coverage 
Mortgage lenders often require borrowers to obtain a credit death 
and disability life policy that covers the amount of the loan outstanding 
at the time of death or long-term disability. This may be inadequate, 
however, because death or disability can cause financial hardships of 
which meeting mortgage payments is only a part. The death and disabil-
ity insurance policy rather should be designed with the family's future 
in mind. The family needs insurance to cover disaster and also may 
need assistance in rearranging its financial affairs after a claim. The 
institution's need to protect itself against loss probably can be met by 
a relatively small amount of life insurance (enough to cover the differ-
ence between the market value of the collateral and the outstanding 
loan if the latter is larger). 
Duncan (1988) confirms that disability and illness are important 
causes of financial hardship. In his tabulation of the causes of the 
large declines in income, disability and illness are responsible in 12 
percent of the cases for men between 25 and 45 and in 9 percent of the 
cases for women. This compares with only 3 percent for the death of 
a spouse, confirming the relative importance of disability compared to 
death. Unfortunately, disability coverage is not as readily available as 
life insurance. Lending institutions may be able to assist aspiring home 
owners obtain disability insurance by pooling borrowers into groups. 
3.2 Cost Increases 
Even if spared death or disability, borrowers still may find them-
selves unable to meet repayments because their costs and their incomes 
are not necessarily matched. This subsection looks at major reasons for 
cost increases, the next subsection examines other causes of income re-
duction. 
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3.2.1 Interest Rates 
Holders of adjustable rate mortgages9 are particularly exposed to 
the risk of an increase in interest rates. Higher inflation rates appear to 
aggravate the problem; not only does the level of nominal interest rates 
rise, but short-term interest rates appear to display greater volatility 
(Chan et al. 1992). 
Government protection from the risk of high interest rates, in the 
form of interest rate controls or subsidies, has not proved effective in 
volatile environments. Malpezzi (1990) argues against the use of such 
interventions. He finds that the distortions introduced into financial 
markets inhibit the appropriate allocations of resources without giving 
concomitant benefits to the poor. 
Three mortgage products are commonly available as alternatives to 
government intervention: fixed interest mortgages; dual index mort-
gages; and privately subsidized mortgages. 
• Fixed Interest Mortgages: Here the interest rate and the repay-
ments remain unchanged throughout the term of the mortgage. 
This provides a level of certainty and probably makes this the 
most attractive mortgage product from the borrower's perspec-
tive. Such mortgages are particularly popular in the United States, 
but are regarded as too expensive in many other countries. Dia-
mond and Lee (1992) show, however, that fixed interest mortgages 
are used in Denmark, France, and Germany (but without a prepay-
ment option). This suggests that the product might be considered 
in other countries, at least those with relatively stable single digit 
interest rates. 
Fixed interest mortgages, however, present a particular problem 
when it includes an option for borrowers to prepay the loan with-
out penalty.lO Schwartz and Torous (1992) have calculated in-
surance fees for the prepayment risk, but it is not clear that the 
prepayments display sufficient statistical regularity to be insur-
able. Mortgage lenders at times have taken a large proportion of 
the risk themselves, but this can prove disastrous. Grigsby (1990) 
gIn an adjustable rate mortgage, interest rates and mortgage payments are fixed for 
a specified period (anywhere from one month to five years). At the end of this period, 
the outstanding balance is determined; new mortgage payments are recalculated using 
this outstanding balance and current market rates. The new rate and the new level of 
payments remain fixed for another speCified period. This process is repeated until the 
mortgage is repaid. Adjustable rate mortgages are common outside the United States. 
lOBorrowers tend to repay their loans early when interest rates have fallen and they 
can refinance at a lower rate of interest. 
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ascribes the American savings and loan debacle of the 1980s to, 
among other things, inadequate allowance for the mismatch of 
the term of their assets and liabilities caused partly by the pre-
payment option. 
• Dual Index Mortgages: Here the mortgage payments are increased 
in line with a wage-related index, while the cost of borrowing is 
related to market interest rates. Although not offering absolute 
protection against interest rate movements, the risk is deferred 
significantly and often will not give rise to losses. Dual indexed 
mortgages are more appropriate for countries with higher rates 
of interest; they are currently in favor with the World Bank. 
Roldan and Spoor (1992) tell how dual index mortgages have been 
introduced in Mexico with apparent success.ll A variant of the 
dual index mortgage was tried by one company in South Africa in 
the early 1980s: the lenders, however, suffered losses from loans 
still outstanding in the early 1990s. The problem was that the 
incomes of some borrowers did not keep pace with the required 
increases in the repayments. The loans of these borrowers became 
too large to be serviced and also exceeded the current market 
value of their homes. 
• Subsidized Mortgages: The third approach is for employers to 
offer a fixed and subsidized lower rate of interest or to. subsidize 
housing expenses on an income-related basis, as mentioned in 
Malpezzi (1990). This not only addresses the interest rate risk, 
but also the affordability of the loan. These subsidies, however, 
have become less popular over time as they are expensive and 
encourage overspending on housing. 
Asher (1992) describes yet another form of mortgage: a salary-linked 
mortgage.12 This type of mortgage links both the periodic mortgage 
payment and the interest rate to the borrower's income. The borrower 
is liable to pay a predetermined proportion of his or her income over the 
term of the loan. The proportion is equal to the initial loan divided by 
the product of current income and the agreed term. The amount out-
standing at any time is the product of the proportion calculated, the 
borrower's income at that time, and the remaining term. The interest 
earned by the lender in a salary linked mortgage is therefore depen-
dent on the growth of the borrower's remuneration. The loan can be 
11 In Mexico repayments are linked to the national minimum wage. 
12The concept of salary linkage is not that different from the income contingent loans 
described in Nerlove (1975) and elsewhere. 
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described as being linked to the index of the borrower's own income. 
A portfolio of such loans is particularly appropriate for defined benefit 
pension funds as it provides an asset matched to the liabilities as both 
are dependent on income growth. 
The link between income and mortgage payments introduces addi-
tional risks of antiselection and moral hazard. Antiselection may occur 
if individuals expecting lower salary growth are more likely to use such 
instruments. It should be feasible to develop classification models for 
potential borrowers to address this problem. Models can be developed 
that predict an individual's lifetime wage patterns. 
Moral hazard risks are directly analogous to those that arise in col-
lecting income tax. Income may be underreported (as in tax evasion), 
shifted to nontaxable sources (tax avoidance), and reduced by working 
less. Avoidance and evasion risks can be minimized by obtaining infor-
mation on income from the employers who sponsor the pension fund 
making the loans. 
Though the possible work disincentives cannot be gauged accurately, 
there are some studies of the problem. Tuomala (1990) reports that 
"most labor supply studies of men seem to indicate backward-sloping 
supply curves." Higher income leads to men taking more leisure (de-
scribed as an income effect), but the leisure is more expensive rela-
tive to other goods (which creates a substitution effect and reduces the 
leisure taken.) He lists 11 studies undertaken in the 1970s, of which 
seven showed the backward slope. Studies of women, however, usually 
have shown the normal forward slope. Brown (1983) gives more detail 
on some of these studies. A typical regression result with ten different 
parameters would produce an R2 of 0.25, explaining only 25 percent 
of variation between individuals. Little confidence, therefore, can be 
placed in these results. 
3.2.2 Individual Changes in Circumstance 
Increased costs for the borrower can arise from many sources in-
cluding divorce, inflation, illness, loss of or damage to possessions, 
increased family size, and the increased costs associated with children 
as they grow older. Duncan (1988) highlights the importance of di-
vorce, where another household with its overhead costs is created. The 
problems may be aggravated by excessive borrOwing-often credit pur-
chases not considered when the initial housing loan was granted. 
Higher levels of inflation appear to increase the possibility that cost 
increases may be unmanageable. Vining and Elwertowski (1976) con-
firm the widely accepted view that higher and more uncertain inflation 
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rates are linked with a wider dispersion of price movements. Their pa-
per covers all elements of the Consumer Price Index, including housing. 
This wider dispersion may increase the chances of a family being unable 
to meet all of their financial obligations and justifies greater prudence 
when lending in times of higher inflation. 
Mortgage lenders normally require borrowers to have homeown-
ers' hazard insurance to protect their collateral against damage (from 
storms, fire, flooding, etc.). While such damage can lead to significant 
losses that otherwise would cause the borrower severe financial hard-
ship, there are other risks to be considered such as unexpected medical 
costs to be considered. Thus, lenders may consider making health in-
surance a requirement in situations where adequate public care is not 
available.13 It is not possible, however, to insure against all fluctuations 
in expenditure. As a result, mortgage lenders still focus on the qual-
ity of the collateral rather than on the borrower's current and future 
income and expenses. 
An actuarial model of lifetime income and expenditure that allows 
for variability in income and expenditure would be helpful in the eval-
uation of loan applications. Such a model also could be used to assist 
in rescheduling mortgage payments. 
3.3 Reduction in Income 
3.3.1 Partial Reduction 
The risk of partial income 10SS14 appears to be greater with manual 
workers and older workers (those over the age of 50); see the surveys 
by Her Majesty's Stationery Office (1992) and Human Sciences Research 
Council (1990). Affordability standards imposed by lenders should al-
low for such fluctuations in income, particularly for older borrowers. 
At the present time in South Africa, a limited allowance sometimes is 
made for the risk of women's earnings declining as a result of childbirth, 
but not for other reasons. The salary-linked home finance product de-
scribed above also addresses this risk directly. 
13Because individual health insurance poliCies are relatively expensive, mortgage 
lenders may consider pooling borrowers to provide them with access to group health 
coverage. 
14It appears that the problem of partial loss of income is the main reason for the 
difficulties experienced by the South African dual index mortgage scheme mentioned 
earlier. If wage patterns in Mexico follow those in South Africa, similar problems are 
likely for some Mexican borrowers in the second decade of operation of Mexico's dual 
index mortgage scheme. 
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The work of Lee (1988) in the United Kingdom shows that inflation 
increases the dispersion or real wage increases, but the earlier work of 
Hamermesh (1986) found the reverse to be true in the United States. 
The ambivalent findings of these authors indicate that the risks do not 
appear to have a regular statistical basis. This and the moral hazard in-
volved in insuring items such as the number of overtime hours probably 
make the risk uninsurable. 
3.3.2 Unemployment 
Though governments offer some form of national unemployment 
insurance in several countries, there is little involvement by private in-
surance companies. This may be because unemployment appears to be 
subject to the three major causes of uninsurability referred to earlier: 
moral hazard, antiselection, and irregular statistical experience. IS 
There is clear evidence of moral hazard. Schmitt and Wadsworth 
(1993), in reviewing the research on its presence in unemployment in-
surance, report that in the United States and the United Kingdom the 
duration elasticity (the percentage increase in average duration of un-
employment related to a percentage increase in the unemployment ben-
efit) appears to be some 0.4 and 0.3, respectively. It appears probable 
that the moral hazard would be even higher with an increase in the 
replacement ratio.16 
Antiselection is also probable. At any given time unemployment 
falls heavily on particular categories of workers (defined by geography, 
by industry, or by skills). These categories are themselves unstable; it 
would appear to be difficult for potential private insurers to predict 
these changes ahead of the workers concerned. 
This degree of uninsurability provides a strong argument for some 
form of compulsory national unemployment insurance, which is desir-
able for reasons other than a reduction in the costs of housing finance. 
Doling (1990) mentions that Finnish banks respond to short periods 
of unemployment by rescheduling repayments. He points out that this 
is possible because of the shorter terms (10 years) of the original loans. 
This is consistent with a life cycle planning model that takes future 
uncommitted income into account and with Duncan's (1988) sample. 
In this sample, the major unemployment of the household head is a 
significant category, accounting for 19 percent of the large drops in 
income for men between 25 and 45. The importance of unemployment 
15There is also a cyclical aspect to unemployment. 
16The replacement ratio is that of unemployment benefit to potential earnings. 
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on defaults also is confirmed in studies by Canner et al. (1991) and 
Clauretie and Herzog (1990). 
3.4 A Note on Mortgage Guarantee Insurance 
Mortgage guarantee insurance protects mortgage lenders against 
losses on their lending. It normally is required for all loans issued 
by a lender, unless the borrower has made a sufficiently large down 
payment on the home so that the difference between the loan and the 
value of the home is large. I? Significant losses can occur in the event 
of a general fall in house prices that coincides with widespread income 
losses-due, perhaps, to a jump in the unemployment rate. The doubts 
expressed earlier (about the statistical regularity displayed by unem-
ployment rates) must be magnified in the case of mortgage guarantees, 
as the movement of house prices appears even less statistically stable. 
The insurance industry in the United Kingdom has suffered losses 
from mortgage guarantee insurance business of thousands of millions 
of pounds that may lead to a shortage of capacity in this market. These 
losses were particularly severe because housing prices in different re-
gions of the United Kingdom tend to move roughly in tandem. Herzog 
(1988) shows that in the United States default risks (and presumably 
house prices) in the different regions have not moved together. Mort-
gage guarantee insurance, therefore, has been able to continue to pro-
vide security to mortgage lenders in the United States. 
The author, however, has misgivings about mortgage guarantee in-
surance's long-term viability as an insurance product. If there is a prima 
facie case for its non-insurability, actuaries should consider the dam-
age that a spate of claims could do to the insurance industry. They 
also could lobby for some compulsory coverage to be provided by gov-
ernment. As with unemployment, a compulsory scheme could adjust 
premiums and benefits in order to ensure solvency. A more thorough 
argument for government intervention is given by Foster and Herzog 
(1981), which could be a base for such lobbying. As Grossman (1992) 
points out, however, government guarantees introduce a moral hazard 
because the mortgage lenders no longer bear the cost of inadequate 
evaluation of borrowers. 
17For example, in the United States borrowers must borrow no more than 80 percent 
of the appraised value of the home to avoid mortgage guarantee insurance. 
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3.5 Other Approaches to Managing the Default Risk 
Statistical models of housing prices could be useful in determin-
ing appropriate collateral requirements for loans and reducing default 
probabilities. Gyourko and Voith (1992) and DiPasquale and Wheaton 
(1993) provide two recent attempts at developing such models. 
Another approach would be to hedge the risks through financial 
options and futures on a house price index. Dwonczyk (1992) has de-
veloped just such an index in Australia. There might conceivably be 
persons hoping to buy homes in the future-in addition to financial 
speculators-who would find it attractive to take bull positions in these 
instruments. Although Dwonczyk expressed confidence that his index 
would be free of manipulation and accurately reflect the overall level of 
house prices, he also reported that adaptations were required for the 
23 submarkets he found in Sydney. It is unlikely that a market could 
develop in derivative instruments for each of these submarkets, which 
would limit their usefulness as hedging instruments. 
4 Administration 
4.1 Initial 
Most of the costs of lending are front ended, being expended in sell-
ing, evaluating the collateral, and performing the legal and administra-
tive procedures necessary to initiate loans. Various stamp duties and 
transfer taxes also may be payable. The costs of administration nor-
mallyare charged as a percentage of the amount outstanding. 
It is, therefore, necessary to estimate the average term of the loan in 
order to decide on a reasonable amortization period for the initial costs. 
The term will be longer if the mortgages are transferable (when the 
borrower moves to another house) or assumable (when the mortgage is 
assumed by the new owner). 
Charging the borrower directly for all the initial costs would be con-
sistent with the approach taken in the life insurance industry. It has the 
advantage of eliminating cross subsidies to borrowers who prepay and 
shifts the risk of underestimating the likely term of the loan from the 
institution to the borrower.18 It is likely to lead to lower charges, but 
because it emphasizes the initial costs, it may repel some prospective 
customers. 
l8In the United States, lenders do reduce the impact of prepayment of mortgages by 
requiring that initial expenses be paid in advance. 
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Ameliorating the tilt19 problem in countries with relatively high rates 
of inflation also should reduce the annual charges for initial costs. This 
is because there is less need to enter the lower end of the housing mar-
ket and to trade up as larger dwellings become affordable. 
4.2 Renewal 
The ongoing costs of installment collection are relatively small and 
particularly amenable to automation. Berger and Humphrey (1991) find 
that efficiencies in administration differ markedly from bank to bank 
in the United States, but are not especially related to size. The criti-
cal issue is limiting input costs. This appears to accord with the South 
African experience. Mergers and acquisitions appear not to be appro-
priate strategies for the control of expenses. 
4.3 Final 
Final expenses are fairly trivial if the loan is fully repaid on or before 
due time. Costs can be considerable in the event of defaults and fore-
closure. Insurance of the risks leading to foreclosure will reduce these 
costs. The administration costs of foreclosure should be added to the 
losses incurred as a result of the failure of the collateral, as a saving in 
one can create costs in the other. 
5 Real Interest Charges 
The real interest charge represents the balance between demand for, 
and supply of, loanable funds. It accords with the risk-free interest rate 
of financial theory and normally is regarded as the rate available on 
short-term government bills. 
Financial innovation by mortgage lenders is unlikely to yield any 
long-term advantage over other financial institutions in reducing the 
cost of the real interest rate-any innovations can be copied. The best 
that can be expected is for the lending institutions' financial instru-
ments on the liability side of their balance sheets to be up-to-date so 
that housing interest rates are comparable with the rest of the market. 
The development of secondary markets may be a necessary part of this 
activity. Actuaries could have a role in this area. 
19Level nominal mortgage repayments are tilted once they are adjusted for inflation. 
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Governments can, and frequently have, intervene(d) in financial mar-
kets to reduce the costs of housing finance. Mayo (1991), in summa-
rizing the World Bank's view on housing, suggests that governments 
should focus on enabling markets to function and that positive real 
interest rates are more appropriate. It is difficult to ensure that the 
subsidies inherent in artifiCially low interest rates help those they are 
intended to help. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
Numerous cost effective housing finance instruments have been de-
signed to adapt to unpredictable inflation. In addition, many conven-
tional insurance products are available to cover the risks to both bor-
rower and lender. Proper financial planning would indicate that these 
insurance coverages are required by borrowers whether or not they have 
home loans. Regarding these risks as part of the business of the mort-
gage lender represents, in some respects, an artificial increase in the 
cost of housing finance and can have the undesirable effect of unnec-
essarily dispossessing the homeowner. 
Actuaries could have two roles in managing the cost of housing. 
First, there is the need for better financial planning and for new insur-
ance products. Second, actuaries could find new fields in the employ 
of home lenders, especially in financial management and product de-
velopment. 
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Appendix 
The present value of annual payments in arrears over n years is 
given by: 
Value = X f. n (1 + Ii) 
k=l i=l (1 + 9i) 
(1) 
where X is the unadjusted base payment, X (1 + !I) is the first payment, 
the interest rate in year i is 9i, and the installment is increased by Ii in 
year i. 
Some of the more commonly used types of mortgages are defined 
in terms of the rules used to determine Ii, 9i, and n (n is assumed to 
be fixed unless otherwise stated). 
• Fixed interest mortgages: 
Ii 0 for all i; 
9i 9, a fixed rate of interest for all i. 
• Adjustable rate mortgages: 
9i 
a(n - i,9i-l) _ 1 for all i; 
a(n - i,9i) 
The market rate of interest in year i 
where a(n, r) is the present value of an n-year annuity immediate 
at a rate of interest of r per annum, i.e., 
( ) 
(1 - (1 + r) -n) 
a n,r = . 
r 
• Low-start mortgages: 
Bi 
Some low, predetermined, rate of increase for (i < k); 
a(n - i,9i-d _ 1 f . > k' 
( 
.) or t _ , 
a n - t,9i 
The market rate of interest in year i. 
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• Progressive annuities: 
Ii \11 : ~i/ - 1 where j represents the real rate of interest; 
Bi The nominal rate of interest in year i. 
• Price level adjusted mortgages: 
Ii The rate of inflation in year i; 
Bi (1 + Ii)(l + j) - 1 where j = the real interest rate. 
As a further generalization, these mortgages can be viewed as 
index-linked mortgages where Ii is linked to any index. 
• Dual index mortgages: 
Ii Growth rate of index (usually related to wages) in year i; 
Bi Interest rate in year i 
As n is no longer fixed, the series may not have a finite value. 
• Salary linked home finance: 
Ii The rate of growth of the borrower's salary 
Bi Ii + Yi 
where Yi is some nonnegative rate of interest in excess of salary 
growth. 
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 2, No.1, 1994 
Reconciling Two Rate Level Indications: A Chain 
Rule Approach 
Cheng-Sheng Peter Wu* 
Abstract 
The problem considered is that of reconciling two rate level indications that 
are based on several common factors, but have been made at different review 
periods. A popular approach to this problem is the so-called sequential re-
placement method, which calculates the impact of each individual factor. Un-
fortunately, this method has a serious deficiency: the estimated impact of a 
factor depends upon the order of the replacement. To counteract this defect, 
a new approach, called the chain rule approach, is developed. Using this ap-
proach, an explicit formula is given for calculating the impact and the marginal 
impact of each factor. 
Key words and phrases: sequential replacement approach, factor impact, mar-
ginal factor impact 
1 Introduction 
Pricing (property/casualty) actuaries often have to deal with situa-
tions where two rate level indications have been produced at different 
rate review periods. If the two indications differ, then underwriters, 
marketing personnel, and regulators usually want to know the reasons 
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behind the difference. This is particularly true when rate level indica-
tions increase 20 percent, 30 percent, or even 50 percent in one year for 
volatile lines such as workers' compensation. Such significant increases 
may result from various factors, including a high trend, deteriorating 
experience, or a change in the loss development pattern. 
In order to explain the difference between two rate level indications, 
the pricing actuary may need to estimate the individual impact of each 
rating factor on the change. Because the rate level indication function 
is usually a nonlinear function of the underlying rating factors, the por-
tion of the overall change due to any given factor depends on the values 
of other factors. 
In Section 2 we describe the approach now in use, the so-called se-
quential replacement approach. A better method, called the chain rule 
approach is introduced in Section 3. 
2 The Sequential Replacement Approach 
2.1 The Definition 
One method that some actuaries use to reconcile two rate level indi-
cations is the sequential replacement approach. The sequential replace-
ment approach starts with the prior review indication and replaces the 
prior review rating factors sequentially (one by one) with the current re-
view factors. The method then concludes that the impact of any factor 
is the change in the indication when that particular factor is replaced 
in the indication calculation. In other words, suppose that there are 
m factors and at time t, for (t = 0, 1, 2, ... ), the ith factor l is de-
noted by Xt,i and the vector of the m factors at time t is denoted by 
Xt = (Xt,l, Xt,2, ... , Xt,m). The indication at time t is It, given by 
It = f(xd (1) 
where f is a real valued function of the m factors. The change in the 
indication is !::lIt = It+l -It. How do we calculate the change in indica-
tion due to a particular factor? According to the sequential replacement 
method, the change in indication between times t and t + 1 for factor i 
is !::lIt (i) where 
!::lIt (i) = f (Xt+l,l, Xt+l,2, ... ,Xt+l,i-l, Xt+l,i, Xt,i+l, ... ,Xt,m) 
- f(Xt+l.l, Xt+l,2, ... , Xt+l,i-l. Xt,i, Xt,i+l, ... , Xt,m). (2) 
----------------------
IThe factors can be labeled in any order, provided the order is maintained through-
out the analysis. 
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An obvious problem with using equation (2) to measure the impact 
of a speCific factor is that the size of the estimated impact depends on 
how the factors are labeled and the order in which they are replaced in 
equation (2). The following example will illustrate this problem. 
2.2 Example 1: The Sequential Replacement Approach 
Assume that the following generic loss ratio formula2 is used to calcu-
late a rate indication: 
I = X x C + (1 - C) x B_1 
ELR 
(3) 
where I is the indication; X is the insurer's ultimate, on-level, and 
trended experience; C is the credibility; B is the experience applied to 
the complement of credibility; and ELR is the permiSSible or expected 
loss ratio. 
Further, assume that the rating factors and indications underlying 
the prior and current reviews are as follows. 
Table 1 
Review Data 
X C B ELR I 
Prior 0.7000 0.8000 0.4000 0.6000 0.0667 
Current 1.0000 0.7000 0.6000 0.6500 0.3538 
The increase in the indication from the prior to current review is 
()"I = 0.3538 - 0.0667 = 0.2871, which is not unusual. The sequential 
replacement approach may proceed as follows: let ()"I (X) be the impact 
due to the insurer's experience, X. From equation (3), it follows that 
()"I(X) 
1.0 x 0.8 + (1.0 - 0.8) x 0.4 
0.6 
0.7 x 0.8 + (1.0 - 0.8) x 0.4 
0.6 
0.4. 
Let ()"I (C) be the impact due to the credibility, C. Then, 
()"I(C) 
1.0 x 0.7 + (1.0 - 0.7) x 0.4 
0.6 
2To keep this example simple, many of the rating factors, such as the on-level factor, 
trend, and loss development factor, are not considered in equation (3). The impacts of 
these factors will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
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1.0 x 0.8 + (1.0 - 0.8) x 004 
0.6 
-0.1. 
Let IlI(B) be the impact due to the experience applied to the comple-
ment of credibility, B. 
IlI(B) = 
1.0 x 0.7 + (1.0 - 0.7) x 0.6 
0.6 
1.0 x 0.7 + (1.0 - 0.7) x 004 
0.6 
0.1. 
Finally, let IlI(ELR) be the impact due to the expected loss ratio, ELR. 
Then, 
IlI(ELR) 
1.0 x 0.7 + (1.0 - 0.7) x 0.6 
0.65 
1.0 x 0.7 + (1.0 - 0.7) x 0.6 
0.6 
-0.1128. 
In the above calculations, the order of replacement is X first, then C, 
then B, and finally ELR. If this order of replacement changes, however, 
the impact of each factor may change. For example, when the order of 
replacement is ELR first, then B, then C, and finally X, we get 
IlI(ELR) = -0.0821, 
IlI(C) = -0.0154, 
IlI(B) = 0.0615 
IlI(X) = 0.3231. 
On the other hand, when the order of replacement is B first, then X, 
then ELR and finally C, we get 
IlI(B) = 0.0667, 
IlI(ELR) = -0.1179, 
IlI(X) = 00400, 
IlI(C) = -0.0615. 
Given this problem with the sequential replacement approach, a new 
method is needed to compute the impact of each factor that is inde-
pendent of the order of the computations. The chain rule approach 
described below solves this problem. 
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3 The Chain Rule Approach 
3.1 Definition 
Again, let Xt = (Xl, X2, ... , xm) denote a vector of the m factors used 
in determining the prior rate level indication at time t, and j (Xt) be the 
rate level indication function. 3 Consider what happens when there are 
infinitesimal changes in the rating factors. The total differential of the 
indication function can be calculated by the chain rule of differentiation 
(Edwards, 1973, Chapter 2): 
~ oj(xd 
dj(xd = L. ~ dxt,i. 
i=l t,t 
(4) 
Let Xt+l be the current vector of rates. Then for small changes, 
however, equation (4) can be approximated by 
(5) 
where ~Xt = Xt+l-Xt = (~Xt,l, ~Xt,2, ... , ~Xt,m). From equation (5), the 
individual impact of factor i may be approximated by [oj(Xt) /OXt,i] x 
dXt,i' Its marginal impact is approximated by oj(xd /OXt,i' Note that 
this approach is not affected by the order of the estimation sequence. 
In the real world, however, the chain rule approach has a serious 
limitation. For many real world applications, the changes in Xt are not 
necessarily small so equation (5) cannot be used. To cope with a signif-
icant change in Xt, a multivariate Taylor series expansion can be used. 
Recall the multivariate Taylor series expansion: 
m oj(xd 1 m m 02 j(xd 
~j(xd = l: -0--' ~Xt,i + "2 l: l: 0 '0 ' ~Xt,i~Xj + .... 
i=l Xt,t i=l j=l Xt,t XJ 
The chain rule can be approximated by the first order Taylor series 
expansion given in equation (5). This is only an approximation, how-
ever. But because we know the (exact) value of ~j (Xt) we can make this 
approximation exact. 
Now, by the mean value theorem, there is at least one point, x, given 
by 
x = Xt + T ~Xt with [0 ~ T ~ 1] (6) 
----------------------
3 f (Xt) is assumed to be at least twice differentiable in each of its parameters. 
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for which the first order Taylor series approximation is exact; see for 
example, Edwards (1973, Chapter 2). The theorem, however, does not 
indicate where x is. One obvious choice is to use the mid-point between 
Xt and Xt+l (Le., at T = 0.5) to evaluate the partial derivatives. As we 
will see, there is a better choice. 
Consider the equation (as a function of T): 
H(T) = !::.j(xd - I oj(xd 
i=l OXt,i 
x !::.Xt,i (7) 
where x is given in equation (6). Let T* be the smallest value of T for 
which H(T) = 0, and let xi be defined as 
(8) 
The mean value theorem only guarantees the existence of T*. We can 
determine T* by first plotting H(T) for T = kIlOO, k = 1,2, ... ,100 and 
observing the number and approximate location of the roots of H(T). 
Then T* can be obtained more accurately using well-known numeri-
cal root-finding methods such as the bisection method or the secant 
method. (See, for example, Burden and Faires, 1985, Chapter 2.) In 
most practical situations, we expect T* to be close to 0.5, Le., T* :::; 0.5. 
The marginal impact and the impact of factor i can be defined as 
follows. 
Definition 1 Given a vector of m factors Xt = (Xl, X2, ... , xm) and the 
rate level indication function j (Xt ), The marginal impact of factor i, for 
i = 1,2, ... , m, is MIF(i) where 
MIF(i) = oj(xt> I 
OXt i x -x* 
I t- t 
(9) 
The impact of factor i can be defined as follows: 
Definition 2 The impact of factor i, for i = 1, 2, ... , m, is !::.I (i) where 
oj(xd I x !::.Xt,i 
OXt i x -x* 
I t- t 
!::.I(i) 
MIF(i) X !::.Xt,i' 
3.2 Example 1 (Continued): The Chain Rule Approach 
Let Xt = (X, C, B, ELR). Recall equation (3), 
I = j( ) = X x C + (1 - C) x B_1 
Xt ELR . 
(10) 
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Clearly the partial derivatives are: 
oJ C 
oX ELR 
oJ (X -B) 
oC ELR 
oJ (1- C) 
oB ELR 
oJ _(XXC+(I-C)XB) 
oELR ELR2 . 
Given the data in Table I, we have Xt = (0.7,0.8,0.4,0.6) and ~Xt = 
(0.3, -0.1,0.2,0.05). Using equation (7), we have T* = 0.4900. Notice 
that, as expected, T* is close to 0.5. From equation (8), xi = Xt + 
0.490Q~xt = (0.8470,0.7510,0.4980,0.6245). Equations (9) and (10) 
now can be used to obtain the marginal impact and the impact of each 
factor. For example, the marginal impact of the factor ELR is 
MJF(ELR) 
0.8470 x 0.7510 + (1 - 0.7510) x 0.4980 
(0.6245)2 
-1.9490. 
The impact of factor ELR is -1.9490 x 0.05 = -0.0975. Table 2 shows 
the marginal impact and the impact of each factor in this example. 
Table 2 
Impact of Factors 
Factor MJF Impact 
X 1.2026 0.3608 
C 0.5588 -0.0559 
B 0.3987 0.0797 
ELR -1.9490 -0.0975 
Total 0.287l 
4 Example 2: Workers' Compensation Rating 
4.1 The Problem 
Next, an example from workers' compensation is considered. The 
example shows how to adjust the indication formula in order to con-
sider the impacts of rating factors for trend, loss development, and any 
intervening rate changes. 
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Assume that we are proceeding on a state rate review in which the 
rate is stipulated by the Rating Bureau in that state. The insurer is free 
to use flexible rating tools, however, such as rate deviation, dividends, 
or schedule rating, to compete in the state. 
Suppose the following information is given: 
• The prior review uses the experience of 1990 accident year ending 
12/31/90 evaluated as of 3/31/1992 (15 month maturity); 
• The current review uses the experience of 1991 accident year end-
ing 12/31/91 evaluated as of 3/31/1993 (15 month maturity); 
• The Bureau's loss ratio is applied to the complement of credibility, 
and the prior and current reviews also use the 1991 and 1992 
accident year experience, respectively, evaluated as of the same 
maturity date for the insurer's loss ratio; 
• The target average effective date for the prior review is 7/1/1993; 
• The target average effective date for the current review is 7/1/1994; 
• An exponential trend with a 6 percent annual trend amount is used 
in the prior review for both insurer's and Bureau's loss ratios; 
• An exponential trend with a 10 percent annual trend amount is 
used in the current review for both insurer's and Bureau's loss 
ratios; and 
• There is a rate change of 15 percent between the two review peri-
ods. 
The following loss ratio formula is used in this example to calculate 
the rate level indication: 
TxF 
I = ELR (X x D x L x C + (1 - C) x B) - 1 (ll) 
where I is the rate level indication; X is the insurer's on-leveled but 
untrended and undeveloped loss ratio; D is the loss development fac-
tor; L is the loss adjustment expense factor; C is the credibility; B is 
the untrended Bureau loss ratio; T is the trend factor; F is the flexible 
rating factor (such as rate deviation and schedule rating); and ELR is 
the expected loss ratio. 
Table 3 lists all the values assumed for these rating factors in the 
two reviews and the resulting prior and current review indications. 
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Table 3 
Review Data for Example 2 
Factors Prior Current 
(xt> (Xt+l) 
X 0.4200 0.4400 
D 1.3500 1.3750 
L 1.1500 1.1480 
C 0.8500 0.9000 
B 0.6300 0.6500 
T 1.1910 1.3310 
F 1.0200 1.0100 
ELR 0.7200 0.7050 
I 0.0946 0.3159 
Both reviews use an exponential trend, but with different annual 
trend amounts: 6 percent for the prior review and 10 percent for the 
current review. The trending period for both reviews is the same, three 
years: from 7/1/90 to 7/1/93 for the prior review and from 7/1/91 to 
7/1/94 for the current review. Thus, the trend factor in the prior review 
was (1.06)3 = 1.1910, while in the current review it is (1.10)3 = 1.331. 
In addition, the overall indication change is 
D.I = 0.3159 - 0.0946 = 0.2213. 
Before applying the chain rule approach, several adjustments must 
be made to the indication formula given in equation (11). Adjustments 
are made to the following factors: rate on-level, trend, and loss devel-
opment. This is because these rating factors must be compared at the 
same point in time between the two reviews. Thus, adjustments are 
necessary if there have been any rate changes between reviews, differ-
ent trends are selected, or if the experience is evaluated on different 
maturity dates. 
One rating factor not considered in this example is the benefit chan-
ges between reviews. Similar to the rate change, the insurer's loss ratio 
and the Bureau's loss ratio reflect all benefit changes through the re-
views. Therefore, the adjustment for benefit change will impact the 
formula in essentially the same way as the adjustment for rate change, 
as discussed below. 
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4.2 Adjustment for Rate Change 
The insurer's loss ratios and the Bureau's loss ratios listed in Table 
3 reflect all rate changes through each review. Because there was a 15 
percent rate change between the two review periods, the loss ratios are 
inconsistent. One way to adjust for the rate change is to recalculate the 
loss ratios in the current review without the 15 percent rate change and 
add one more rating factor, R, for the rate change to equation (11). Let 
X' be the insurer's adjusted loss ratio and B' be the Bureau's adjusted 
loss ratio. Table 4 shows their values. 
Table 4 
Adjustment for Rate Change 
Factors Prior Current 
X' 0.4200 0.5060 
B' 0.6300 0.7475 
R 1.0000 1.1500 
Note: 0.4400 x 1.1500 = 0.5060 and 0.6500 x 1.1500 = 0.7475 
4.3 Adjustment for Trend 
The impact of trend on the rate indication can be split into two parts: 
the impact due to the trend amount and the impact due to the trend 
date. In this example, the annual trend amounts are different between 
the two reviews: 6 percent in the prior review and 10 percent in the 
current review. Also, the impact of the trend date must be evaluated 
separately because a more recent review will trend the on-level experi-
ence into a later effective date, which is one year later in this example. 
The trend date impact represents the increase in costs from the prior 
target average effective date to the current target average effective date. 
The overall trend impact can be broken into the trend amount im-
pact and the trend duration impact as follows: The average accident 
date (7/1/90) of the experience period in the prior review is used as the 
point in time to compare the trend impact between the two reviews. 
First the insurer's loss ratio and Bureau's loss ratio in the current re-
view are de trended backward from 7/1/91 to 7/1/90 using the 10 per-
cent trend amount. Next the trend amount impact for both reviews is 
defined from 7/1/90 to 7/1/93, which is 1.103 = 1.331 for the current 
review and 1.063 = 1.191 for the prior review. The difference between 
these two numbers is due to the different trend amounts used. Be-
cause the experience in the current review is trended one year beyond 
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the prior review (from 7/1/93 to 7/1/94) the trend date impact for the 
current review is defined as 1.10, while the trend date impact for the 
prior review is assumed to be 1.0. The trend date impact reflects the 
loss cost inflation from the prior target date to the current target date. 
Following the previous adjustment for the rate change in Table 4, we 
further adjust the indication formula for the trend impact as follows: 
let TA be the trend amount factor and IV be the trend date factor, then 
Table 5 
Adjustment for Trend 
Factors Prior Current 
X" 0.420 0.4600 
B" 0.630 0.6795 
TA 1.191 1.3310 
IV 1.000 1.1000 
Note: 0.5060/1.10 = 0.4600, and 0.7475/1.10 = 0.6795. 
4.4 Adjustment for Loss Development Factor 
In addition to the adjustments for rate change and trend, we need to 
ensure that the loss data in the prior and current reviews are evaluated 
as of the same maturity date. That is, X" and D must represent the 
experience and development factor of the same maturity between the 
two reviews. If not, an adjustment must be made to one of the reviews 
so that the two reviews are consistent. 
For example, assume that prior review data are 12 months matured, 
while current review data are 15 months matured. We can make an 
adjustment to the prior review by dividing the prior 12-to-ultimate fac-
tor into a 12-to-15 factor and a IS-ultimate factor. Then the prior ex-
perience is combined with the 12-to-15 factor. By doing so, the loss 
experience and development factors between the two reviews become 
comparable. In this workers' compensation example, however, the in-
surer's loss ratio and the Bureau's loss ratio between the two reviews 
are developed from the same maturity date to ultimate; thus, there is 
no need for this adjustment. 
4.5 Application of the Chain Rule Approach 
At this point, we have finished all the necessary adjustments, and 
we are ready to adjust equation (11) to reflect all of the adjustments 
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made thus far. 
[
TAXTDXF " "J I = R x ELR (X x D x L x C + (1 - C) x B ) - 1. (12) 
Table 6 summarizes the prior data and the current (adjusted) data 
needed for equation (12). It directly gives us Xt and ~Xt. From the 
equations for the partial derivatives, we can calculate T* and hence xi: 
Xt (0.42,1.35,1.15,0.85,0.63,1.191,1.0,1.02,1.0,0.72) 
~Xt (0.04,0.025, -0.002,0.05,0.0495,0.14,0.1, -0.01, 
0.15, -0.015) 
T* 0.50376 
x* t (0.4402,1.3626,1.1490,0.8752,0.6550,1.2615,1.0504, 
1.0150,1.0756,0.7124). 
Table 6 
Adjusted Review Data 
Factors Prior Current Change 
Xt Xt+l ~Xt 
X" 0.4200 0.4600 0.0400 
D 1.3500 1.3750 0.0250 
L 1.1500 1.1480 -0.0020 
C 0.8500 0.9000 0.0500 
B" 0.6300 0.6795 0.0495 
TA 1.1910 1.3310 0.1400 
TD 1.0000 1.1000 0.1000 
F 1.0200 1.0100 -0.0100 
R 1.0000 1.1500 0.1500 
ELR 0.7200 0.7050 -0.0150 
I 0.0946 0.3159 0.2213 
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Table 7 
Chain Rule Results 
Factors MIF Impact 
X" 2.4049 0.0962 
D 0.7768 0.0194 
L 0.9212 -0.0018 
C 0.0599 0.0030 
B" 0.2191 0.0108 
TA 0.9528 0.1334 
TD 1.1443 0.1144 
F 1.1843 -0.0118 
R -1.1175 -0.1676 
ELR -1.6871 0.0253 
Total 0.2213 
5 Summary 
The chain rule approach has been introduced in this paper to recon-
cile two rate level indications that have been made at different rate re-
view periods. This approach individually estimates the impact of each 
rating factor on the overall indication change. Unlike the sequential 
replacement approach, the chain rule approach does hot depend on a 
sequence of estimation. This paper further indicates evaluating partial 
derivatives at the mid-point between the prior and current reviews pro-
vide a close approximation to the overall indication change. A workers' 
compensation example is given to show how to adjust the rate level in-
dication formula for trend, loss development, and any rate and benefit 
changes between two reviews. 
Although the main body of the discussion focuses on the loss ratio 
method, the developed chain rule approach can be applied equally to 
the pure premium method, such as the pure premium formula noted 
by McClenahan (1990, Chapter 2): 
RT = (PP + FE)/(l - VE) 
where RT is the indicated rate per unit of exposure; PP is the trended 
and developed pure premium per unit of exposure; FE is the fixed ex-
pense per unit of exposure; and VE is the variable expense per unit of 
exposure. 
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While the loss ratio method develops the indicated percent change 
in the rate, the pure premium method develops the indicated rate. The 
PP term in the above formula can be subdivided into loss development 
and trend factors. The subsequent procedure to estimate the impact 
of each factor on the change in the indicated rate remains the same as 
described earlier in this paper. 
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Tax Assistance to Qualified Retirement Savings 
Plans: Deferral or Waiver? 
Robert L. Brown* 
Abstract 
There exist significant tax incentives for retirement savings plans in Canada 
and the United States. Qualified employer and employee contributions, within 
limits, are tax deductible to the employer and nontaxable to the employee. 
Also, investment income is not taxed until taken. On the other hand, monies 
received from funds having such tax incentives are taxable in full as income to 
the recipient when taken. This paper analyzes the two tax advantages of qual-
ified retirement savings plans: the tax deductibility of contributions and the 
nontaxation of investment income until it has been distributed. The algebraic 
analysis shows that the deductibility of contributions represents a deferral of 
tax, but that it does not create any permanent loss of revenue to the govern-
ment. On the other hand, the algebra indicates that there is a permanent tax 
subsidy associated with the deferred taxation of investment income. 
Key words and phrases: tax deductions, savings vehicle, contributions, accumu-
lated value 
1 Introduction 
Canadian and United States laws provide significant tax incentives 
for individuals to save for retirement through qualified vehicles. There 
are two tax incentives provided in the United States and Canada. 
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1. Employer contributions to qualified plans are tax deductible to the 
employer and nontaxable to the employee. For employees and in-
dividuals saving for retirement through qualified vehicles, their 
contributions, within limits, are also tax deductible (e.g., IRAs, 
401(k) plans in the United States and RRSPs in Canada 1 ). 
2. For these qualified plans, the investment income earned on the 
pension funds is not taxable until it is paid out. Income derived 
from these funds, however, is fully taxable to the individual who 
receives it. 
What is the value of these tax incentives? In particular, do these incen-
tives effectively result in deferred taxes, or is the outcome a waiver of 
taxes?2 
It often is stated that these incentives represent only tax deferral 
and are not a tax expenditure or permanent tax subsidy. For example, 
Johansen (1993) states: 
But when the plan starts paying out benefits, the recipients 
will have to pay the appropriate income tax on those ben-
efits. So the tax-exempt status of qualified pension plans 
creates a tax deferral-not a tax expenditure. 
Similarly, in a discussion of Aitken's (1991) paper that claims there 
is a permanent tax subsidy implicit in the nontaxation of the annual 
investment income earnings, Flanagan (1991) states: 
One does not need to be an actuary to realize that the au-
thor's fundamental point is flawed. There is tax on the in-
vestment income accumulating in a registered plan, but the 
tax on the investment income, like the tax on the principal, 
is deferred until the payout period. 
The objective of this paper is to review the two tax incentives (cited 
earlier) that are provided to retirement savings vehicles and to deter-
mine algebraically whether such incentives are essentially tax deferrals 
or if they result in a tax waiver. The paper also will present a summary 
of the tax advantages associated with alternative savings vehicles. It is 
IThis is not meant to be an exhaustive list. Any plan with these tax advantages is 
meant to be included, such as some profit sharing plans. 
2In this paper, the term tax deferral means that for that particular tax provision the 
accumulated value of the taxes paid is the same with or without the prOvision. Note 
that the deferral still may be viewed as advantageous. If the accumulated value of the 
taxes paid with the provision is smaller than that paid without the provision, however, 
then the provision results in a tax waiver. 
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well known (and obvious) that for persons who expect to be in a lower 
tax bracket after retirement than before retirement (which often is ex-
pected), there are permanent tax advantages to using qualified savings 
vehicles to save for retirement. Thus, this paper will not investigate 
that particular aspect of the tax advantages. 
2 Advantage of Alternative Savings Vehicles 
What are the tax advantages associated with the ability to take a tax 
deduction for contributions made to a qualified vehicle? To explore 
this issue, the following notation is needed: T is the marginal tax rate; 
I is the gross investment rate of return (for all investments) per annum; 
i is the net rate of return per annum; C is the before tax contribution; 
and n is the time from contribution to withdrawal. 
To simplify the presentation, the following assumptions are made: 
1. T, I, C, and i are constant throughout the period under consider-
ation, n years. In addition, they do not vary by whether the fund 
is a qualified fund or not or whether the fund is private or public. 
2. The marginal tax rate is the same before and after retirement. 
3. The value of a tax incentive is defined to be the difference between 
the accumulated value of certain defined contributions without 
and with the tax incentive.3 
2.1 Tax Deductibility of Contributions 
What advantage is gained purely from the tax deductibility of con-
tributions? To determine this advantage, it will be assumed that the 
rate of return on the funds is the after-tax rate, so 
i=Ix(l-T). 
Table 1 shows that the after-tax accumulated incomes for qualified and 
nonqualified vehicles are equal (ignoring the effects of taxes on invest-
ment income). 
3Further possible investment or expenditure considerations are beyond the scope 
of the illustrations contained herein. 
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Table 1 
After-Tax Accumulations 
Qualified Vehicle Nonqualified Vehicle 
C C(1- T) 
Accumulated Value: C(1 + On C(1 - T)(1 + on 
C(1 - T)(1 + on After-tax Income: C(1 - T)(1 + i)n 
It is clear that the tax advantage associated with the deductibility of 
contributions is purely an advantage of tax deferral. If one's marginal 
tax rate is the same before and after retirement, then there is no per-
manent tax waiver or tax subsidy associated with the deductibility of 
contribu tions. 
2.2 Nontaxation of Investment Income 
Within the qualified vehicle, funds grow at a rate of I per annum. 
Income derived from these funds is taxed at the marginal rate, T, when 
disbursed. Within the nonqualified plan, funds will grow at rate i = 
I( 1 - T) per annum, but funds will not be taxed when taken out. 
Again, consider a before-tax contribution of $C within either a qual-
ified or nonqualified vehicle. For the qualified plan, the net receipt to 
the retiree is C(1 - T)(1 + I)n, while for the nonqualified plan it is 
C(1 - T)(1 + on. One must remember th.at the tax deductibility of the 
contribution provides no net gain and explains none of the difference 
between the two values above. Thus, the gain represented by the dif-
ference of the two values above can be categorized as coming from the 
difference in the taxation of investment income. That gain is: 
C(1 + I)n(1- T) - C(1- T)(1 + On = C(1 - T)[(1 + I)n - (1 + i)n]. 
As i = I(1 - T), it follows that i < I; there must be a net gain. A 
numerical example illustrates these points. You are given the following 
information: 
Before-tax contribution: C = $2,000 
Marginal tax rate: T = 40% 
Gross rate of return per annum: I= 7% 
Net rate of return per annum: i = 0.07(1 - 0.40) = 4.2% 
Time from contribution to withdrawal: n = 30 years. 
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Using a qualified vehicle, the retiree receives: 
$2,000(1.07)30(1 - 0.40) = $9,134.71. 
On the other hand, using a nonqualified vehicle yields the retiree: 
$2,000(1 - 0.40)(1.042)30 = $4,123.00. 
The net gain to the retiree by using the qualified fund is $5,011.71. But 
what is the source of this $5,Oll.71 gain? 
One must conclude that the $5,Oll.71 comes from a direct tax waiver 
or subsidy. To prove this assertion, look at the tax revenues that accrue 
in each situation. For the qualified fund, the government gets 
exT x (1 + I)n = $6,089.80 at time t = 30. 
In the nonqualified fund, however, the government gets exT = $800 
immediately which, at time t = 30, is worth: 
exT x (1 + I)n = $800(1.07)30 = $6,089.80. 
Thus, as proven before, there is no tax waiver or subsidy associated 
with the tax deductibility of contributions, only tax deferral. Under the 
nonqualified fund, however, the government receives additional taxes: 
the taxes on the yearly investment income on the fund. In this example, 
the accumulated value of this tax on annual investment income at time 
t = 30 is: 
t-l 
ex (1 - T) x T x I x L (1 + i)k(l + I)t-l-k = $5011.71. 
k=O 
That is, the gain to the retiree who uses a qualified fund is equal to the 
permanent tax revenue loss to the government under the assumptions 
given. 
The nontaxation of the investment income on the qualified fund un-
til taken as income clearly is a permanent tax waiver, not a tax deferral. 
3 Extensions 
The expressions for the tax impact on qualified pension funds, de-
rived in Section 2, can be adjusted to include other insurance and sav-
ings vehicles. The table below presents the tax effects in summary 
form. 
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Table 2 
The Effects of Taxes on Various Vehicles 
Vehicle Taxes? Frequency Rate of After-tax 
of Taxes Taxation Accumulation 
MF Yes Annually C-Gains [1 + 1(1 - gT)]n 
MMF Yes Annually Ordinary [1 + 1(1 - T)]n 
IP Yes Never Exempt (1 + I)n 
SPDA Yes Deferred Ordinary (1 + I)n(1 - T) + T 
PF No Deferred Ordinary (1 + I)n 
FC Yes Deferred C-Gains (1 + I)n(1 - gT) + gT 
MF = Mutual Funds; MMF = Money Market Funds; 
IP = Insurance Polices; SPDA = Single Premium Deferred Annuities; 
PF = Pension Funds; FC = Foreign Corporations; and 
C-Gains = Capital Gains; and gY = The capital gains tax rate. 
The follOwing is a brief description of the various savings vehicles. 
• Money Market Funds (MMF): This vehicle is the ordinary savings 
account. Deposits are not tax deductible, and investment income 
normally is taxed fully each year at ordinary tax rates. This is the 
least advantageous of the savings vehicles. 
• Mutual Funds (MF): These refer to those mutual funds that are 
not money market funds. Here depOSits are not tax deductible. 
Investment income is taxed at the capital gains tax rate, however, 
which is given in the table as rate gT. In the United States current 
tax rates for capital gains are subject to a 28 percent limitation, 
while there is no such limitation on ordinary income. Dividend 
and interest received by the mutual fund and capital gains realized 
by the mutual fund are taxable to shareholders annually. 
• Insurance Polices (IP): This category refers to those insurance 
poliCies that have achieved exempt status. While deposits ate not 
tax deductible, the earnings on the investment are entirely tax 
exempt. The gain on disposition is taxable in the hands of policy-
holders unless the proceeds are paid as a death benefit. Further, 
the insurance company pays some tax on its investment income. 
• Single Premium Deferred Annuities (SPDA): Deposits are not tax 
deductible, but the taxes on the investment income are deferred 
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until the policyholder takes the money out as income. The same 
applies to IRA contributions that are not deductible because the 
owners have income above certain limits specified by law. The 
value of this deferral is the same as in the qualified pension plan. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the United States eliminated the 
ability of corporations and partnerships to defer tax with single 
premium deferred annuities. Only individual investors can use 
SPDAs to defer tax on the investment income. Also there exists 
an excise tax of 10 percent if the SPDA is surrendered, in whole or 
in part, prior to age 59.5 unless the withdrawals take the form of 
a life annuity. Finally, the insurance company pays some tax on 
its investment income. 
• Pension Funds (PF): The tax advantages of qualified pension funds 
have been discussed in detail previously. When tax rates are con-
stant over time, insurance policies that are tax exempt are equiv-
alent to pension funds that are qualified. 
• Foreign Corporations (FC): Again, deposits are not tax deductible; 
however, the tax on the earnings is deferred and taxed at capital 
gains rates when the investment is liquidated. Examples include 
an investment in the common stock of an investment company 
located in a tax haven or bond investments held by corporations 
in tax havens.4 
When 9 = 0, mutual funds, foreign corporations, insurance policies, 
and pension funds are equivalent vehicles. When 9 = 1, investments in 
foreign corporations and single premium deferred annuities are equiv-
alent. 
In general, it is more accurate to list the accumulated value of the 
dollar invested in the qualified pension fund as [(1- Tn) / (1 - To)] (1 + 
I)n where Tn and To represent the marginal tax rates at the time of 
contribution (t = 0) and at the time of withdrawal (t = n). This paper 
assumes that these two tax rates are the same. But one would expect 
the marginal rate Tn to be slightly less than To which, as mentioned 
previously, provides a further tax advantage. 
4 A tax haven is a country or other political entity that offers outside businesses and 
individuals a climate of minimal or nonexistent taxation. In some cases, the low taxes 
apply not only to those levied by the tax haven itself, but also to the possibility of 
reducing or avoiding taxes levied in the investor's home country (Scott, 1988, p. 353). 
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4 Conclusions 
This paper has looked at the tax incentives provided in several sav-
ings vehicles and qualified pension funds in particular. The paper has 
shown that the tax advantage associated with the deductibility of tax 
contributions is one of tax deferral, but not tax avoidance or permanent 
tax waiver. On the other hand, the paper shows that the tax advan-
tage associated with the nontaxation of investment income on qualified 
funds until taken is a tax waiver or tax subsidy from the government to 
participants of qualified plans. 
Further public policy debate on the impact of tax concessions is 
needed. The author hopes that this paper will spark such a debate and 
assist in an intelligent discussion. 
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